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Introduction 
 
“From the great secular games celebrated by Philip to the death of the emperor Gallienus, 
there elapsed twenty years of shame and misfortune. During that calamitous period, every in-
stant of time was marked, every province of the Roman world was afflicted, by barbarous in-
vaders and military tyrants, and the ruined empire seemed to approach the last and fatal mo-
ment of its dissolution.”1 
Thus Edward Gibbon on the years between 248 and 268,2 a period which has since antiquity 
itself been seen as one of the darkest times in the history of the Roman Empire. Our scant 
literary sources for the period speak of enormous political and military upheaval, and for a 
long time modern authors have followed them, adding widespread economic dislocation to 
the list of evils. It is common to speak of the ‘third-century crisis’,3 and while the years dis-
cussed by Gibbon are often seen as its lowest point, for many the ‘crisis’ only ended in 284. 
 It was in that year that Diocletian became emperor. He reformed the empire to com-
bat the problems of the ‘crisis’, most notably by appointing imperial colleagues to make gov-
erning the empire more manageable. This system, with two senior augusti and two junior 
caesares, is known as the tetrarchy. Most authors have recognised that this period also had 
its problems, particularly the various internal conflicts that started shortly after Diocletian’s 
abdication in 305 and did not end until 324 when only one contestant, Constantine, was left 
standing.4 Nevertheless, this era, often called the ‘tetrarchic era’, has been contrasted with 
the ‘crisis’ that preceded it as a time of imperial recovery and renewed vitality. 
 However, times change, and views on historical periods change with them. Just how 
much of a ‘crisis’ the third century was is currently the subject of much debate. Some argue 
that the traditional view needs to be heavily nuanced, sometimes even implying that there 
was never anything resembling a crisis at all. But others point to the basic events transmitted 
by the sources to show that there were in fact many things wrong back then. In recent years, 
                                                          
1 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (J. B. Bury ed., London 1897-1900) 1: 237. 
2 All dates are AD unless listed otherwise. 
3 The term ‘crisis’ has become controversial recently, as will become obvious from the rest of this introduction. 
But whatever position one takes, there is no denying that the period was far more tumultuous than what came 
before, and should be described by its own term. My solution is to always put ‘crisis’ in parentheses and use 
the term only in a descriptive manner (i.e. to describe the 249-284 timeframe). It thus owes much to the ap-
proach to the even more controversial term ‘Romanisation’ outlined in G. Woolf, Becoming Roman. The Origins 
of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge 1998), 4-7. I follow the same method with the term ‘barbarians’. 
4 See e.g. Gibbon (Bury ed. 1897-1900) 1: 394. 
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several authors have also carefully suggested that the view of the tetrarchic period as a time 
of restoration perhaps puts too much faith in the propaganda of Diocletian’s government, 
although this line of thought has yet to be pursued thoroughly. 
 But what is especially striking is the strict demarcation that most historians, regard-
less of their views on these two periods, maintain between both eras at 284, something that 
is especially obvious in standard reference works like the Cambridge Ancient History and the 
recent Edinburgh History of Ancient Rome. There are some exceptions, but they are few.5 
While the long-standing magical reputation of this date makes such a decision understanda-
ble even for historians who view its significance critically, it does have the unfortunate con-
sequence that thorough comparisons between the ‘crisis’ and the tetrarchic era remain rare, 
despite the valuable insights that these might produce. Such a comparison is therefore ex-
actly what I will aim to do here, in order to cast a new perspective on the debate surround-
ing the ‘crisis’ and give a push towards more discussion on the era of Diocletian and Con-
stantine. 
 The main drive will thus be comparative history. The specific kind of comparison un-
dertaken here will be a diachronic variation-finding comparison: a comparison where two 
successive periods within in a single overarching phenomenon (the Roman Empire) will be 
contrasted.6 In addition, we will look at the way in which previous authors have written 
about these two eras, in order to see how their opinions have shaped the general views on 
these times. We will therefore also be dealing with comparative historiography.7 
 The timeframe of the second period is easily set: it will start with the accession of the 
tetrarchy’s founder Diocletian in 284 and end with Constantine’s final victory in 324 , which 
                                                          
5 A. K. Bowman, A. Cameron and P. Garnsey eds., The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. XII: The Crisis of Empire, 
AD 193-337 (Cambridge 2005) (henceforth CAH XII) notably has a single chapter on the ‘crisis’-years of 235 to 
284, followed by two separate chapters for the first tetrarchy (284-305) and the rise and reign of Constantine 
(306-337). The Edinburgh series also chooses 284 as the point where one book in the series stops and another 
one begins. Thus, we have C. Ando, Imperial Rome AD 193 to 284: the critical century (Edinburgh 2012); and 
then J. Harries, Imperial Rome AD 284-363: the new empire (Edinburgh 2012). For exceptions, see M. Christol, 
L’Empire Romain du IIIe siècle. Histoire politique, 192-325 après J.-C. (Paris 1997), who works with the idea of 
the ‘long third century’ (spanning the dates that appear in the title), and D. S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay, 
AD 180-395 (London/New York 2004), who has separate chapters for the worst of the ‘crisis’, 238 to 260 (p. 
217-262), the period of recovery, 260 to 300 (p. 263-298), the end of the first tetrarchy and the rise of Constan-
tine, 300 to 313 (p. 333-365), and finally Constantine’s reign, 313 to 337 (p. 364-400). 
6 See S. Berger, ‘Comparative history’ in: S. Berger, H. Feldner and K. Passmore eds., Writing History: Theory 
and Practice (London 2003) 161-179, for a useful introduction to the various kinds of comparative history. 
7 For a clear statement regarding the importance of comparative historiography, see C. Lorenz, ‘Comparative 
Historiography: Problems and Perspectives’ History and Theory 38 (1999) 1, 25-39, esp. 28-29, although his 
emphasis is on a transnational approach rather than the diachronic one undertaken here. 
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left only one augustus standing and thus meant the final end of Diocletian’s system. Where 
to start and end with the ‘crisis’, however, is more difficult to say. While many authors (in-
cluding Gibbon, as we saw above) place the start of the recovery as early as Gallienus’ death 
in 268, with the reign of Aurelian (270-275) being singled out as especially significant, in re-
cent years there is more emphasis on the fact that although the crisis should have ended 
then, it actually went on.8 Given this newfound interest in the period 268-284 as a time of 
continued crisis, I have chosen to end the first period at 284 to involve this historiographical 
development in the discussion. In addition, I have chosen to start in 249 with the accession 
of the emperor Decius rather than earlier in the third century because even those who view 
the period pessimistically agree that the ‘crisis’ did not really gather steam until that point.9 
 In terms of the structure of my account, my approach owes much to the model de-
veloped and used by esteemed authors like A. H. M. Jones, Peter Brown and most recently 
Stephen Mitchell in their works on late antiquity: to start with a brief narrative section in 
order to establish a chronological framework and introduce the key players, followed by a 
series of thematic chapters that offer a more in-depth analysis on their subjects. Sadly, a 
(comparative) discussion of the third century is lacking in these books, which is where my 
contribution will distinguish itself.10 
 I will investigate the three main strands of Roman imperial history in these periods: 
the attacks of foreign enemies, internal strife and the economy, with a particular focus on 
coinage. Social and demographic developments will not receive separate chapters, but as 
they are to a greater or lesser extent intertwined with the three main topics, they will be 
discussed as well. Matters such as administrative, legal, cultural, intellectual and religious 
history will be excluded; not because they are not important, but because there is simply not 
enough space to do all these complex topics justice. Throughout the three main chapters I 
                                                          
8 The traditional view is visible in the increasing optimism present in Christian writings produced around 270. 
See G. Alföldy, ‘The crisis of the third century as seen by contemporaries’ Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 
15 (1974) 89-111, 97-98. For matching modern views, see e.g. A. Watson, Aurelian and the third century (Lon-
don 1999), 7; Potter (2004) 262. The most notable example of the more critical approach can be found in J. F. 
Drinkwater, ‘Maximinus to Diocletian and the “crisis”’ in: CAH XII (2005) 28-66, 60-62. 
9 Christol (1997) 119-121; L. de Blois, ‘Monetary policies, the soldiers pay and the onset of crisis in the first half 
of the third century AD’ in: P. Erdkamp ed., The Roman army and the economy (Amsterdam 2002), 90-107; 
Ando (2012) 146. 
10 A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey (London 
1964); P. Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad (London 1971); S. Mitchell, 
A History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284-641: The Transformation of the Ancient World (Oxford 2007). It 
should, however, be noted that Jones and Brown do include the third century ‘crisis’ in their narrative section. 
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will attempt to answer my main research question: how do the third-century ‘crisis’ and the 
tetrarchic period compare?  But first, it is necessary look at the ancient sources and modern 
studies that form the foundation of my own work. 
 
Sources 
Unfortunately, the ancient material, especially as far as the crisis is concerned, is rather 
scarce. There are several categories of evidence: literary, epigraphical, papyrological, nu-
mismatic and archaeological, each with their own advantages. But each category also has its 
own problems. We will start with the literary sources, for while it is undoubtedly true that 
they only represent a very limited viewpoint and that their narratives are subject to distor-
tion in a way that the other categories usually are not, they also provide the kind of details 
that are rarely found in other sources. 
 By far the most voluminous writings from our timeframe originate from Christian 
bishops. For the ‘crisis’, the most notable author is Cyprian, bishop of Carthage between 
248/249 and his death by persecution in 260, who has left a voluminous corpus of letters 
and treatises. For the tetrarchy, we have Eusebius of Caesarea, where he was bishop from 
about 314 to his death around 340. He is the author of the first universal Historia Ecclesiasti-
ca (church history) and he also wrote, among other things, the Vita Constantini (life of Con-
stantine), a naturally very favourable biography of the first Christian emperor.11 As both men 
were understandably mostly concerned with church matters, the information provided on 
secular history is limited, although still important. Eusebius gains some additional use by his 
practice of frequently inserting seemingly genuine documents into his narrative.  
In terms of non-Christian sources, the number of contemporary authors from the lat-
ter half of the third century is very small. We have the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, which de-
scribes the events of 238 to 260 in the manner of a prophecy, and it is an invaluable source. 
But its Syrian authors were mostly interested in what was happening in their own surround-
ings, and did not care much for the rest of the empire. In addition, the section that covers 
the years 255 to 260, which appears to be a later (though still contemporary) inclusion, is 
                                                          
11 All of Cyprian’s letters and treatises are available in the fifth volume of A. Roberts, J. Donaldson and A. C. 
Coxe eds., The Ante-Nicene Fathers: translations of the writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325 (Buffalo 1885-
1896); for Eusebius, I have used the Loeb edition of his church history (K. Lake and J. E. L. Oulton eds., The ec-
clesiastical history (London/Cambridge 1926-1932); and for his biography of Constantine I have used A. Camer-
on and S. G. Hall eds., Life of Constantine (Oxford 1999). 
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very brief.12 Aside from the Oracle, there are only two main sources for the latter half of the 
third century written by contemporaries, with the ‘Kaisergeschichte’ primarily informing the 
Latin historical tradition, and Dexippus of Athens dominating the Greek tradition.  
 While the ‘Kaisergeschichte’ itself, which appears to have covered both of our peri-
ods but only presented a relatively short narrative, has not survived, it has been mostly pre-
served through the very similar narratives by two major civil servants from the fourth centu-
ry: Sextus Aurelius Victor’s De Caesaribus (on the Caesars, running from 27 BC to AD 361) 
and Eutropius’ Breviarium (abbreviated account) of Roman history from the founding of the 
city to the death of the emperor Jovian in 364. Victor, who wrote on his own account, was 
fond of adding moralising interludes, while Eutropius, who wrote his popular history on the 
orders of emperor Valens (r. 364-378), tended to stay sober and brief.  
A source often associated with Victor is the so-called Epitome de Caesaribus 
(abridgement of ‘the Caesars’), whose unknown late fourth-century author (usually called 
Pseudo-Victor or the Epitomator) provides a briefer narrative of our timeframe but nonethe-
less has some independent information, although this must be used with caution. Finally, the 
last great Latin historian Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 325-395) may also have used this 
source; although his Res Gestae (history) only survives from 353 onwards, he makes a few 
useful references to earlier periods.13 
 Another source that appears to have used the ‘Kaisergeschichte’ is the Historia Au-
gusta (Augustan history, henceforth abbreviated as HA). It presents what is by far the fullest 
narrative of the third century ‘crisis’ (except for the years 244-258, which are missing from 
the manuscript), but unfortunately it is deeply problematic. While purporting to be the work 
of six authors writing in the tetrarchic period (on which it provides no information, as the 
work ends in 284), it is more likely to be the work of one person from the late fourth centu-
ry. This author, who, much like us, found himself with few sources, decided to fill the gaps 
with additional information produced from his own considerable imagination. The result has 
                                                          
12 The best edition of the Oracle is that of D. S. Potter, Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire 
(Oxford 1990), which also has a translation and commentary, as well as a general analysis of the third century. 
13 Victor and Eutropius are both available in translation; see H. W. Bird ed., Aurelius Victor: De Caesaribus (Liv-
erpool 1994); and idem ed., Eutropius: Breviarium (Liverpool 1993); both books also include an introduction to 
the ‘Kaisergeschichte’. For quotations I have used P. Dufraigne ed., Livre des Césars (Paris 1975) and F. L. Müller 
ed., Eutropius, Kurze Geschichte Roms seit Grundung (753 v Chr-364 n Chr). Einleitung, Text und Ubersetzung 
(Stuttgart 1995). For the Epitome I have used the translation of T. Banchich that is available online at 
http://www.luc.edu/roman-emperors/ (accessed on 30-05-2014). For Ammianus I have used the Loeb edition: 
J. C. Rolfe ed., Ammianus Marcellinus (London/Cambridge 1935-1939). 
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to be read in order to be believed. That it must nevertheless be mined for the few genuinely 
useful bits that it contains shows just how poor the state of our third-century source materi-
al is.14 
 The works of Dexippus, one of the foremost citizens of Athens, appear to have been 
more extensive than the ‘Kaisergeschichte’, but unfortunately only fragments survive of his 
Scythica (a work about Rome’s third-century wars with the peoples from across the Danube) 
and Chronike Historia (a thousand-year history which ended at 270).15 However, he has been 
the main informant of three Byzantine accounts that have come down to us. The first of 
these is the Historia Nova (new history) of Zosimus, a violently anti-Christian official. 
  Zosimus’ history, intended to show how the adoption of Christianity led to the decay 
of the Roman Empire, was written around 500. His narrative of the third century up to about 
270 uses Dexippus and possibly other unidentified sources, while the section of his work that 
runs from there to 404 preserves information from the otherwise also mostly lost history of 
the equally anti-Christian author Eunapius of Sardes, who wrote a continuation of Dexippus’ 
history in the early fifth century. Zosimus’ narrative is often muddled, his religious stance 
heavily distorts his treatment of Constantine, and his narrative of the period 282-304 is miss-
ing entirely. That his account is nonetheless our best source for the period of ‘crisis’ is yet 
another sign of just how bad things are with regard to sources.16 
 The second Byzantine author is George Syncellus, a monk who wrote his Ekloge 
chronographias (extract of chronography) in the early ninth century, but while it was intend-
ed to cover all of history he only got as far as the accession of Diocletian before he died. His 
sections on secular history are brief, but preserve some information from Dexippus. Our 
third and final author is John Zonaras, a twelfth-century politician (and later monk) who 
wrote the Epitome ton Historion (extracts of history), a universal history stretching from the 
Creation until his own time. Despite its late date of composition, it preserves useful data 
from Dexippus and other lost authors about both periods covered in this thesis.17 
                                                          
14 For the text and translation of the HA, see D. Magie ed., The Scriptores Historiae Augustae (Lon-
don/Cambridge 1922-1932); the best introduction to the many problems posed by the text remains R. Syme, 
Emperors and biography: studies in the ‘Historia Augusta’ (Oxford 1971), 281-290.  
15 The surviving fragments are available with a German translation in G. Martin ed., Dexipp von Athen (Tübing-
en 2006). 
16 For Zosimus, I have used the English translation of R. T. Ridley, Zosimus: New History (Canberra 1982), and F. 
Paschoud, ed., Zosime: Histoire Nouvelle (Paris 1971) for quotations. 
17 For Syncellus, see W. Adler and P. Tuffin eds., The Chronography of George Synkellos: a Byzantine Chronicle 
of Universal History from the Creation (Oxford 2002); the relevant section of Zonaras’ work is available in E. N. 
9 
 
 The tetrarchic period is somewhat better served, as it has three literary sources of its 
own. First, there are the Panegyrici Latini, a collection of speeches delivered in praise of em-
perors by Gallic orators to various Roman emperors between 289 and 389 (a speech deliv-
ered by Pliny the Younger to Trajan in the early second century is also included). Several 
speeches are essential sources for early tetrarchic history, not just for what they say, but 
also for what they omit. Second is Lactantius, a Christian rhetorician who was a contempo-
rary of the tetrarchy and wrote a treatise called De Mortibus Persecutorum (on the death of 
the persecutors), a scathing attack on all emperors who persecuted Christians, with a focus 
on the period 300-313. While is by far our most extensive source for that period, his reliabil-
ity is highly controversial. The varying degrees of criticism applied to the De Mortibus have 
resulted in widely varying modern narratives of Diocletian’s reign. Finally, we have the Origo 
Constantini Imperatoris (rise of the emperor Constantine), which, as the name implies, de-
scribes Constantine’s rise to supreme power. While the work as we have it is of a fairly late 
date (around 400), it appears to have been informed by reliable contemporary sources.18 
 The other categories of sources can be dealt with more briefly. Inscriptions are usual-
ly short and as such tend to provide little information, but they are often our only sources 
for comparatively minor events that are not mentioned in the literary accounts. Unfortu-
nately, there is a sharp decline in the number of surviving inscriptions from the mid-third 
century onward, which may or may not be a sign of crisis itself.19 One inscription deserves to 
be singled out as a source: The Res Gestae Divi Shaporis (henceforth abbreviated as RGDS), a 
trilingual inscription detailing the deeds of the highly successful Sassanid monarch Shapur I 
(r. 240-270). It provides a rare non-Roman perspective on Imperial history.20 A problem with 
the epigraphical material is that its information may only relate to a specific region rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Lane and T. Banchich eds., The History of Zonaras: From Severus Alexander to the Death of Theodosius the 
Great (London/New York 2008). 
18 For the Panegyrics, see C. E. V. Nixon and B. S. Rodgers eds., In praise of later Roman emperors: the Panegyri-
ci Latini (Berkeley 1994). The most recent edition and translation of the De Mortibus is that of J. L. Creed, Lac-
tantius: De Mortibus Persecutorum (Oxford 1984). For two widely varying assessments of Lactantius’ veracity, 
see, on the one hand, T. D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge 1981) 12-14 (“He deserves to be be-
lieved”); and on the other hand, F. Kolb, Diocletian und die Erste Tetrarchie: Improvisation oder Experiment in 
der Organisation monarchischer Herrschaft? (Berlin 1987) 133 (“da kann man Lactantius nur sehr frägwurdige 
Qualitäten als Historiker zuschreiben”). The Origo is included in S. N. Lieu and D. Montserrat eds., From Con-
stantine to Julian: Pagan and Byzantine Views (London 1996), with J. Stevenson providing the translation. 
19 That it is a sign of crisis has recently been argued by De Blois (2002) 105; but see C. Witschel, Krise – Rezes-
sion – Stagnation? Der Westen des römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. (Frankfurt 1999) 65-84 for a 
sharply contradictory opinion. 
20 For the RGDS, see R. N. Frye, The History of Ancient Iran (Munich 1983), app. 4. 
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than the empire as a whole.21 This is an even more valid concern with the papyrological evi-
dence, which survives in reasonably large quantities, but only in Egypt. Moreover, while pa-
pyri are an important source for the economic side of the story they are not that informative 
about the other aspects covered in this thesis. 
 One kind of source that has survived in abundance from this period is coinage. This 
numismatic evidence is an essential tool for determining the period’s chronology and con-
firming the existence of usurpers mentioned in other sources. But most importantly, the 
varying degrees of purity of these coins have allowed numismatist to track the increasing 
debasement of the Roman coinage. Finally, the images displayed upon the coins tell us about 
the messages that the issuing emperor wanted his subjects to get. But using these images to 
reconstruct the events of the period should be attempted only if no alternative is possible; 
unfortunately, this is often the case.22 Coins have frequently been found in hoards; this too 
may or may not be a sign of crisis.23 
 The final category is archaeology. While this has much to offer in theory, in practice 
the material is often difficult to interpret. For instance, the remains of a burned house would 
appear to be clear proof of a raid by ‘barbarians’, but it is just as possible that the house 
caught fire from an entirely unrelated cause. It many cases it is impossible to move beyond 
attempts at confirming information found in other sources, but archaeology can neverthe-
less provide an alternative perspective in some instances.24  
All in all, it can certainly be said that our sources for this period, particularly the ‘cri-
sis’, are paltry. Nevertheless, previous authors have succeeded in reconstructing much of 
this timeframe, and we will now turn to their views upon it. 
 
Historiography 
The lack of source material for much of the third century is naturally easily connected to the 
view of this period as a time of ‘crisis’. This was done by A. H. M. Jones, who described the 
half century running from 238 to 285 as “in both senses of the word one of the darkest of 
the empire”. But he also remarked that “defective though our information is, it is abundantly 
clear that the period was profoundly troubled”. The empire was wracked by both foreign 
                                                          
21 Witschel (1999) 60-65. 
22 A good example of this method is P. Casey, Carausius and Allectus: The British usurpers (London 1994).  
23 The view that they indicate a crisis has once again been argued against by Witschel (1999) 94-99. 
24 See ibidem, 100-117, for a good summary of the problems that the archaeological material poses. 
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invasions and internal conflicts, and the continual debasement of the coinage had disastrous 
consequences. While noting that things began to improve slowly in the 270’s, he maintained 
that “the condition of the empire nevertheless remained precarious in the extreme”.25  
 This was the modern orthodoxy on the ‘crisis’, and it remained in full force through-
out the 1970’s and 80’s. This is obvious from three of the foremost works of the time dealing 
with the third century. In his monograph on the emperor Gallienus (r. 260-268) Lukas de 
Blois described it as “a dark century indeed, with the time of Valerian and Gallienus being an 
absolute low”. In his The Roman Government’s Response to Crisis Ramsay MacMullen vividly 
sketched the various problems of the age, and how successive emperors sought to deal with 
them. And Fergus Millar’s monograph on the third-century Roman Empire once again singled 
out the reign of Valerian (254-260) as a period which “was marked by an endless series of 
disasters”.26 This view also remained common in the 1990’s. David Potter’s edition and 
translation of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle also includes a thorough examination of the 
problems that together formed the ‘crisis’, while Michel Christol has remarked in his refer-
ence work on the ‘long third century’ (192-337 that between 250 and 275 it would not have 
been odd to wonder whether the Roman empire would survive.27  
But a different trend also gained force at this time. A collection of archaeological sur-
veys of Western Europe in the third century published in 1981 already indicated that things 
were perhaps not quite as bad as the literary sources suggested. However, the first compre-
hensive attack on the idea of crisis was undertaken in 1993 by Karl Strobel, who mostly ar-
gued against the idea of a ‘crisis mentality’ present in the mind of contemporary authors, 
but also sought to nuance the view of the ‘crisis’ as a period of profound military and politi-
cal instability. While Strobel’s work did not garner much attention, the 1999 monograph of 
Christian Witschel on the Roman west in the third century would prove to be a key publica-
tion. After a thorough critique of all categories of source material, from which he concluded 
that all the evidence for any ‘crisis’ is highly problematic, he proceeded with a socio-
economic survey of various areas of West Europe in the third century, which led to much the 
                                                          
25 Jones (1964) 1: 23-36. 
26 L. de Blois, De Politiek van Keizer Gallienus (Amsterdam 1974), 17 (my translation); R. MacMullen, Roman 
government's response to crisis, AD 235-337 (New Haven 1976); F. Millar, The Roman Empire and its neighbours 
(London 1981), 50. 
27 Potter (1990); Christol (1997) 119-120. 
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same results as the 1981 archaeological surveys mentioned above. Witschel therefore ar-
gued that the ‘crisis’-model cannot be applied to the third century.28 
The response to Witschel’s monograph has been variable. Some authors have gone 
on to re-evaluate other aspects of the crisis, with Thomas Burns’ book on Rome’s dealings 
with the ‘barbarians’ being a particularly notable example.29 Others, such as De Blois and 
Wolf Liebeschuetz, have stressed that the many problems mentioned by our sources show 
that there actually must have been something like a ‘crisis’, and argue that attempting to 
deny this is unwise.30 But it seems as if most authors are now unsure what to do with the 
‘crisis’, and are content to state that there was a ‘crisis’ in terms of military and political 
events, but that things are more complex on the socio-economic level.31 
Tetrarchic historiography is less complex. Jones’ viewpoint was clear: “By his adminis-
trative, military and fiscal reforms Diocletian gave security and order to the empire.” The 
general tendency is exemplified by the biography of Diocletian written by Stephen Williams, 
which has as its general tenor that the reforms of the tetrarchs were a success and managed 
to end the ‘crisis’.32 Williams is not a professional historian, but three of the foremost books 
written on the subject in the last thirty-five years, those of Timothy Barnes, Frank Kolb and 
William Leadbetter, also seem to accept the general success of the tetrarchy.33 And while 
these authors are at least well aware of the fact that the tetrarchy had its own share of is-
sues and deal with these issues in their books, works that focus on specific aspects of the era 
often only pay cursory attention to them. The most notable example is Simon Corcoran, who 
blithely states in his The Empire of the Tetrarchs that the years after 293 were filled with 
military success, passing over the fact that Britain would be outside of Imperial authority 
until 296 and a war with Persia was won only after an initial severe defeat.34 Corcoran’s book 
                                                          
28 K. Strobel, Das Imperium Romanum im „3. Jahrhundert“: Modell einer historischen Krise? Zur Frage mentaler 
Strukturen breiterer Bevölkerungsschichten in der Zeit von Marc Aurel bis zum Ausgang des 3. Jh. n. Chr. 
(Stuttgart 1993); Witschel (1999). The surveys appeared in A. King and M. Henig eds., The Roman West in the 
third century: contributions from archaeology and history (Oxford 1981).  
29  T. S. Burns, Rome and the barbarians, 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 (Baltimore 2003). 
30 De Blois (2002); W. Liebeschuetz, ‘Was there a crisis of the third century?’ in: O. Hekster, G. de Klein and D. 
Slootjes eds., Crises and the Roman Empire (Nijmegen 2007) 11-20. 
31 E.g. Hekster (2008) 82-86; Ando (2012) 13-15, 224-229. 
32 Jones (1964) 1: 67; S. Williams, Diocletian and the Roman recovery (London 1985); the title itself is, of course, 
also telling. 
33 Barnes (1981), which had the same author’s The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge 1982) 
as a companion piece; Kolb (1987); W. L. Leadbetter, Galerius and the will of Diocletian (London 2009). 
34 S. Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government, AD 284-324 (Oxford 
1996), 5-6. 
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is about tetrarchic law and government rather than the events of the time, so it is under-
standable that he has provided only a superficial narrative, but it is just such statements that 
keep the idea of the tetrarchy as mostly a success alive. I feel that this is unfortunate, for 
while it would be difficult to argue that the tetrarchic period was in no way an improvement 
compared to the ‘crisis’ that preceded it, I do think that the common overly optimistic stance 
towards the era needs adjusting. 
There have, however, been some dissenting voices. As early as 1997 Christol already 
argued against placing too much trust in the restoration ideology of the tetrarchs. More re-
cently, Roger Rees has also pushed for a re-evaluation of the tetrarchic period, and Adrian 
Goldsworthy has stressed that the establishment of the tetrarchy by no means meant the 
end of internal conflict. But none of these authors provide a thorough critique: Christol 
leaves it at his cautionary remarks, Rees states that a re-evaluation of the tetrarchy is un-
derway without providing any further information (or, indeed, sources), and Goldsworthy 
does not move beyond his point about internal warfare.35 Accordingly, in general the opti-
mistic view of the tetrarchy remains very much alive, and the recent focus on the negative 
aspects of the period 270-284 has only done more to make the tetrarchy seem better.36 
To sum up, it would appear that for both periods the traditional views, which hold 
that they are respectively a time of crisis and a time of restoration, have for a long time 
dominated and shaped the opinions of authors working on them. How much of a crisis the 
‘crisis’ really was is currently being debated, while a reconsideration of the restorative char-
acter of the tetrarchy has not really gotten underway yet. It is now time to move to my own 
analysis, with the establishment of a more detailed chronological framework being the first 
step.  
                                                          
35 Christol (1997) 206, 245-246; R. Rees, Diocletian and the Tetrarchy (Edinburgh 2004), 87-89; A. K. Golds-
worthy, How Rome Fell. Death of a Superpower (London/New Haven 2009), 158-159. 
36 See e.g. A. Demandt, ‘Diokletian als Reformer’ in: idem, A. Goltz and H. Schlange-Schöningen eds., Diokletian 
und die Tetrarchie. Aspekte einer Zeitenwende (Berlin 2004), 1-9, 1-2. 
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1. Narrative 
 
From Decius to Diocletian 
Our story begins with the death of a man named Marinus Pacatianus. He had set himself up 
as usurper in Moesia in late 248, but within a few months he had shared the fate of most 
who strove for absolute power in this period: he was murdered by his own soldiers. Philip, 
the reigning emperor, sent the distinguished senator Decius to Moesia with the assignment 
to punish Pacatianus’ supporters. But on arrival Decius found himself acclaimed as emperor 
by the soldiers, and near Verona his forces defeated the army of Philip, who perished in the 
battle.37 
 Decius would mostly be remembered for his edict in which he ordered all the inhab-
itants of the empire to sacrifice to the gods, which, whether this was Decius’ intention or 
not, would cause great harm to the Christian communities.38 But for our purposes the man-
ner in which he died is more important. Decius soon found himself having to take on in-
vaders, consistently called ‘Scythians’ by our sources, in the Danube provinces. A usurpation 
in Rome by a certain Julius Valens seems to have died down by itself, but things did not go as 
smoothly on the Danube. An initial defeat, in combination with the aid provided by the offi-
cial Lucius Priscus who made a failed bid to become emperor himself, allowed the ‘Scythians’ 
to take the city Philippolis. Decius engaged the retreating invaders near a place called Abrit-
tus in 251. The result was a crushing Roman defeat, with Decius himself falling in the fight.39 
 Decius was succeeded by his second-in-command Trebonianus Gallus, who found 
himself having to buy off the Goths. His biggest immediate problem was caused by an Anti-
ochene nobleman called Mariades,40 who had rebelled against Roman authority and was 
ravaging Syria. He soon joined forces with the Sassanid king Shapur, the result being a suc-
                                                          
37 Orac. Sib. XIII.79-80; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 28.10-11; Eutr., Brev. 9.3; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 28.2; Zos. 1.20.2-
22; Zon. 12.19. 
38 Orac. Sib. XIII.87-88; Lact., DMP 4; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 6.39-42; cf. George 445-452, mostly copying Eusebius 
but providing a far less favourable assessment of the Alexandrian theologian Origen, as does Zon. 12.20.  
39 Orac. Sib. XIII.100-105; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 29.2-5; Eutr., Brev. 9.4;  {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 29.1-3; Zos. 
1.23-24.1; George 459; Zon. 12.20. The Oracle, Zosimus and Zonaras claim that Decius was betrayed by his 
successor Gallus, but cf. Potter (1990) 45: “it is inconceivable that Roman soldiers would have supported a man 
who had sent their comrades to their deaths or that the surviving marshals could have supported him.” 
40 He is the subject of Orac. Sib. XIII.89-100; HA, Tyr. Trig. 2 (where he is called Cyriades), Mal. 12.26 and frag. 1 
of the anonymous Continuator of Dio (= M. H. Dodgeon and S. N. Lieu eds., The Roman Eastern Frontier and the 
Persian wars: a documentary history (London 1991), 51-53 no. 3.1.5) give additional information, but this 
should be used with caution. 
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cessful surprise attack on a Roman force concentrated at a place called Barbalissos. This was 
followed by a devastating Persian incursion into Roman territory, while the ‘Scythians’ plun-
dered the Danube provinces and Asia Minor in large numbers. The Oracle, Zosimus and 
Zonaras describe these events, concluding that Gallus’ reign was a period of massive catas-
trophes across the entire empire, with his indolence being to blame. But Aurelius Victor and 
Eutropius state that, other than a plague epidemic that is discussed more thoroughly by Cyp-
rian, nothing noteworthy happened at this time.41 We might therefore conclude that the 
military situation was grave in many of the eastern provinces, but that other parts of the 
empire only had the plague to worry about. 
 During the course of 253, the invaders were driven back. The Persians were repulsed 
by a militia originating from the Syrian city Emesa, with a local priest being declared emperor 
under the name Uranius Antoninus, while Aemilian, the governor of Moesia, managed to 
score a victory over the Goths. Aemilian was immediately declared emperor by his men, and 
as his forces prepared to do battle with those of Gallus the latter was slain together with his 
son and co-ruler Volusianus. Aemilian only ruled for a few months before suffering the same 
fate as Gallus when he had to go up against the army of the general Valerian, who had been 
collecting reinforcements from Gaul under orders from Gallus.42 
 Valerian, who now became emperor, made a firm attempt to restore order. He ap-
pointed his son Gallienus as colleague and gave him control over the west, while he set 
about to reassert Roman authority over the east – apparently not without success, as Urani-
us Antoninus disappears from the historical record at this point. Valerian’s attempt to force 
compliance with the rites of state from the Christians, whose refusal led to a direct persecu-
tion, should also be seen in this context. While Gallienus seems to have succeeded in keep-
                                                          
41 See, on the one hand, Orac. Sib. XIII.106-141; Zos. 1.24-27; Zon. 12.21; with RGDS l. 4-9 for Shapur’s account 
of the Sassanid attack; and on the other hand, Aur. Vict., De Caes. 30; Eutr., Brev. 9.5; Pseudo-Victor (30) does 
not even bother to record the epidemic; in fact, the chapter on Gallus is shorter than that on Aemillian, despite 
the fact that the former ruled for two years as opposed to a few months. George presents an oddity: he also 
claims (459) that there is nothing significant to say about Gallus, citing Dexippus, who would surely have rec-
orded the ‘Scythian’ invasions, as a source. Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. 6.1), claims that things were going well for 
Gallus until he began persecuting the Christians (there is no explicit proof that this ever happened, but Cyp., Ep. 
53 does express fear of the possibility). This provides the interesting suggestion that the aforementioned trou-
bles only began later in his reign, but the connection with his alleged persecution attempt means that this evi-
dence must be used cautiously. For the plague epidemic, see Cyp., De Mortalitate. 
42 Orac. Sib. XIII.142-146; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 31.1-2; Eutr., Brev. 9.6; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 31.1-2; Zos. 1.28-
29.1; George 465; Zon. 12.21-22. Uranius Antoninus is mostly known from his coins. He is also alluded to in 
Orac. Sib. XIII.147-154 and is the subject of the fantasy reported in Mal. 12.26; the inscriptions published in 
Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) 56 no. 3.2.3 may also refer to his victories. The essential study is H. R. Baldus, Uranius 
Antoninus: Münzprägung und Geschichte (Bonn 1971). 
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ing the western provinces reasonably tranquil throughout most of the 250’s, Valerian found 
himself unable to cope with more ‘Scythian’ raids across the Balkans and Asia Minor, as well 
as a concurrent Persian raid. The worst would come in 259 and 260. Although the precise 
chronology is deeply controversial, it is certain that throughout these two years the Rhine 
frontier was penetrated by large groups of ‘barbarian’ invaders (with one group even reach-
ing Italy), two of Gallienus’ generals, Ingenuus and Regalianus, successively rose against him 
in Pannonia, and Valerian’s plague-stricken army was mauled when the Sassanids began a 
new full-scale attack on the eastern provinces, with Valerian himself being taken prisoner. 
Finally, Postumus, the governor of Lower Germany, after a quarrel about the distribution of 
booty, formed his own separatist empire (killing Gallienus’ son Saloninus as he did so) that 
comprised Gaul, the German provinces, Britain and Spain.43 
 But things soon began to look up. Gallienus repulsed the ‘barbarians’ from Italy, his 
subordinate Aureolus restored order on the Balkans and the Persian advance was checked 
by the officials Macrianus and Callistus in conjunction with the local potentate Odaenathus 
of Palmyra. Macrianus and Callistus then made a bid for the empire through the two sons of 
the former, but Macrianus, who was marching west, was defeated and killed by Aureolus, 
while Gallienus convinced Odaenathus to take out Callistus. In return, Gallienus had to 
acknowledge Odaenathus as de facto ruler of the eastern provinces, but the latter always 
remained at least nominally loyal to the emperor and would score considerable successes 
against the Persians in the following years, supposedly even reaching their capital of Ctesi-
phon at one point. Relations were less cordial with Postumus, who managed to hold on to 
his power as two attempts by Gallienus to unseat him met with failure after initial success. 
The two emperors would remain in a permanent status of hostility, but Postumus never at-
tempted to take Rome, instead devoting his attention on keeping the peace within his own 
provinces. Indeed, between 262 and 265 the empire was peaceful enough for Gallienus to be 
able to devote himself to philosophy in Rome, something that would give rise to undeserved 
charges of laziness in the vehemently hostile Latin sources.44 
                                                          
43 Orac. Sib. XIII.155-161; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 32.3-33.8; Eutr., Brev. 9.7-9.9.1; Festus, Brev. 23.1; {Aur. Vict.}, 
Epit. de Caes. 32; Zos. 1.29.2-38.2; George 466; Zon. 12.23; with RGDS l. 9-16 for Shapur’s perspective on the 
Sassanid incursion; the ‘barbarian’ attack described by AE (1993) 1231 belongs to 260. For the persecution, 
rescinded by Gallienus shortly after becoming sole augustus, see Lact., DMP 5; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 7.10-13;  
44 Orac. Sib. XIII.162-171; Eutr., Brev. 9.9, 9.11.1; Festus, Brev. 23.2; Zos. 1.39; George 466-467; Zon. 12.23-24. 
For Gallienus’ supposed indolence, see especially Aur. Vict., De Caes. 33.15-16, as well as most of the Vitae of 
Gallienus and the ‘thirty pretenders’ in the HA. 
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 But this respite could not last. While a ‘Scythian’ raid in 266 in Asia Minor was still 
halted by Odaenathus, a massive attack that started in 267 and went on for several years 
caused widespread devastation in Greece. Gallienus arrived there in early 268 and scored 
some successes, but he was soon compelled to return to Italy after learning of the revolt of 
Aureolus. Gallienus managed to pin down his erstwhile general in Milan, but fell victim to a 
conspiracy that appears to have involved all his senior officers, with one of them, Claudius II, 
succeeding him. Aureolus either died during a sally or was killed by his own men.45 
Initially, Claudius scored some significant successes: he defeated a ‘barbarian’ inroad 
over the Rhine and, in 269, took on the still marauding ‘Scythians’ near Naissus in modern-
day Serbia, scoring a crushing victory. More good news came from the Gallic Empire, where 
Postumus had been murdered by his own men, with his successor Marius soon being bested 
by a man named Victorinus. As a result of these internal troubles parts of Gaul were recon-
quered by the central government, Spain defected back of its own accord and the city of 
Autun declared itself for Claudius. But Claudius could or would not help Autun, and Victori-
nus succeeded in asserting his control, having Autun ravaged when he retook it. Moreover, 
relations with Palmyra, where the murdered Odaenathus had been replaced by his wife Ze-
nobia as ruler, worsened at this time, leading to successful Palmyrene attacks on Arabia and 
Egypt. Claudius scored no further successes against the ‘Scythians’ before he died of the 
plague in 270. His brother Quintillus initially assumed the purple, but he soon killed himself 
(or was killed) at the approach of the preferred candidate of the army: Aurelian.46 
Aurelian had to tackle a number of issues during his first year in power. While the 
chronology is once again controversial, it is certain that he had to take on three separate 
‘barbarian’ incursions, one of which reached quite far into Italy, while there was also at least 
one pretender that rose against him, although order was quickly restored. There was also a 
revolt in Rome, which was probably related to the fear caused by the latest ‘barbarian’ in-
road, so Aurelian took several measures to appease the city’s population, most notably the 
start of the construction of the ‘Aurelian Wall’ around Rome.47  
                                                          
45 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 33.17-28; Eutr., Brev. 9.11.1; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 33.2; Zos. 1.40; George 466-467; 
Zon. 12.25. 
46 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 33.9-16, 34.1-5; Eutr., Brev. 9.9, 9.11-12; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 34; Zos. 1.41-47; Ge-
orge 469; Zon. 12.26. For the siege of Autun, see Pan. Lat. IX 4.1, V 4.2-3. 
47 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 35.2, 6-7; Eutr., Brev. 9.13.1, 9.14-9.15.1; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 35.2-4; Zos. 1.48-49; 
Zon. 12.27. 
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He then set about reuniting the empire, a difficult task that he nonetheless achieved 
within a few years. First, he went to the east, where he re-established Roman control 
through a combination of military might against the Palmyrene forces and pragmatic mild-
ness towards captured cities. Even Palmyra itself was initially treated with mildness, but 
when the city chose to revolt again Aurelian ordered it destroyed. After dealing with a new 
‘Scythian’ raid, which seems to have made him decide to give up the province Dacia for 
good, he turned his attention towards the Gallic Empire. There, Tetricus had replaced Victo-
rinus as emperor after the latter’s murder. Tetricus supposedly felt so threatened in his new 
job that he secretly arranged his surrender with Aurelian, whose army then slaughtered the 
Gallic forces. The empire was once again reunited, but Aurelian would have little time to 
enjoy his achievement. While marching towards Persia for a campaign in 275, he was assas-
sinated in a plot of some of his subordinates who had reason to fear his wrath.48 
Because Aurelian’s death had come so unexpectedly, no one of the members of his 
staff was prepared to put himself forward as emperor. This led to a brief period without an 
emperor, something that the Latin tradition (barring Eutropius) eagerly inflated into a six-
month senate-run interregnum. Eventually, the aged general Tacitus became emperor. He 
took on a new ‘Scythian’ invasion, seemingly not without success, but he died shortly after 
his accession, either by illness or by the hand of a group of soldiers who feared punishment 
because they had killed his kinsman, the governor of Syria. Tacitus was succeeded by his 
praetorian prefect (and possibly half-brother) Florian, but he soon had to contend with a 
rival candidate, Probus. While Florian seemed to have the upper hand at first, his army was 
struck by illness, and he was killed by his own men before it could come to a battle.49 
Probus’ reign, which lasted from 276 to 282, was dominated by various campaigns. 
He first went to Gaul, defeating some leftover Scythian raiders on the way. In the wake of 
the disappearance of the Gallic Empire various groups of ‘barbarians’ made attacks on the 
province, but Probus seems to have been successful in driving them back. He then went back 
to the east (possibly after a campaign around the Danube), where he had to put down bands 
of Isaurian raiders in Asia Minor, while one of his lieutenants put down a revolt in Egypt. 
Probus then began preparations for Aurelian’s stalled invasion of Persia, but the news of a 
                                                          
48 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 35.3-5, 7-9; Eutr., Brev. 9.13, 9.15.2; Festus, Brev. 24.1; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 35.2, 8, 
10; Zos. 1.50-62; George 470; Zon. 12.28.  
49 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.5-37.2; Eutr., Brev. 9.16; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 36; Zos. 1.63-64; George 471; Zon. 
12.29. For the most fanciful description of the ‘interregnum’, see (naturally) HA, Vit. Tac. 1-2. 
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new revolt, that of Proculus and Bonosus in Germany, forced him to return west. Saturninus, 
the governor of Syria, then put himself forward as a usurper, but he was soon killed by his 
own men. Probus defeated Proculus and Bonosus, while one of his subordinates quelled 
unrest in Britain. He then went to the Balkans, where he was killed by his own men. He had 
made himself unpopular by his stern enforcement of discipline and the forced employment 
of soldiers in agricultural projects, and the revolt of his praetorian prefect Carus may well 
have given the soldiers all the incentive they needed, leaving Carus free to assume power.50 
For the first time since Valerian and Gallienus, the new emperor had sons, and he 
immediately appointed them as caesares. The older son, Carinus, was left behind in Italy, 
while the younger son, Numerian, went along with his father as he set about on the long-
delayed expedition against the Persian Empire. The campaign went well, which undoubtedly 
owed much to the internal strife that the Sassanids had found themselves in since Shapur II’s 
death around 270. In 283 Carus reached Ctesiphon, and he may have even taken the city. 
But shortly afterwards he died, struck, as our sources would have it, by a divine thunderbolt; 
it is perhaps more reasonable to assume that he died either of illness or assassination. Cari-
nus and Numerian automatically succeeded their father, with the latter initiating the retreat 
from Persian territory. But at some point during the march he was murdered. The culprit 
was supposedly the praetorian prefect Aper, who tried to have himself elected as emperor. 
He failed, and was murdered in November 284 by the man who did become emperor, and 
who may have been the actual ringleader in the plot to assassinate Numerian: the guard 
tribune Diocles, who assumed the purple under the name Diocletian.51 
 
The rise and fall of the tetrarchy 
His first task was to take on Carinus. The two armies met at the river Margus (Great Morava) 
in modern-day Serbia in 285, Carinus having dispatched a pretender called Julianus along the 
way. Carinus seemed to have the upper hand, but in the midst of battle he was slain by his 
own prefect, supposedly for seducing the prefect’s wife. Diocletian almost immediately ap-
pointed his associate Maximian as caesar, and promoted him to full augustus within the next 
few years (when exactly this happened is deeply controversial and now impossible to deter-
                                                          
50 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 37.2-4; Eutr., Brev. 9.17; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 37; Zos. 1.65-71; George 471-472; Zon. 
12.30. 
51 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 38.1-39.1, 39.13; Eutr., Brev. 9.18.1-20.1; Festus, Brev. 24.2; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 
38.1-5, 39.1; George 472; Zon. 12.30. 
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mine). While Diocletian went off to campaign on the Danube, Maximian was sent to Gaul to 
deal with the ‘Bagaudae’, a group of marauding peasants. Maximian subdued the Bagaudae 
with ease and also repulsed a ‘barbarian’ raid across the Rhine. But these early successes 
where soon overshadowed by the revolt of Carausius.52 
Carausius was a naval officer in command of a fleet charged with protecting the Gallic 
and British coasts from sea-borne ‘barbarian’ raiders. He appears to have had some kind of 
quarrel with Maximian about the distribution of booty (which seems rather similar to what 
happened with Postumus), and when he heard that Maximian planned to have him executed 
he declared himself emperor in mid-286, winning the loyalty of Britain and parts of Gaul. 
Maximian was initially too occupied to deal with him, as there was a new raid across the 
Rhine in early 287. Maximian defeated the invaders, even organising a brief expedition 
across the Rhine, and then set about constructing a fleet to take on Carausius, with a Pane-
gyric delivered to him in 289 expressing great confidence in Maximian’s upcoming defeat of 
“that pirate” (ille pirata). The complete silence on this matter in the next Panegyric, deliv-
ered in 291, gives a pretty clear indication of how well the naval expedition went.53 
Diocletian, who had spent the last few years campaigning in Arabia and on the Dan-
ube, realised the regime was in crisis, and summoned Maximian to Italy for a conference, 
which was held in late 290. While we cannot know what exactly was decided, it probably had 
much to do with the radical restructuring of government that was openly announced in early 
293. It was then that Diocletian and Maximian both invested one of their subordinates, Ga-
lerius in the east and Constantius in the west, with the purple as caesares. There were now 
four emperors, two augusti assisted by two caesares. The tetrarchy had been established.54 
While Diocletian went on yet another Danubian campaign and Galerius suppressed a 
revolt in Egypt, Constantius succeeded in recapturing the parts of Gaul held by Carausius, 
who was around this time slain and replaced by his subordinate Allectus. After a few years of 
preparation, during which Constantius also found himself having to fight ‘barbarians’, a new 
expedition against Britain led by Constantius and his praetorian prefect Asclepiodotus suc-
ceeded in defeating Allectus in 296. Maximian had moved to the south, where, in the period 
                                                          
52 Pan. Lat. X 4-9; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.9-12, 14-19; Eutr., Brev. 9.19.2-9.20; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 38.6-8; 
Zon. 12.31. 
53 Pan. Lat. X 4.3-4 (cf. Pan. Lat. XI); Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.20-21; Eutr., Brev. 9.21. 
54 Pan. Lat. X 5-9, 12-13; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.24-30; Eutr., Brev. 9.22.1. 
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following the recapture of Britain, he occupied himself with campaigns in Spain and Africa.55 
War also loomed in the east, where the Sassanids had once again been united under a 
strong monarch, Narseh. The inevitable conflict started in 296, with Galerius taking charge 
on the Roman side. After suffering an initial defeat against Narseh, Galerius received rein-
forcements from Diocletian, and a second campaign in late 297 and 298 resulted in a re-
sounding Roman victory, with the resulting peace treaty being highly advantageous. While 
this war went on, there had been another revolt in Egypt, probably related to Diocletian’s 
taxation measures, which was crushed by the senior augustus in person.56 
The following few years appear to have been relatively tranquil, with the emperors 
mostly being occupied with economic reforms. The next significant event would occur in 
303, when Diocletian, allegedly under strong encouragement from Galerius, issued a series 
of edicts that proclaimed a number of repressive measures against the Christians. This was 
to be the most vehement of the attempts of the Roman government to stamp out the in-
creasingly popular religion, but the edicts were enforced far less enthusiastically in the west-
ern half of the empire; Constantius in particular only took minimal measures against the 
Christians living in his territory. The persecution would spasmodically continue across the 
empire until 313, but it would achieve little.57 
It was during his twentieth year as emperor, 304, that Diocletian caught a serious ill-
ness, which continued until early 305. He survived, but was apparently very much weakened 
by his ordeal, and he decided, again allegedly due to intimidation by Galerius, to abdicate. 
Whether it was indeed a sudden decision or part of a plan conceived long before Diocletian’s 
illness, he and a reluctant Maximian both stepped down as augustus on the 1st of May 305, 
with Constantius and Galerius succeeding them. While Maximian and Constantius both had 
adult sons, Maxentius and Constantine respectively, who would have been obvious candi-
dates for the position of caesar, those jobs were taken by two close associates of Galerius 
                                                          
55 Pan. Lat. VIII 6-7, 12; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.39-43; Eutr., Brev. 9.22.2-9.23; Zon. 12.31. 
56 Lact., DMP 9.5-7; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.23, 39.35-38 Eutr., Brev. 9.24-9.25.1; Festus, Brev. 25; Zon. 12.31-32; 
most of our information regarding the internal problems of the Sassanids and Narseh’s rise to power comes 
fron the fragmentary inscription that he had erected at Paikuli (= Frye (1983) app. 5); see also Potter (2004) 
290-292; frag. 13 and 14 of the sixth-century historian Petrus Patricius (= Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) 131-133 
nos. 5.4.2-3) describe the negotiations and the treaty that concluded the Persian war. 
57 Lact., DMP 9-16; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 8.1.1-16.2; Zon. 12.32. 
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called Severus and Maximinus Daja; this, too, Galerius had supposedly forced upon the ailing 
Diocletian.58 
The ‘second tetrarchy’ would have stability only briefly. In 306 Constantius died of ill-
ness while campaigning in Britain, and his army proclaimed Constantine, who had escaped 
from Galerius’ court a few months earlier to be with his father, augustus on the spot. This 
could still be solved with negotiation: Galerius accepted him into the college of emperors, 
but only as caesar, with Severus becoming the augustus of the west. Far graver, however, 
was the revolt of Maxentius, who declared himself emperor in Rome with support from the 
Praetorian Guard and easily persuaded his father to return from retirement at his side. Seve-
rus marched against him, but his soldiers proved unwilling to fight against their old com-
mander, and the abandoned Severus was forced to surrender himself. To follow up on this 
success, Maximian travelled to the court of Constantine and succeeded in arranging a mar-
riage between the caesar and his daughter in 307, thus ensuring that Constantine would not 
attack him. An attack by Galerius that same year proved ineffective, and as Galerius found 
himself losing control over his army he was forced to retreat. The stakes were raised even 
higher when Maxentius had Severus murdered shortly afterwards.59 
However, in 308 Galerius ingeniously managed to turn the tables on his opponents. 
He assumed the consulship with as his colleague no one less that Diocletian, against whom 
the soldiers would have been even less willing to fight than against Maximian. Galerius’ mas-
ter stroke resulted in major problems for Maximian and Maxentius, and it was at this point 
that father and son fell out with each other. This culminated in an attempt by Maximian to 
strip his son of his power that failed miserably, forcing him to flee to Constantine. All aside 
from Maxentius now realised that only negotiation could resolve the crisis, resulting in a 
conference in Carnuntum. Constantine and Maximinus Daja, who had as of yet played no 
part in the power struggles, remained caesares, but were permitted to call themselves ‘Sons 
of the augusti’. Maximian was once again forced into retirement, with Licinius, an associate 
of Galerius, being declared augustus of the west, even though Maxentius remained in con-
                                                          
58 Lact., DMP 17-20; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.48-40.1; Eutr., Brev. 9.27; Zos. 2.8.1; Zon. 12.32. 
59 Lact., DMP 24-27; Origo 4, 6-7, 9-10; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 40.2-9; Eutr., Brev. 10.1-2; Zos. 2.8.2-10.3; Zon. 
12.33-34; the union between Maximian and Constantine is the subject of Pan Lat. VII. 
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trol of Italy. The authority of Diocletian ensured everyone’s acceptance, but he would make 
no further impact upon the historical record after this.60 
All non-retired emperors, legitimate or otherwise, spent the next few years cam-
paigning against external enemies, with Maxentius also being forced to tackle the usurpation 
of a certain Alexander in Africa. In 310 Maximian made one last attempt to seize power, but 
it failed and Constantine forced him to commit suicide.61 It was shortly after Galerius’ death 
after a painful illness in 311 that open conflict would finally break out. After Constantine and 
Licinius had agreed upon an alliance against Maxentius and Maximinus Daja, who had previ-
ously joined forces, Constantine invaded Italy in 312 and scored a number of spectacular 
successes against the strongholds of Maxentius. He finally defeated him in the famous battle 
of the Milvian Bridge and thus became emperor over the west, while Maxentius drowned in 
the Tiber. It was also at this time that Constantine declared himself a Christian. Licinius, in 
turn, managed to take control of the east by defeating Maximinus Daja in several battles. 
Daja was eventually driven to suicide.62 
Only Constantine and Licinius now remained, and they too would soon come into 
conflict with each other. The first war would break out in 316, allegedly due to religious dif-
ferences but more probably due to incompatible dynastic ambitions. Constantine won, 
which allowed him to add large parts of Licinius’ territory to his own. A second final war 
would erupt in 324 due to disagreement on how to deal with a ‘barbarian’ incursion over the 
Danube, and Constantine was again the victor. Licinius was stripped of his power but spared, 
only to be executed shortly afterwards on charges of conspiracy. Constantine was now sole 
ruler over the Roman Empire.63 
  
                                                          
60 Lact., DMP 28-29.2; Origo 8; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 40.21; Eutr., Brev. 10.3.1, 10.4.1; Zos. 2.10.4-7. There are 
conflicting traditions about Diocletian’s death (which was somewhere between 311 and 313): he either com-
mitted suicide out of fear for the remaining emperors (Lact., DMP 42; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 39.7) or died 
peacefully of old age (Eutr., Brev. 9.28); Zonaras (12.33) reports a story in which Diocletian and Maximian are 
executed by decree of the senate, but as the manner of Maximian’s death is well attested (even if what pre-
cisely happened is obscure), this story is probably best left ignored. 
61 For Maximian’s plot, see Pan. Lat. VI 15-20; Lact., DMP 29.3-30.6; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 40.22; Eutr., Brev. 
10.3.2; Zos. 2.11; Zon. 12.33; most of our information about Alexander and his revolt comes from Zos. 2.12. 
62 Pan. Lat. XII 2-17; Pan. Lat. IV 21-30.2; Lact., DMP 43-47, 49; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 9.9.1-10.6; idem, Vit. Cons. 
1.37.1-38.4; Origo 12-13 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 40.23-41.1; Eutr., Brev. 10.4.2-4; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 40.7-8; 
Zos. 2.14-17; Zon. 13.1. 
63 Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 10.8.2-7, 9.1-5; idem, Vit. Cons. 2.6-10, 16-18; Origo 14-29; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 41.2-9; 
Eutr., Brev. 10.5-10.6.1; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 41.5-7; Zos. 2.18-28; Zon. 13.1. 
24 
 
2. Foreign warfare 
 
The Roman empire as an island surrounded by a seas of ‘barbarians’ eager to strip it bare has 
long been a popular view of late antiquity in particular, but also of the third-century ‘crisis’. 
On its two major frontiers, the empire had to contend with powerful new enemies: ‘barbari-
an’ groupings like the Goths, Alemanni and Franks in the north, and the aggressive Sassanid 
dynasty of Persians in the east. They would invade the empire time and time again, and suc-
cessive emperors would prove powerless to stop them. “In short, enemies along two fronts 
penetrated the frontiers at will, sacking cities in the very heart of the empire and pillaging to 
the gates of Rome.”64 It was the achievement of the tetrarchs that they restored Rome’s 
dominance, “culminating in victories on all frontiers and all enemies, and most important, 
the consolidation of these gains in a far more formidable scheme of defences, and the return 
of real military and civil security for the first time in over half a century”.65 
 Of course, this image owes much to the restorative propaganda of the tetrarchs, who 
had a penchant for rewriting history in order to aggrandize themselves at the expense of 
emperors who reigned during the ‘crisis’.66 In addition, later sources would often inflate de-
feats to denigrate the suffering emperor, and, inversely, exaggerate victories to exalt histori-
ographical heroes.67 Nevertheless, not all propaganda has to be untrue – if the tetrarchic era 
actually was an improvement with regard to external warfare, Diocletian and his colleagues 
would have had good reason to boast of their success. Throughout this chapter we will put 
this idea to the test. There will be separate sections for the northern ‘barbarians’ and the 
Persians, while the southern and Arabian frontiers, on which our sources have little to say, 
will all the same receive attention in their own separate area. 
 
‘Barbarians’ at the gates 
If there is one word that the average person will associate with the fall of Rome, it is un-
doubtedly ‘barbarian’. The idea of massive tidal waves of invaders continually smashing into 
the empire is powerful, and it seems doubtful that it will ever disappear from the public con-
                                                          
64 Ando (2012) 146; the recentness of this work shows just how persistent this viewpoint is. 
65 Williams (1985) 61. 
66 Something that Potter (2004) 294-298 lays particular emphasis on, citing Pan. Lat. VIII 10.1-4 as a notable 
example. 
67 J. Wilkes, ‘Provinces and frontiers’ in: CAH XII (2005), 212-268, 222, 224. 
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sciousness completely. Among historians, however, this traditional view has been subject to 
considerable revision. That the numbers of invaders reported in the sources are undoubtedly 
vastly exaggerated was realised already by Gibbon.68  
But their characterisation has also changed completely. While Gibbon still saw them 
as bloodthirsty savages, throughout the last few decades an alternative picture has been 
proposed by authors like Thomas Burns, John Drinkwater and Michael Kulikowski: the rela-
tionship between the ‘barbarians’ and Rome was generally characterised by peaceful coex-
istence with only occasional violence. That they became a problem during the crisis was the 
result of a more violent ethos provoked by Rome itself, and even then their incursions never 
came close to threatening the empire’s survival. Nevertheless, emperors eager for glory 
would describe the ‘barbarians’ as a clear and present danger to Roman security (Drinkwa-
ter’s ‘bogeymen’), allowing them to take much credit for victories over comparatively easy 
targets.69 So while a good number of incursions during the ‘crisis’ have been outlined in the 
previous chapter, it is worth wondering how damaging these were in terms of military casu-
alties, effectiveness of sieges and long-term damage. 
If we start with ‘barbarian’ effectiveness in the field, there is at least one notable ex-
ample where the ‘barbarians’ living across the Danube, indiscriminately called ‘Scythians’ by 
our sources, showed themselves highly effective: Decius’ campaigns against them in 250-
251, leading to his defeat and death at Abrittus. And even if we accept that Decius had 
scored some successes against the invaders prior to his final defeat, then it is still remarkable 
to see that the ‘Scythians’ did not immediately give up as would have been the case in previ-
ous times, but continued their raiding activities.70  
An attempt to deflate the consequences of Abrittus has been made by Strobel, who 
notes that the Oracle, our only contemporary source, barely mentions it, that Gallus suc-
ceeded in restoring peace by bribing off the ‘Scythians’ and that later authors who describe 
Abrittus and its aftermath in bleak terms may well have been influenced by the catastrophic 
                                                          
68 Gibbon (Bury ed. 1897-1900) 1: 236. 
69 Burns (2003) 248-308; J. F. Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis (Oxford 2007); 
M. Kulikowski, Rome's Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric (Cambridge 2007), 34-41. 
70 A Roman defeat at Beroea is only mentioned in the Getica (102) of the sixth-century historian Jordanes and 
George 459 (citing Dexippus); the defeat at Beroea is accepted by Potter (2004) 246 and Drinkwater (2005) 39, 
however, it seems odd that Zosimus (1.23) and Zonaras (12.20) do not mention it and actually state that Decius 
scored some initial successes against the ‘Scythians’, although it is possible that they have suppressed the de-
feat. A second defeat, during which Decius’ elder son was killed (rather than dying at Abrittus, as George 459 
and Zon. 12.20 have it), is recorded by Aurelius Victor (De Caes. 29.5) and copied into Jordanes (Getica 103), 
but this story is problematic (so Potter (1990) 283). See also Wilkes (2005) 225. 
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Roman defeat against the Goths at Adrianople in 378.71 But this is unconvincing. First, as 
Potter has pointed out, this section of the Oracle exemplifies the fact that its authors did not 
care much for non-eastern events: “the scope of this narration is one of the most striking 
illustrations of the author’s lack of interest in and ignorance of western affairs.” Second, our 
one contemporary source for Adrianople, Ammianus Marcellinus, does indeed, as Strobel 
notes, describe Decius’ defeat as a similar catastrophe, but this is intended to put Adrianople 
into perspective rather than to overdramatize Abrittus.72 
Finally, that Gallus bought off the ‘Scythians’ rather than trying to avenge the loss at 
Abrittus is itself telling of the weak Roman position at that point. The fact that the raiders 
would soon be back for more (which would lead directly to Gallus’ downfall) also indicates 
that Gallus’ arrangement was rather unsatisfactory. An alternative theory proposed by Pot-
ter, that the Scythian raids were a minor irritant made bigger by Decius’ personal mistakes, is 
more plausible, but depends on acceptance of Potter’s view of Decius as a complete incom-
petent: “The evidence of his actions suggests that he was deeply conservative, that he was 
deeply pious, that he possessed a ferocious temper, and that he was quite stupid.”73 Overall, 
it remains reasonable to see Abrittus and the surrounding campaign as an important indica-
tion of the fact that the ‘Scythians’ had become stronger. 
 If we turn to the ‘barbarians’ on the Rhine, then there is also one case were they are 
said to have caused major problems to the Roman army: the raids into Italy in the early part 
of Aurelian’s reign. While Aurelian eventually managed to repulse the invaders, he is said to 
have suffered an initial severe defeat by at least one source, which also directly connects this 
defeat with the revolt in Rome. Unfortunately this source is the always-problematic HA, but 
as the uprising in Rome and the construction of the Aurelian wall shortly afterwards are well 
attested, it would seem that the author has something useful to offer in this case.74  
                                                          
71 Strobel (1993) 231-231; with Orac. Sib. XIII. 100-102. 
72 Potter (1990) 148; Amm. Marc. 31.5.10-17; due to the absence of a comprehensive third-century narrative 
that predates Adrianople it cannot be said how Abrittus was viewed before then. 
73 Potter (2004) 244-245; with Potter (1990) 241 for the quote; for a reaction against Potter’s generally rather 
negative view of third-century emperors, see K. E. T. Butcher, ‘Imagined emperors: personalities and failures in 
the third century’ Journal of Roman Archaeology 9 (1996), 516-527. 
74 HA, V. Aurel. 18.3, 21.1-4; V. Aurel. 18.4-20.20.8 deals with the ensuing revolt at Rome. The tale of the defeat 
is believed by Watson (1999) 50-51 and Potter (2004) 269; it is denied by Drinkwater (2007) 76-78, who, I think, 
places insufficient weight on the disturbances in Rome caused by the defeat and the fact that Aurelian felt the 
need to initiate construction on the Aurelian Wall afterwards. Drinkwater’s view of the wall a symbol with little 
practical use is controversial (cf. H. W. Dey, the Aurelian Wall and the Fashioning of Imperial Rome, A.D. 271-
855 (Cambridge 2011), 83-84); the flaws in its construction (on which see Watson (1999) 150-151) can be the 
27 
 
Admittedly, these defeats were still rare occurrences, and if the Romans could mus-
ter enough forces they still seem to have been able to repulse the ‘barbarians’ without too 
much trouble. But we should not forget that, as the large number of raids listed in the first 
chapter shows, the ‘barbarians’ had also become more skilled at evading the Roman forc-
es.75 It therefore seems fair to conclude that the military effectiveness of ‘barbarians in-
creased considerably during the ‘crisis’, and that this made them a greater danger than they 
had previously been. But what of their skill at sieges? That is what we will look at now, alt-
hough the complete lack of information of ‘barbarian’ sieges in the western part of the em-
pire means that we have to focus on the east. 
We know that various cities fell to the ‘barbarians’. Two fragments of Dexippus (a 
portion found in Syncellus and his own speech to the Athenians) tell us that the Macedonian 
city of Philippopolis fell, and that Athens was also sacked.76 The descriptions of the ‘Scythian’ 
wars found in Zosimus confirm these captures and add several others, and in general lay 
much emphasis on the devastation caused by ‘Scythian’ attacks; Syncellus also list a number 
of Greek and Asian cities that were supposedly sacked by ‘Scythians’ in the late 260’s, alt-
hough this list makes no topographical sense.77 
But there is good reason for thinking that the general picture given by Zosimus is ex-
aggerated. Other fragments of Dexippus deal with the sieges of three cities: Marcianopolis 
(which lay on the Balkans), Philippopolis (an attempt that precedes its fall) and Side (which 
lay in the south of Asia Minor). The fragments can be summarized as follows: the ‘Scythians’ 
lay siege to the city, make several attempts to storm it that all end in miserable failure, and 
finally give up and move on to somewhere else.78 These are certainly not the kind of tales 
one expects to find among the surviving material of the sole surviving contemporary histori-
an from the worst of the ‘crisis’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
result of inexperience rather than a lax attitude, and the walls would prove effective enough to protect Maxen-
tius from Galerius in 307 (so Lact., DMP 27.2). 
75 Cf. Potter (2004) 128, who notes that the effectiveness of the Roman army depended to a large extent upon 
the willingness of its enemies to frontally attack it, which they proved less and less willing to do. 
76 George 459; Dexippus F 26 
77 Zos. 1.26.1-27.1, 31-35, 37, 43; George 467 (listing Corinth, Sparta and Argos, which are not mentioned by 
Zosimus); the capture of Athens is also reported by Zon. 12.26 and corroborated by the archaeological record 
(on which see F. Millar, ‘P. Herennius Dexippus: The Greek World and the Third-Century Invasions’ Journal of 
Roman Studies 59 (1969) 1-2, 12-29, 27). For the problem with George’s list, see S. Mitchell, Anatolia: Land, 
Men and Gods in Asia Minor (Oxford 1993) 1: 235. 
78 Dexippus F 22 (but cf. Jordanes, Getica 92, who says that the inhabitants had to buy the attackers off), 24, 27.  
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It should be noted that these fragments all come from the Byzantine Excerpt on tac-
tics, which would hardly have included accounts of ‘Scythian’ victories. Nevertheless, these 
scattered accounts of sieges do deserve more attention than they have previously been giv-
en, especially as the ‘Scythians’ have been seen as the most dangerous ‘barbarians’.79 The 
only previous author who has comprehensively studied them in order to arrive at conclu-
sions concerning the ‘Scythian’ attacks is Millar, who notes that these fragments show a will-
ingness on the part of the empire’s Greek citizens to defend themselves if the need arose.80 
But the ease with which the defenders seemingly managed to sabotage and destroy the 
‘Scythian’ siege equipment on multiple occasions also suggests another important conclu-
sion: that ‘Scythians’ were not very good at sieges.81 This is corroborated by an inscription 
from Didyma in Asia Minor that alludes to a failed ‘Scythian’ attack on a fortified temple.82 
As such, it may be suggested that we should place little trust in the dramatic tales by 
Zosimus of ‘Scythians’ taking one city after another. The examples where cities are actually 
named should not be set aside so easily, but these examples are not all that common. And 
our sources often give mitigating circumstances in these cases: Philippopolis only fell be-
cause of betrayal from within, the fortress of Pityus held out until its commander, Successi-
anus, had to be reassigned to another location and the ‘Scythians’ only managed to take 
Trapezus and Chalcedon because their respective garrisons put in a poor effort.83 That the 
account of Syncellus is topographically problematic has already been noted. 
It must be restated that the above only relates to events in the east, as there is simp-
ly no concrete information for the west. But the fact that the rule of the Gallic emperors was 
supported by the general populace until the victory of Aurelian, as well as the presence of 
the Bagaudae in later years (we will come back to both in the next chapter), shows that 
there, too, people were willing to drive back invaders if necessary.84 And yet, it should not 
                                                          
79 See e.g. Drinkwater (2005) 43. 
80 Millar (1969) 24-29; Potter (1990) 85-86 also discusses the fragments, but only as part of his critique of Dex-
ippus’ value as a historian. 
81 This is not really a novel idea, but most authors seem content to make an offhand remark about ‘barbarian’ 
ineffectiveness at sieges, without interacting with the material provided by Dexippus (e.g. Burns (2003) 280). 
82 SEG IV (1929) 467. 
83 For betrayal at Philippolis, see Jordanes, Getica 103; for Pityus, see Zos. 1.32.1-33.1; for Trapezus and Chal-
cedon, see Zos. 1.33-34. 
84 I owe the view of the Gallic Empire and the Bagaudae as people taking the defence of their territory into 
their own hands to R. MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire 
(Cambridge 1966), 211-213; contra Millar (1969) 26-29, whose suggestion that civil resistance in the west was 
less common compared to the east fails to take MacMullen’s idea into account. 
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be forgotten that some cities were sacked, and this brings us to the third aspect of ‘barbari-
an’ incursions: the extent of the damage that they inflicted. 
Answering that question conclusively is impossible, but in order to arrive at an ap-
proximation it is necessary to turn away from the dramatized picture painted by the literary 
sources to overviews of the archaeological material. Despite the problems of interpretation 
posed by the archaeological material, the available overviews of the western provinces – 
those available in the sadly unfinished series History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire, 
those in the collection of King and Henig and those undertaken by individual authors like 
Millar, Mitchell and Witschel – seem to be in general agreement that the damage caused by 
invaders differed strongly from area to area and from decade to decade. Thus, while areas 
like German provinces and Noricum (roughly present-day Switzerland) where hit hard re-
peatedly from the 260’s onwards, other provinces, such as Italy, Gaul and Spain, were only 
partly affected by the crisis, and Pannonia experienced trouble intermittently throughout 
the 250’s but remained relatively tranquil afterwards, while Britain was probably only trou-
bled towards the end of the century, and Dalmatia barely ever experienced any trouble at 
all.85 In addition, we should also remember that, as we saw in the first chapter, there appear 
to have been no major incursions across the Rhine throughout the 250’s. 
The only real bone of contention is the situation in Gaul after the unification of the 
empire. It has traditionally been held that, with the disappearance of the special attention of 
the Gallic emperors for the province, the ‘barbarians’ attacked in great numbers and suc-
ceeded in causing great damage before being driven off by Probus.86 However, more recent 
                                                          
85 On the German provinces and Noricum, see G. Alföldy, Noricum (trans. A. R. Birley; London/Boston 1974), 
169-171; Witschel (1999) 338-361 (notably the only area in the west where he would agree that the situation 
was dire in the third century). On Italy, see Millar (1981) 144-145; Witschel (1999) 239-261. On the dichotomy 
between the disturbed north and reasonably tranquil south of Gaul, see Witschel (1999) 307-337; his conclu-
sions for the south are supported by the earlier work of A. L. F. Rivet, Gallia Narbonensis: southern France in 
Roman times. With a chapter on Alpes Maritimae (London 1988), 93. On Spain, see S. J. Keay, ‘The Conventus 
Tarraconensis in the third century A. D.: crisis or change?’ in: King and Henig (1981) 451-486; Witschel (1999) 
262-264. On Pannonia, see A. Mócsy, Pannonia (Stuttgart 1962), 565-567. On Britain, see S. S. Frere, Britannia: 
a history of Roman Britain (London 1987), 172-173; Witschel (1999) 362-374; cf. Casey (1994) 100-103 for the 
theory that piratical raids later in the century can help to explain British support for Carausius. On Dalmatia, 
see J. J. Wilkes, Dalmatia (1969), 416. 
86 Our sources for the incursions and Probus’ victories are Aur. Vict., De Caes. 37.3; Eutr., Brev. 9.17.1; HA, Vit. 
Prob. 13.5-14.7; Zos. 1.67-68; Zon. 12.30. For modern historians who agree with this picture, see J. F. Drinkwa-
ter, The Gallic Empire. Separation and continuity in the north-western provinces of the Roman Empire (Stuttgart 
1987), 201-202; an even more bleak view is offered by E. Wightman, ‘The fate of Gallo-Roman villages in the 
third century’ in: King and Henig (1981) 235-243, who suggests that these invasions meant the beginning of the 
Middle Ages in Gaul; the essential truthfulness of the literary account is still accepted by G. Kreucher, Der Kai-
ser Marcus Aurelius Probus und seine Zeit (Stuttgart 2003), 135-136. 
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authors have not unreasonably pointed out that the evidence upon which this assumption 
rests is questionable: all our literary sources saw Probus as a hero and were consequently 
inclined to exaggerate the extent of his victories, and modern historians have reinforced this 
view by seeing confirmation in the archaeological record. In addition, the rapid construction 
of walls around Gallic cities and the many coin hoards that appear in Gaul during this period 
may have more to do with the economic situation – specifically the decree of the Central 
government that Gallic Empire coinage no longer had any value – than with fear for ‘barbari-
ans’.87 
On the, as the literary sources would have it, much-suffering Balkan provinces and 
Asia Minor (the latter being attacked not just by ‘Scythians’ but also by Persians) less work 
has been done. But there are still some instructive comments: Millar has noted that the Bal-
kan provinces only show signs of intermittent heavy raiding, suggesting that ‘Scythian’ incur-
sions there were limited to the occasions known from the sources.88 In addition, for Asia 
Minor Mitchell has noted that many cities show signs of damage and constructions of emer-
gency fortifications, and there are several inscriptions of people who claim that they had 
been in ‘Scythian’ captivity. It is also at this time that correctores (ἐπανορθωτοί) appear, who, 
as their title indicates, had the task of ‘putting things right’; Priscus, the brother of Philip, 
and Odaenathus also held this position. On the other hand, he notes that the countryside 
seems to have held out quite well.89 However, Mitchell seems too determined to see the 
third century as a ‘crisis’ when he wants to redate an inscription from 330 to the third centu-
ry based only on the fact that the phrase “saviour of the province” (l.3-4: σωτῆρα τῶν ἐθνῶν) 
also occurs on two third-century inscriptions.90 
                                                          
87 Wilkes (2005) 222; Witschel (1999) 97; that the scope of the Probic incursions are likely vastly exaggerated 
was suggested already by Gibbon (Bury ed. 1897-1900) 1: 330. The idea that the construction of walls in this 
period was a response to the raids has recently been defended by Kreucher (2003) 143-144, pointing to the  
apparent hastiness with which these walls were constructed; but cf. Dey (2011) 124-125: the building of walls 
came too late to fit with the ‘crisis’. For the alternative hoard explanation, see S. Estiot, ‘The later third century’ 
in: W. E. Metcalf ed., The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage (Oxford 2012), 538-560, 551. 
88 Millar (1981) 216-217, 236-238. 
89 Mitchell (1993) 1: 227-240. For captured people, see (in addition to the documents cited by Mitchell) AE 
(1949) 255 from Lydia in 263; AE (1895) 58 is an example from Bulgaria dating from as early as 238. There are 
two Asian correctores known by name: Aurelius Appius Sabinus during the 250’s (ILS 9467 l.3: τῆς Ἀσίας 
ἐπανορθωτής) and Titus Oppius Aelianus Asclepiodotus during the 280’s (C. Roueché ed., Aphrodisias in Late 
Antiquity: The Late Roman and Byzantine Inscriptions (London 1988), no. 7 l.8-9: ἐπανορθωτήν Ἀσίας). 
90 Roueché (1988) no. 14; Mitchell (1993) 1: 228, citing SEG XXVII (1977) 845 and E. Bosch ed., Quellen zur Ge-
schichte der Stadt Ankara in Altertum (Ankara 1967), 351 no.289. 
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To summarize, therefore, while the ‘barbarians’ proved able during the ‘crisis’ to 
elude and even occasionally defeat the Romans in the field, to the average inhabitant of the 
empire things may not have been quite so bleak: we have good reason to question the effec-
tiveness of the ‘barbarians’ at sieges, and how much damage they inflicted varied between 
time and place. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the ‘barbarians’ did sometimes inflict 
considerable damage. It is also important to remember that the empire had to abandon its 
territories across the Rhine and Danube at this time. The withdrawal from the so-called Agri 
Decumates (the German areas between the Rhine and the Danube) might have been under-
taken by Postumus because of his unwillingness to defend it against Gallienus rather than 
‘barbarian’ invaders, and the area was not that significant anyway. But Aurelian’s surrender 
of Dacia appears to have been sheer necessity.91 We should not, therefore, take the down-
playing of the ‘barbarian’ menace compared to the period that preceded the ‘crisis’ too far. 
But what of the tetrarchic era that followed it? 
The first thing to note about the activities of ‘barbarians’ from the accession of Dio-
cletian onward is that we hear little about them. It is known from documentary sources that 
the tetrarchs regularly campaigned along, and occasionally over, the Rhine and Danube.92 
But these events only rarely ever appear in our literary sources, and when they do it is only 
in the Panegyrics that we get some information about why conflict broke out. Thus, as we 
saw in the first chapter, the Panegyric held before Maximian around 289 describes how a 
large conglomerate of various ‘barbarian’ groupings invaded the empire shortly after the 
suppression of the Bagaudae, only for Maximian to massacre them and move across the 
Rhine for a punitive expedition, with a later raid on Trier being suppressed by Maximian in 
person. In addition, in later Panegyrics both Constantius and Constantine are said to have 
campaigned against Franks on a few occasions in response to attacks.93 But our other 
sources seem content to state that the tetrarchs won many victories over ‘barbarians’ and 
                                                          
91 For the theory about the Agri Decumates, see Drinkwater (2007); for the withdrawal from Dacia, see Watson 
(1999) 155-157; Potter (2004) 270. 
92 The tables published in Barnes (1982) 254-258 provide a catalogue of campaigns from 284 to 337 based upon 
the available evidence. 
93 Pan. Lat. X 5, 6, VII 4.2, XII 22.3, VI 6.3-4, 10.1-2, 21.2 (cf. Lact., DMP 29.3-6), IV 17.1-2; Drinkwater (2007) 
181-194 argues that most of these attacks were only very minor events that the various emperors eagerly used 
as an excuse for punitive expeditions. ‘Barbarians’ are also noticeably absent from the list of reasons wrongly 
given by Victor (De Caes. 39.20-24) and Eutropius (Brev. 9.22.1) for the establishment of the tetrarchy. 
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leave it at that. The general impression conveyed is thus one of mostly compliant ‘barbari-
ans’, a sharp contrast to the bleak picture of invasions set up for the ‘crisis’.94  
Something that we do hear plenty about in this period is the restoration of peace 
with regard to external enemies by the tetrarchs. Previous emperors had already proclaimed 
themselves to be “the restorer of the world” on their coins. The most notable example is the 
series of coins of Aurelian issued after the reunification of the empire, but it also appears as 
early as 253/243 on a coin of Gallienus.95 But the tetrarchs would take the restorative theme 
even further. The Panegyrics naturally have much to say on this theme,96 but it appears in 
other sources as well.  
One inscription calls Diocletian “the founder of eternal peace”, another calls Maxim-
ian “great, invincible, and far braver that all previous emperors”, a third calls both “the re-
storers of the whole world” and a fourth describes the tetrarchs establishing a military camp 
“after defeating the nations of the barbarians, and confirming the tranquillity of their 
world”, while a papyrus containing a poem says of Diocletian that “he extinguished the 
memory of former grief for any of those still suffering in grim bonds in a lightless place” and 
also speaks of the “light of a golden age”. The most striking fact is the early date of some of 
these comments: the third inscription comes from 288, while the papyrus may date from as 
early as 286.97 
But they may have had good reason for doing so. After all, that there is so little in-
formation on ‘barbarian’ incursions is significant in and of itself, and it is also worth noting 
that Roman-‘barbarian’ conflict now often took place beyond Rome’s borders.98 Indeed, 
perhaps the most telling sign of the comparative tranquillity is the fact that, with the excep-
tion of a ‘barbarian’ raid in 323 that Constantine managed to exploit as an excuse to attack 
Licinius and possibly a Frankish incursion that may have taken place at the time of Constan-
                                                          
94 Eutr., Brev. 9.25.2; Zos. 2.8.2; Zon. 12.31. 
95 RIC V2 Aurelian 291-306, Gallienus 234. 
96 The earliest example, and one of the most notable ones, is Pan. Lat. X 1.5: “one might justifiably call you 
[Maximian] and your brother [Diocletian] the founders of the Roman Empire, for you are, what is almost the 
same thing, its restorers” (merito quiuis te tuumque fratrem Romani imperii dixerit conditores: estis enim, quod 
est proximum, restitutores; trans. Nixon); see also the previously cited Pan. Lat. VIII 10.1-4. 
97 ILS 618 l. 4-5 (fundatori pacis aeternae), 619 l. 1-3 (magno et invicto ac super omnes retro principes fortissi-
mo), 617 l. 6 (totius orbis resitutores), 640 (post debellatas hostium gentis confirmata orbi suo tranquilitate in 
aeternum; I owe the translation to Potter (2004) 296); P. Oxy. LXIII 4352 l. 21 (μνημοσύνην δ̣᾿ ἀ̣χέων προτέρων 
σβέ̣σ̣ε̣[ν]), 29-30 (φωτ̣[ὶ] χρυσείης γενεῆς). 
98 Something that Pan. Lat. X 7-9 naturally makes much of. 
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tine’s invasion of Italy,99 the ‘barbarians’ do not seem to have taken advantage of the inter-
nal conflicts in the empire between 307 and 324.  
One theory sees the actions of the tetrarchs as the main factor: it was the strength-
ening of the frontiers that kept raiders out.100 However, it may well be that the scope of Dio-
cletian’s frontier reforms was really rather limited, and that authors tend to overstate the 
difference between the frontier installations of the Principate on the one hand and the Dom-
inate on the other hand.101 I am inclined to think that the answer can be found in a Panegyr-
ic held before Maximian in the early 290’s. Having noted earlier that Diocletian and Maxim-
ian “have transplanted civil wars to races worthy of that madness”,102 the speaker goes on to 
give a general overview of the state of things across Rome’s various borders: 
“The unruly Moorish tribe rages against its own flesh, the Goths utterly destroy the Burgundi-
ans, and again the Alamanni wear arms for the conquered, and the Tervingi too, another group 
of Goths, with the help of a band of Taifali join battle with the vandals and Gepids. Ormies with 
the Saci and Rufii and Geli as allies assaults the Persians themselves and the king himself, and 
respects neither his king’s majesty nor his brother’s claims on his loyalty. The Burgundians 
have taken over the land of the Alamanni, but obtained it at great cost to themselves. The Al-
amanni have lost the land but seek to regain it. Oh great power of your deity! Not only those 
and other races, terrible in strength of arms, yield to their confidence, armed for the ruin of 
barbarism, but even those Blemmyes, I hear, used only to light arrows, seek arms which they 
do not have against the Ethiopians, and  join murderous battle with as it were naked ha-
tred.”103 
While it would be easy to dismiss the above as mere propaganda, we know that at the very 
least the part about internal unrest among the Persians is true, and the idea of wars among 
‘barbarians’ is corroborated by the statements from Eusebius and the Origo that the cam-
paign of Constantine against the ‘barbarian’ Goths in the 330’s was launched when anther 
group, the Sarmatians, requested Constantine’s aid against them.104 According to Burns, this 
                                                          
99 For the raid of 323, see Origo 21 (calling the invaders Goths); Zos. 2.21 (calling them Sarmatians); with Barnes 
(1981) 76-77; Potter (2004) 378-379. For the Franks, see Pan. Lat. IV 17.1, with Nixon and Rodgers (1994) 362 
n. 76. 
100 Williams (1985) 205; cf. Kulikowski (2007) 78, who sees the tetrarchic reforms in general as the main factor. 
101 B. H. Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East (Oxford 1990), 162-171, 186-208; cf. Rees 
(2004) 20-23. See also C. R. Whittaker, ‘Grand strategy, or just a grand debate?’ in: idem ed., Rome and its 
Frontiers (London/New York 2004), 28-49, 38-39, who mostly agrees but nonetheless sees a slightly more stra-
tegic approach to the frontier from Diocletian onwards. 
102 Pan. Lat. XI 16.2 (trans. Rodgers): bella civilian ad gentes illa vesania dignas transtulistis. 
103 Pan. Lat. XI 17 (trans. Rodgers). 
104 Frye (1983) app. 5; Euseb., Vit. Cons. 4.6.1; Origo 31. 
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situation was also the result of the actions of the tetrarchs, who succeeded in normalising 
the relationship between Rome and the ‘barbarians’ after the aberration of the ‘crisis’, alt-
hough the ‘barbarian’ confederacies were now stronger than they had previously been.105 
But perhaps it is worth wondering if this conflict was not something that arose naturally 
among the ‘barbarians’, rather than being the result of Roman management. Still, the overall 
result seems obvious: the ‘barbarians’ were far less an issue for the Romans than they had 
been during the ‘crisis’. 
 But the extent of the recovery is perhaps sometimes taken for granted too easily, and 
Constantius’ struggle against Franks somewhere between 295 and 305 present a good ex-
ample. According to Eutropius, Constantius was at one point attacked by a group of Franks 
and nearly killed, but managed to escape into the nearby city of Langres (supposedly by be-
ing hauled over the wall by a rope), rallied his forces and crushed the ‘barbarians’, killing 
almost 60.000. Drinkwater, who wryly remarks that nearly killing the father of Constantine 
was as close as the Alemanni ever got to influencing the course of history, notes that inci-
dents like this “should not have happened”.106 But happen they did, and while Drinkwater 
may well be right in seeing this incident as provoked by Romans and the number of Aleman-
nic soldiers given by Eutropius as an exaggeration, it is nonetheless a sign that dealings with 
‘barbarians’ could occasionally still get out of hand. 
The years between 307 and 310 provide another good example of this. All the various 
contenders for imperial power spent these years campaigning against external enemies, and 
it has been easy to assume, as Potter has done, that this was a way for the tetrarchs to prove 
their military credentials against an easy target in preparation for the upcoming battles with 
their rivals. But it is also possible to see these campaigns in another light, like Kulikowski 
does when he notes that they could also have been intended to keep the ‘barbarians’ quiet 
while the tetrarchs were fighting with each other. Indeed, one can take this even further, as 
done by Leadbetter, who has noted that Licinius’ campaign of 310 delayed his planned at-
tack on Maxentius, which suggests a situation on the Danube that needed checking rather 
                                                          
105 Burns (2003) 296-308. 
106 Eutr., Brev. 9.23; Drinkwater (2007) 187-188; as Drinkwater notes, Pan. Lat. VI 6.3 naturally puts a positive 
spin on the event. 
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than a convenient excuse to gain an easy victory. Galerius’ invasion of Italy in 307 may also 
have come sooner had it not been necessary for him to campaign on the Danube first.107 
 It must be admitted that it is impossible to gain certainty about the aims of the te-
trarchic campaigns. But there are a few other indications in the sources that suggest prob-
lems with ‘barbarians’. A Panegyric held before Constantine in 324 describes a recent incur-
sion into Spain, and while the dramatic tales of ‘barbarians’ laying waste to the entire penin-
sula can be seen as rhetorical exaggeration intended to flatter the emperor that defeated 
the invaders, it is also known that Maximian had to campaign in Spain in the mid-290’s. His 
adversaries were either Frankish pirates or Mauri from Africa, and it is even possible that he 
had to contend with both groups at the same time.108  
If Frankish pirates did manage to get as far as Spain, it indicates that the Roman naval 
defences were in a poor state at this time. And there is another possible example of sea-
borne raiders striking at the empire: an inscription found in Sinop, located in the north of 
Turkey, mentions “enemy attacks”, although the fragmentary state of the document means 
that we do not know what context this was said in. This fits in well with the fact that we 
know of practically no major naval operations between the battle of Actium in 31 BC and 
Constantine’s final war with Licinius in 324, the only exceptions being Aurelian’s recapture of 
Egypt and Carausius’ operations against pirates.109 And while it might be objected that we 
do not hear about incursions deep into Roman territory in the literary sources, it should not 
be forgotten that our only comprehensive source for events in the empire as a whole for this 
period, Lactantius, had practically no interest in foreign warfare.110 
 That being said, just as it was with the ‘barbarian’ incursions during the ‘crisis’, the 
denigration of the tranquillity during the tetrarchy should not be pushed too far. After all, 
                                                          
107 Potter (2004) 351 (cf. Rees (2004) 15, who suggests that the tetrarchs would have fought more external 
wars if they had not been so busy fighting with each other); Kulikowski (2007) 80-81; Leadbetter (2009) 193-
194, 219; cf. T. D. Barnes, ‘Imperial Campaigns, A. D. 285-311’ Phoenix 30 (1976) 2, 174-193, 188-192, who has 
previously noted that the various external wars in the early fourth century tend to be rather easily overlooked. 
108 For the incursion under Constantine, see Pan. Lat. IV 17.1-2; a campaign in Spain by Maximian is attested by 
the papyrus published in D. L. Page ed., Select Papyri III: Literary Papyri/Poetry (London/Cambridge 1941) as no. 
135, as well as a tetrarchic palace in Corduba, on which see E. W. Haley, ‘A Palace of Maximianus Herculius at 
Corduba?’ Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 101 (1994) 208-214, with 212-213 for a brief discussion of 
Maximian’s enemies during these campaigns. 
109 ILS 660 l. 12 (hostium (…) incursio[nes]), 13 (hosti[l]it[e]r adpetito[s]). I owe the point about fleets to D. S. 
Potter, Constantine the Emperor (Oxford 2013), 211. 
110 As noted by Barnes (1976) 174; the two cases of foreign warfare that Lactantius does cover, the war with 
Narseh (DMP 9.5-8) and Constantine’s 310 campaign against the Franks (DMP 29.3-5) both have some bearing 
on the internal power struggles that he gives most of his attention to. 
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the possible examples of ‘barbarian’ incursions discussed above were only relatively minor 
affairs; there was never anything like Decius’ defeat at Abrittus or the incursions into Italy of 
the 260’s and 270’s, otherwise they would surely have appeared somewhere in the literary 
sources. Overall, therefore, it seems fair to say that the tetrarchic era was an improvement 
over the ‘crisis’ in the sense that Rome succeeded in regaining is managerial position to-
wards the ‘barbarians’, although it should not be forgotten that the tetrarchs were greatly 
aided by the victories won over ‘barbarians’ form the late 260’s onwards.111 However, the 
empire also had to deal with an enemy that could match it in sophistication, to which we will 
now turn. 
 
 King of kings of Iran and non-Iran  
While much work has been done to re-evaluate the nature of the ‘barbarian’ menace, most 
would still agree that the Sassanid Persians were a major danger to the stability of the em-
pire, with Burns explicitly stating that the Sassanids should take precedence over the ‘bar-
barians’ when it comes to the factors that created the ‘crisis’. Potter takes this one step fur-
ther: “The weakening of Persia should not be underestimated as a factor in Rome’s recovery 
in the later third century any more than Persia’s strength should be underestimated as a 
contributory cause of the disorders of the mid-third century.”112 And indeed, if the effec-
tiveness of ‘barbarians’ at taking cities can be questioned, this is not so for the Persians: the 
RGDS gives two long lists of captured cities during the attacks of 252-253 and 259-260, and 
frequent mentions of plundered cities in western literary sources show that this is not just 
propaganda. Their effectiveness in the field is shown by the battle of Barbalissos in 252, 
where the Persians managed to surprise and slaughter a large Roman force.113 Finally, while 
the ‘Scythians’ succeeded in killing an emperor, the Sassanids managed to capture one. 
 But there are also reasons for placing less weight upon the rise of the Sassanids. In 
general, it should not be forgotten that the Sassanid state, while undoubtedly second only to 
                                                          
111 Kulikowski (2007) 21 notes that after the defeats suffered against Aurelian and Tacitus in the 270’s the 
‘Scythians’ vanish from our sources for a long time (becoming ‘Goths’ when they return); likewise, Drinkwater 
(2007) notes that after the incursions of the early 270’s the Italian peninsula would remain free from foreign 
attacks until the fifth century. 
112 Burns (2003) 253; Potter (1990) 62. 
113 For the lists of captured cities, see RGDS l. 5-9, 12-15; cf. Orac. Sib. XIII.93-96, 125-128; Amm. Marc. 23.5.3; 
Zos. 1.27.2, 3.32.5; Mal. 12.26; George 466; Zon. 12.23. For Barbalissos, see RGDS l. 4; Shapur’s figure of 60.000 
Roman soldiers may not be quite true, but the defeat was significant enough for Shapur to ravage the eastern 
provinces seemingly unopposed. 
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Rome in de Mediterranean world of the third and fourth centuries in terms of military 
strength and cultural sophistication, could never come close to matching the sheer power of 
its rival. In particular, it should be noted that none of the various Persian wars in this period 
ever resulted in major long-term losses of territory, making them actually less significant 
than the ‘barbarians in that respect.114  
Of course, the fact that there were no major territorial shifts should not obscure the 
devastation that wars with the Sassanids could cause, so we will now investigate the sepa-
rate incursions and try to determine just how serious they were. Before doing so, however, it 
is important to note that up to 252 the region was relatively tranquil. There was the revolt of 
Jotapianus (which seems to have been a minor affair), and the local Christian communities 
undoubtedly suffered from the consequences of the Decian edict. But the only conflict with 
the Sassanids at this time consisted of an abortive attempt by Philip in the mid-240’s to re-
gain the few territories that may have been lost during the unsuccessful Persian war of Gor-
dian III in 241-244. Like the previous Roman-Sassanid conflicts, it took place only on the bor-
der.115 This was, however, to change in 252. 
 Unfortunately, our sources for the Persian attack of 252-253 are so meagre that it is 
not really possible to add anything to what has already been said about it in the first chapter: 
that the Sassanids overwhelmed a concentrated Roman force and followed up on this suc-
cess by splitting up into several groups and laying waste to the eastern provinces, aided by 
the Antiochene defector Mariades. However, it is at least reasonable to conclude from the 
complete absence of indications of resistance to the Persians from our sources that the Ro-
man army in the area had been wiped out completely, giving the Persians free reign to plun-
der.116 The long-term consequences of this war are even more difficult to determine, as the 
Persians would attack at least two more times before 259; the first of these was the incur-
sion repulsed by Uraninus Antoninus, while the second resulted in the destruction of the 
frontier town Dura Europus somewhere between 255 and 257. In fact, given the absence of 
                                                          
114 Goldsworthy (2009) 135-137; E. Winter, Die sāsānidisch-römischen Friedensverträge des 3. Jahrhunderts n. 
Chr. – ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der außenpolitischen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Großmächten 
(Frankfurt am Main 1988), 114-120, 125; Isaac (1990) 31-33; see also U. Hartmann, Das Palmyrenische Teilreich 
(Stuttgart 2001), 140: the full-scale integration of the entire Roman East into the Persian state would have been 
beyond the administrative capacities of the Sassanids anyway. 
115 F. Millar, The Roman Near East, 31 B.C.-A.D. 337 (Cambridge 1993), 154-159; Philip’s attempt to regain lost 
territories is reported only by Zon. 12.19, but it may also be one of the factors lying behind the confused tale of 
conflict  in the east during the late 240’s found in Orac. Sib. XIII.25-49. 
116 Potter (1990) 307-308. 
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another campaign discussed by Shapur on the RGDS until the one of 259-260, it is held by 
Frye that these incidents were still part of the same campaign started by Shapur in 252, re-
sulting in the following view on the 250’s: “the entire period was one of war and pillage in 
Syria, Cappadocia and Cilicia, with the Romans on the defensive.”117  
But this blatantly ignores the evidence presented by Millar of an at least temporary 
restoration concurrent with Valerian’s arrival in the east in 254. In addition, there are also 
indications from at least some cities taken by the Persians in 252-253 that life had returned 
to normal there at that time, despite the devastation that the Sassanids must have undoubt-
edly caused to these cities and their surroundings.118 Furthermore, Frye’s view is based upon 
the ideas that Antioch was captured in 256 rather than 253 and that the destruction of Dura 
should be equated with the capture of Dura listed on the RGDS, but Baldus has already 
demonstrated that both propositions should be rejected.119 In addition, the fact that the 
Oracle originally ended with the victory of Uranius Antoninus and that the later addition only 
covers Shapur’s attack of 259/260 and the exploits of Odaenathus is surely also signifi-
cant.120  
It is therefore better to see the absence of the incident involving Uranius Antoninus 
and the sack of Dura from the RGDS as a sign that these were not part of a full-scale cam-
paign. The victory of Antoninus seems to have halted the renewed attack and would have 
been quite an embarrassment for Shapur, while the capture of Dura was probably an isolat-
ed incident that has been taken out of proportion by its rich archaeological remains, which 
have given us an unparalleled insight into the horror that siege warfare brought upon the 
inhabitants of a sacked city.121 
                                                          
117 R. N. Frye, ‘The Sassanians’ in: CAH XII (2005) 461-480, 469. 
118 Millar (1993) 162-164. 
119 Baldus (1971) 257-259, 263-265. The idea that Antioch was taken in 256 rests upon a passage of the Chroni-
cle of Se’ert, an anonymous medieval Arabic work from which two extracts survive. The Antiochene patriarch 
Demetri(an)us, who is known to have been in the city is late as 254, was supposedly captured by the Sassanids 
and brought along to Persia (see Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) 297 for the relevant section). But, as Baldus has 
shown, there is no reason why this could not have happened in 260, and as the next Antiochene patriarch is 
not attested until then this actually makes more sense. Alternatively, the statement of Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. 
7.27.1) that Demetri(an)us died in Antioch suggests that he may never have been captured at all, which means 
that there is even less reason for postulating a sack to 256; so Potter (1990) 339, who also notes  a capture of 
Antioch in 260 is itself unlikely. As for Dura, there is no reason why it could not have been captured prior to its 
destruction, and this is in fact what the archaeological record (see Millar (1993) 162) and in particular P. Dura 
154 (= Dodgeon and Lieu 1991) App. 2 no. 2A) suggest. 
120 Orac. Sib. XIII.150-173. 
121 See Goldsworthy (2009) 101-102 for a narrative of the siege and capture of Dura based upon the archaeo-
logical remains. 
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When Shapur attacked again in 259/260, he was fortunate enough to find himself up 
against Valerian’s plague-stricken Roman army, allowing him to capture the emperor himself 
and once again move on to ravage Rome’s eastern provinces. The first point of discussion is 
the effect of Valerian’s capture on the empire as a whole. Given that it was at this time that 
the empire’s fortune were as low as they would ever be, with multiple usurpations and inva-
sions all happening at once, it has naturally been easy to see the imprisonment of Valerian as 
the immediate cause: “As defective as the evidence is, it nonetheless seems possible to con-
nect an enormous range of insurrections and upheavals to the arrival of the news”.122  
But the muddled chronology of these years means that alternative interpretations 
are also possible: the usurpation of Ingenuus in Pannonia may have taken place before Vale-
rian’s capture, while the establishment of the Gallic Empire seems to have come too late for 
a direct connection with the events in the east.123 Nevertheless, the consequences of Valeri-
an’s loss of liberty should not be treated too lightly. The lack of contemporary mentions of 
Valerian’s capture in the context of catastrophes is perhaps more a sign of embarrassment 
on the part of Gallienus, who distanced himself from his father after 260, than a sign of un-
importance, while the relatively easy suppression of the usurpers Macrianus and Callistus by 
Aureolus and Odaenathus should not obscure the fact that Gallienus was forced to cede de 
facto control over the east to the latter; more will be said on that in the next chapter.124 
The mentions of Macrianus, Callistus and Odaenathus bring us to the second point: 
the extent of the damage caused by the Persians in 259/260. Again Shapur gives an impres-
sive list of cities and territories captured by his army, which once again appears to have split 
itself up into multiple columns, but it should be noted that these are mostly located in Mes-
opotamia and eastern Asia Minor, suggesting that Syria was generally left undamaged.125 
Moreover, it has been rightly observed by Potter that the ability of Macrianus to assemble 
an army shortly afterwards to challenge Gallienus in the west indicates that Roman losses 
may not have been all that heavy.126 Indeed, the earlier minor successes of Macrinus and 
Callistus against some of the Persian columns that led to their usurpation also make for a 
notable contrast with the apparent absence of Roman army resistance in 252-253. 
                                                          
122 Ando (2012) 169; cf. Christol (1999) 139. 
123 J. Fitz, Ingenuus et Régalien (Brussels 1966), 35, 41-45; Drinkwater (1987) 26. 
124 Contra Strobel (1993) 245-247; for Gallienus’ distancing from his father, see De Blois (1974) 20-21. 
125 RGDS l. 27-34; Millar (1993) 166-167. 
126 Potter (1990) 344. 
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So while the attack of 260, like that of 252-253, must have been devastating to those 
living in the captured cities and struck a considerable blow at Roman prestige, recovery was 
quite rapid. That Potter, who is known for emphasising the importance of the Sassanids as a 
factor in the onset of the ‘crisis’, should compare Shapur to Hannibal is therefore highly sig-
nificant: “It is arguable that he was a general whose skill was comparable to that of Hannibal, 
for like Hannibal he seems to have proceeded from a careful study of the Roman way of war, 
and the disasters that he inflicted on Roman armies were on a par with some of the great 
catastrophes suffered at the beginning of the Second Punic War.”127 For while Potter may be 
right to equate the impressive victories of Shapur to those of Hannibal, the two are also simi-
lar in the sense that neither of them succeeded in dislocating Roman rule over the area that 
they ravaged despite their repeated triumphs over Roman forces, as Odaenathus quickly 
recaptured whatever territory had been lost.128 And it should not be forgotten that after the 
campaign of 259-260 Shapur would not trouble the empire again. Of course, a difference 
between Hannibal and Shapur is that the latter probably never aimed at permanent large-
scale conquest; it is more likely that Shapur had more modest aims and was perhaps not 
even aware of the exact size of the Achaemenid Empire.129 
Why Shapur repeatedly failed to follow up on his victories is difficult to tell. It is pos-
sible that, having achieved his main aim of acquiring prestige and booty to satisfy his follow-
ers, the aging monarch could now rest upon his laurels as far as the Romans were con-
cerned, and move his attention to issues on his other borders.130 But the successful cam-
paign against the Persians of Odaenathus, who seems to have been able to strike deep into 
Persian territory on at least one occasion practically without meeting any opposition, sug-
gests something else entirely: that the earlier campaigns of Shapur, as triumphant as they 
seemed to be, seriously overstretched the resources of the Sassanid state. This necessitated 
the disbanding of its standing army after 260, as Shapur likely did not foresee the ability of 
the Romans to strike back within a few years of their resounding defeat.131  
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Admittedly, this reasoning must remain speculative, as there is simply no evidence 
from Persia itself to check its correctness. Nevertheless, it seems to be the best explanation 
for Odaenathus’ seemingly effortless success against Persia, and its implications – that the 
Sassanid state could only sustain prolonged warfare for limited periods – are highly signifi-
cant. And indeed, Shapur’s successors proved incapable of repeating his triumphs, despite 
the fact that, as evidenced by the abandonment of Aurelian’s and Probus’ plans for war with 
Persia, the Roman Empire remained troubled. When the Romans did finally launch a cam-
paign, that of Carus in 282-283, there once again seems to have been practically no opposi-
tion to him, although the extremely confused traditions about how far Carus got, how he 
died, and why the Romans retreated mean that very little can be understood of this cam-
paign anyway. The most that can be said is that there were once again no territorial shifts.132 
Carus’ campaign would prove to be an exception in the years from 260 to 296, and 
this brings us to the onset of the tetrarchic period. Diocletian and the then-reigning Sassanid 
monarch Bahram II agreed on a peace treaty in 288, when both sides had something to gain 
from this peace. the Persian state was still wrecked by internal disorder at this point, while 
Diocletian’s authority had not been firmly established yet and would, in fact, soon be chal-
lenged by the revolt of Carausius.133 
But with Narseh firmly in control by 296, war was inevitably renewed. The course of 
the war has already been sketched in the first chapter: initial defeat followed by resounding 
victory for Rome. For our comparative purposes it is intriguing that the Sassanids once again 
failed to follow up on their initial success. This contrasts noticeably with Galerius, who, after 
his initial victory in Armenia, went on to score victories in the Persian provinces of Media 
and Adiabene.134 However, it may simply not have been possible for the Persians to move 
into Roman territory, as the approach of summer would have made campaigning difficult.135 
The treaty that was concluded in 299 was very advantageous to Rome, with some 
modest territorial gains among the Tigris, most notably the fortress city of Nisibis, which 
gave the empire far better control over its eastern border. In addition, the treaty provision 
that all trade passing through the border had to be checked at Nisibis ensured considerable 
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economic gains at the expense of the Sassanids.136 At the same time, the Persians would not 
forget the humiliation that they suffered through this treaty, and the wars fought with Rome 
after the death of Constantine were intended to recoup these losses – a goal the Sassanids 
would finally achieve after the disastrous Roman campaign of 363. But to blame this treaty 
for that would not be fair, as Diocletian actually showed restraint in not demanding more 
territory from the Persians: Aurelius Victor explicitly notes that Diocletian opposed the crea-
tion of a new province, even though Galerius’ victory had made that a possibility.137 
The war with Narseh itself was perhaps just as much an exception in Roman-Persian 
relations between 267 and 337 as Carus’ campaign was. There were no major conflicts, but 
some coins and inscriptions suggest occasional fighting under Daja in 310 and 312 and under 
Licinius in 313 or 314. In addition, Constantine is known to have prepared for a Persian cam-
paign in the last year of his life, but his unexpected death meant that the campaign had to 
be aborted.138 The following period would be one of renewed warfare, the Sassanids now 
being led by Shapur II, whose vigour matched that of his great-grandfather of the same 
name. But those events are beyond the scope of this thesis. For now it is most important 
that the border with Persia generally appears to have remained tranquil throughout our pe-
riod. Then again, Lactantius’ lack of interest in foreign warfare is as much of a problem here 
as it was with regard to the ‘barbarians’; in fact, the lack of a Near East-centric narrative 
source after the Oracle leaves off makes the problem even more significant in this case.139 
All in all, if we look at the history of Roman-Persian relations between 249 and 324, 
there are two points that merit great interest. First, the incursions of 253 and 259/260 were 
devastating, but also fairly unique: other than some intermittent attacks throughout the 
250’s and some possible conflict in the first half of the 310’s, the only three other major con-
flicts throughout the ‘crisis’ and the tetrarchic period were the campaigns of Odaenathus 
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and Carus and the war with Narseh. The first and third of these were Roman victories; our 
sources for the second conflict also speak of Roman success, although the fact that Carus 
may well have been murdered by his own men means that things were perhaps not going as 
well as the sources indicate.140 Second, the Sassanids had a tendency to not follow up on 
victories won over Roman forces. This may well have been due to the modesty of their aims 
in general and to unfavourable campaigning circumstances in the case of the 296-298 war. 
But for our purposes it is more important that the Sassanid incursions, while devastating in 
the immediate aftermath, could not inflict long-term damage on the Roman Near East. 
The above, then, suggests a large degree of continuity. But, as with the ‘barbarians’, 
care must be taken not to go too far. After all, the defeat without any real consequences 
suffered against Narseh does not really compare with the two long lists of captured cities 
that the RGDS proudly displays. Therefore, as with the ‘barbarians’, the tetrarchic era was an 
improvement over the ‘crisis’ in the sense that the Persians could never come close to 
matching the successes of Shapur in the 250’s and 260. How did this improved situation 
come about? Again, the frontier defence reforms of Diocletian have been seen as an im-
portant factor. There is considerable evidence of fortification construction under Diocletian, 
and Williams has a point when he notes that the withdrawal of men from the Balkans to re-
inforce the army of Galerius after his initial defeat does not seem to have resulted in dis-
turbances, which contrast with similar withdrawals from the Balkans under Gallus and from 
Gaul under Valerian in response to Persian attacks.141  
But the doubts expressed about the revolutionary character of Diocletian’s re-
forms142 are valid here as well, and the lack of ‘barbarian’ responses to the withdrawal of 
men from the Danube could just as well be a result of the stabilised relationship between 
them and Rome. And it should also be noted that the little internal evidence that survives 
from Narseh’s reign indicates that his control over the Sassanid state was far less solid than 
that of Shapur I had been and that of Shapur II would be.143 As we have already seen that 
the periods between Narseh and both Shapurs were times of deep-seated instability for the 
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Persian state, it is once again legitimate to wonder whether the Romans did not simply get 
lucky. 
We have now dealt with the three frontiers that have traditionally received the most 
attention: the Rhine, Danube and Syrian/Mesopotamian frontier. But there were also desert 
borders along Palestine, Arabia, Egypt and Africa. The various nomads that lived across these 
borders have made far less of an impact on the historical record than the northern ‘barbari-
ans’, but they existed, and as such they are well worth dealing with here, even if compara-
tively little space will be allotted to all but Africa. In the next section we will first look at the 
provinces of the western half of North Africa, then we will turn to Egypt, and finally Palestine 
and Arabia will be discussed. 
 
Out beyond the desert 
Traditionally, the northwest of Africa has been seen as unusual during the third century in 
that, other than a brief civil war in 238, it remained relatively undisturbed. While there are 
some signs of decay, most notably the lack of construction activities in African cities on the 
fringes of Roman territory between 244 and 284, compared to other areas these signs are 
minor. In fact, for the core territories the third century was generally a time of great eco-
nomic growth. And while inscriptions record fighting with various tribes of raiders during the 
reign of Valerian, this was only a temporary problem without long-term consequences.144 
However, a far less optimistic picture of third-century Africa has been presented by Marcel 
Bénabou, who stresses the severity and perseverance of the raids.145 As he has conveniently 
listed the relevant material, occasionally even providing the entire texts of inscriptions, we 
will now look at these inscriptions to see whether he is right to see them as signs of major 
trouble, or whether the incidents that the epigraphic material describes were actually as 
minor as is usually thought. 
 Bénabou gives three inscriptions that indicate conflict with ‘barbarians’ in 253. The 
first of these, from the north of Algeria dating from August 254, celebrates a victory “be-
cause of barbarians who surrendered and also fled”. The second, found in the same place as 
the first but dating from February 255, honours the cavalry commander Primianus as “the 
defender of his province”. The third, found in the northeast of Algeria and dating from 
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around 256, has Veturianus, legate of Numidia, thanking the gods for making his province 
prosperous once again.146 But notwithstanding the fact that only the first inscription pro-
vides direct evidence of conflict with foreign enemies, the general impression conveyed is 
that, at most, there were some minor difficulties that have now been overcome. 
 Next, Bénabou discusses Cornelius Octavianus, who held a special command in Africa 
between 255 and 258, during which he fought against “Bavaran rebels”.147 Bénabou uses a 
text found in Teniet Mesken, which describes a Roman victory over the Bavares but also 
mentions kings and a multitude, to argue that the situation was quite serious, something 
that the seeming necessity to create a special command emphasises. Moreover, two inscrip-
tions, one from the northeast of Algeria, another from the north, list a number of battles 
against various tribes of invaders; the soldier honoured on the second inscription, Gargilius 
Martialus, is known to have been killed by raiders not long after the erection of the inscrip-
tion. From this, combined with a later inscription that addresses the restorative goddess 
Fortuna Redux and another detailing the establishment of a fort, Bénabou concludes that 
Octavianus’ command accomplished little: there would continue to be disturbances during 
the 260’s.148  
The latter point is reasonable, as the documents cited by Bénabou do indicate that 
the Romans had some rouble re-establishing order. But as this was a period when the dan-
ger of usurpation often forced emperors to do as much as possible themselves rather than 
delegating matters to their generals,149 the existence of Octavianus’ special command is 
perhaps less significant than the fact that Valerian and Gallienus did not feel the need to 
come to Africa themselves. So while Bénabou is probably right with his contention that 
stamping out the unrest took a long time, there also seems no need to attach any real 
weight to them. 
Between Gallienus and Probus the history of the area is rather sketchy. Saturninus, a 
pretender, is said to have “recovered Africa, captured by the Moors” in the HA, a comment 
that may have been based upon minor trouble in Africa, but the only possible piece of cor-
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roboration is an inscription from this period about the subjugation of several tribes.150 From 
the reign of Probus it is known that the Romans conducted a treaty with the Baquates, a 
tribe living in the east of present-day Morocco, suggesting that peace was maintained at 
least there, and there are no further reports of unrest for the ‘crisis’. On the other hand, the 
remote town of Volubilis had to be abandoned within the next few years, suggesting that the 
peace broke down again in Mauretania.151 But as Volubilis was remote and not all that im-
portant, its abandonment is perhaps not that significant, like it was with the Agri Decumates. 
Overall, while the incidents discussed by Bénabou do indicate that the tranquillity of Africa 
should not be taken as lightly as is sometimes done, there seems to be no good reason for 
being as bleak about it as he is either. 
As it was with the previous sections of this chapter, there is less that can be said 
about foreign warfare in Africa during the tetrarchic period. There was trouble during the 
290’s, which apparently involved the enigmatic ‘Quinquegentanei’. One inscription reports 
that a “bridge destroyed during the war with the savages” has been repaired, while two oth-
ers proclaim victories over raiders.152 Order was restored again by 298 at the latest, in a 
campaign led by Maximian in person. Bénabou has suggested that the presence of Maximian 
has made this campaign seem more important than it actually was.153 But that an emperor 
actually went to Africa makes for an important difference with ‘crisis’, when no emperor 
ever went on campaign there, and perhaps suggests that the unrest caused by the ‘Quin-
quegentanei’ was the most serious threat to Africa’s internal security in the third century. 
However, this must remain conjecture: nothing is heard of trouble in the African provinces 
for the remainder of the tetrarchic period, and Maximian’s presence may just as well be due 
to the relative absence of frontier warfare on Rome’s other borders, or due to the fact that 
there were now four emperors, allowing them to take on even minor issues in person. 
In addition to the above, Africa is one of the few cases in Ancient History where we 
have contemporary observations about the area on record from an individual who was well 
situated to comment on current events: Cyprian of Carthage. In terms of foreign warfare he 
has, unfortunately, little to offer. One of his letters is about a number of Christians that have 
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been captured, with Cyprian attempting to buy them free. There is possibly another attesta-
tion of such an event: the inscription dating from between Gallienus and Probus discussed 
above speaks of “their captured families”.154 However, this incident, while certainly traumat-
ic for those involved, seems to have been relatively minor – indeed, even Bénabou states 
that he hostage crisis probably amounted to little.155 But while Cyprian has little to offer with 
regard to events, he is invaluable for the way in which he viewed the crisis, even if the way in 
which he should be interpreted is controversial. While this subject is not quite directly rele-
vant to this chapter or any other, it is important for the thesis as a whole, and this is the best 
place to discuss the various ideas about Cyprian’s writings. 
One view is that of Alföldy, who holds that Cyprian gave equal weight to the internal 
troubles of the church and the ‘crisis’ that he thought held the empire in its grip. However, 
MacMullen, who holds that Alföldy makes Cyprian into too rational a mind, argues that Cyp-
rian’s view on the crisis was determined solely by his Christianity. Strobel agrees with this, 
but goes one step further in claiming that, as a result, his pessimism should not be seen as a 
sign that there was actually a ‘crisis’ in progress around him at all. Most recently, Brent has 
suggested that Cyprian, like his contemporaries, saw the ‘crisis’ in metaphysical terms: the 
world was transitioning from the golden age to an iron age of decline. 156 But one thing is not 
under debate: that Cyprian’s mood was subject to change throughout the 250’s. Changes in 
the degree of bleakness in his account of third century mostly seem to be related to the ap-
pearance and disappearance of schisms within the church and of persecution attempts, as 
well as individual events like the plague epidemic of 252-253. 
So what are we to make of these various ways of looking at Cyprian’s mode of 
thought? The different viewpoints ascribed to him can be reconciled through the notion of 
inconsistency developed by Versnel: Cyprian was simply not consequential in his degree of 
negativity towards his own time, and as such his variable comments can take on multiple 
different meanings depending on the observer, meanings that are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.157 But while this helps to explain why the notion of ‘crisis’ has multiple meanings 
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for Cyprian, it also means that it cannot be determined to what extent his views can be seen 
as evidence for what was happening around him.  
However, I think that there are reasons for assuming that Cyprian cannot be used for 
determining the existence of a structural ‘crisis’. In observing Cyprian’s changing mood in the 
250’s in a chronological fashion Alföldy has not, I think, sufficiently appreciated that most of 
Cyprian’s examples of pessimism come from his treatises, which have all been written in 
response to some sort of crisis. By contrast, his letters show little sign of apocalyptic think-
ing, which indicates that the day-to-day state of the empire did not give him much cause for 
alarm. The first letter from his corpus, which describes a general state of turmoil, is highly 
uncharacteristic; most letters deal with the disputes between him and the antipope No-
vatian.158 Moreover, a tendency to equate the state of the church with the degree of ‘crisis’ 
faced by the empire can also be found in letters of the Alexandrine bishop Dionysus pre-
served by Eusebius. Indeed, it was also present in the tetrarchic period: Lactantius admits 
that Diocletian’s rule was initially prosperous, but when he started persecuting Christians 
conditions became ruinous.159 
Egypt can be dealt with more briefly: while it will figure prominently in the next two 
chapters, there is very little known about foreign warfare there. The HA mentions an attack 
by Blemmyes, nomads originating from modern-day Sudan, during the reign of Probus; that 
there was indeed such a campaign is corroborated by Zosimus, but the HA’s claim that the 
Blemmyes had taken cities seems doubtful, and Zosimus actually seems to imply that the 
affair was handled by Probus’ generals rather than the emperor himself. In addition, a few 
years earlier there were also battles against the Marmaridae, another nomadic tribe that 
lived in the desert between modern-day Egypt and Libya.160 But nothing further is explicitly 
attested. 
However, Christol has argued that the second half of the 250’s was also a time of in-
stability for Egypt. Papyri attest the presence of ‘correctors’ in Egypt, and Aemilianus, pre-
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fect of Egypt between 258/259 and 261/262 (not to be confused with the ephemeral em-
peror of 253), is referred to as “deputy prefect” (διέποντος τὴν ἡγεμονίαν) in some docu-
ments between 256 and 258, a unique position altogether. According to Christol these spe-
cial measures indicate major trouble on the Egyptian frontier, much like Octavianus’ special 
command in Africa.161 But again, as was the case with Octavianus’ command, what really 
matters is that Valerian and Gallienus felt no need to handle the situation themselves. In 
addition, while Christol claims that the documents allude to military problems, in fact they 
either deal with day-to day matters like freight contracts and inheritance issues or with mi-
nor brigandage.162 So while something must have been going on to necessitate the presence 
of ‘correctors’, this should not be made too much of. 
Even less can be said about the Arabic provinces. While the Arabic nomads seem to 
have become more active from about the early third century onwards, resulting in occasion-
al raids, it was not until the late fourth century that these raids became somewhat signifi-
cant.163 In our timeframe only Diocletian is known to have campaigned against Saracens in 
290;164 much like Maximian’s African campaign this might suggest that at this time the raids 
were sufficiently threatening to necessitate the presence of an emperor or it might suggest 
that the changed circumstances allowed for the presence of the augustus. 
To summarize this chapter, it would appear that the position of the empire vis-à-vis 
its neighbours was indeed better during the tetrarchic period than it was during the crisis. 
Defeats suffered against ‘barbarians’ and Persians during the ‘crisis’ like Abrittus and Bar-
balissos would not be repeated. Indeed, the one major Roman-Persian conflict of the tetrar-
chic era, the war against Narseh, ended in a clear victory for the Romans, and the ‘barbari-
ans’ appear to have remained generally quiet. Of course, we have also seen that both ‘crisis’ 
and tetrarchy need to be nuanced in this regard. 
 For the ‘crisis’ it has been noted that the ‘barbarians’ were usually only effective in 
the field and that the Sassanids were unable or unwilling to follow up on their great victories 
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over Roman forces. Neither groups managed to inflict long-term damage on the empire, ex-
cept for some western provinces like Germania that were subjected to raids for prolonged 
periods. For the tetrarchy there were some instances, like Constantius’ near-death experi-
ence against the Alamanni and other events attested by epigraphic and numismatic sources, 
that show that the extent of stabilization should not be taken for granted. The African and 
Arabic provinces, which seem to have been relatively untroubled during the ‘crisis’, present 
an ambiguous picture: the presence of emperors on campaign there during the tetrarchic 
period may be either a sign of urgency or a sign of restored order. But these nuances cannot 
be pushed too far: overall the tetrarchic era was an improvement over the ‘crisis’ in terms of 
external warfare. When it comes to internal warfare, however, things were rather different. 
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3. Internal strife 
 
“The war against the usurper is my concern, the one against the barbarians, the state’s, and it 
is proper that that of the state take precedent.”165 
These words were put into the mouth of Claudius II by Zonaras (or perhaps rather one of his 
sources) in the context of his decision to let the Gallic Empire be in favour of war against the 
‘Scythians’. The sentiment expressed here is remarkably similar to the line of thought at-
tributed by Ammianus Marcellinus to another emperor, Valentinian I (r. 364-375), who, in 
365, had to decide between responding to an attack by Alamanni and assisting his younger 
brother and co-ruler Valens (r. 364-378) against the usurper Procopius: 
“At last, after giving careful thought to what was expedient, he followed the view of the major-
ity, often repeating that Procopius was only his own and his brother's enemy, but the Alaman-
ni were enemies of the whole Roman world; and so he resolved for the present nowhere to 
leave the boundaries of Gaul.”166 
These quotes give a clear indication of what it was that the Roman aristocracy valued in its 
emperors – success against ‘barbarians’ and other external enemies. It also shows what they 
did not value: ‘selfish’ wars against usurpers. Indeed, Gallienus’ regular wars against pre-
tenders may well be one of the main reasons for his poor reputation in the pro-senatorial 
Latin historiographical tradition.167 And yet, most historians nowadays would agree that it 
was internal unrest, not ‘barbarian’ invasions, that was “the real bane of the age”.168 
In this chapter we will compare the internal struggles during the ‘crisis’ on the one 
hand and the tetrarchy on the other hand on several levels. Usurpations, which can be divid-
ed into the straightforward sort by men that made a direct bid for imperial power and the 
less common variety by men who instead chose to consolidate their power over just a specif-
ic part of the empire, form the most obvious category. But internal troubles were not just 
caused by individuals. Groups, whether they were brigands or unruly soldiers, could inflict 
considerable damage upon the areas that they ravaged. This mostly affected the common 
man and as such belongs to the most basic level, so we will start our survey there. From 
                                                          
165 Zon. 12.26 (trans. Banchic and Lane). 
166 Amm. Marc. 26.5.13 (Loeb translation). 
167 De Blois (1974) 68-69. 
168 Drinkwater (2007) 51. 
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there we will move steadily up on the ladder until we reach those who risked all in the pur-
suit of supreme power. 
 
Robbery, assault and battery 
With brigandage the main problem is that it generally increases and decreases in intensity as 
part of  long-term trends, which makes it difficult to determine when exactly it became a 
major problem and why this happened. But in general, it seems as if there was a rare lull in 
banditism between the mid-first and mid-second century, after which it became more com-
mon again. Usually, the imperial response was to send in soldiers to take on the bandits. But 
for the general populace this might only make things worse: the soldiers would plunder at 
will and occasionally even join forces with the brigands. In his Enemies of the Roman Order 
MacMullen has listed several examples of conflicts between brigands and Roman authorities 
as well as measures undertaken by said authorities to curb the problem. He even goes so far 
as to suggest that the proliferation of bandits and the ravaging bands of soldiers that came 
in their wake provoked the first major raids by foreign enemies into Roman territory in the 
third century (presumably after said soldiers had cleared off). This then led to more internal 
unrest, which then provoked more foreign attacks, thus creating the cycle that was one of 
the main problems during the ‘crisis’.169 
This brings us to the thorny chicken-and-egg question of which came first: the exter-
nal issues or the internal ones. We already saw in the previous chapter that the threat posed 
by ‘barbarians’ has often been exaggerated, which makes it more plausible that it was in-
deed the internal issues that came first, giving the ‘barbarians’ an easy chance to gain plun-
der from Roman territory.170 On the other hand, so little can be said about the start of the 
vicious cycle that the fact that both issues started at about the same time may also have 
been a coincidence,171 or they may both spring from an entirely different factor. 
But as far as banditism is concerned, the most important point is that for both of our 
timeframes the sources tell us little about the activities of bandits and deserters, and noth-
ing about imperial measures to deal with them; the Bagaudae would seem to be an excep-
                                                          
169 MacMullen (1966) 193-197; see also Isaac (1990) 85-89, who notes that banditry was endemic in Palestina 
even during the Principate, and that this could also have been the case in provinces with less evidence. 
170 Kulikowski (2007) 28-30; Goldsworthy (2009); but cf. Burns (2003) 279, arguing against the idea of ‘barbari-
ans’ eagerly seizing any chance to attack the empire: “Northern barbarians were not sitting around their camp-
fires eagerly waiting for the first sign of Roman weakness.” 
171 Millar (1981) 240. 
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tion, but as these cannot be dismissed as mere brigands they will be dealt with in the next 
section. In fact, other than a notice in Zosimus about escaped gladiators who became ban-
dits in the early 280’s the only examples of banditry that can be securely dated to the period 
between 249 and 324 come from two papyri: the first, which was previously discussed as 
one of the attestations of an Egyptian ‘corrector’, dates from the second half of the 250’s 
and concerns the manhunt for a murderer in the city of Oxyrhynchus and its province; in the 
second, a fragmentary trial text from the city of Antinoopolis that dates from the last quarter 
of the third century, it is claimed that the accused was “in the company of brigands”.172  
Of course, MacMullen is probably right to note that this does not mean that there 
were no such problems; after all, the absence of imperial countermeasures could be related 
to the well-known fact that there are few surviving rescripts from the third century, particu-
larly from the reigns of Claudius II, Aurelian, Tacitus and Probus.173 But it does indicate that 
we should not give too much weight to banditism between 249 and 324: it was a serious 
problem, but not significantly more so than in the periods before and after. In addition, it is 
in general important to remember that on the spectrum between ‘embarrassing’ and ‘disas-
trous’ banditry belongs firmly on the side of the former.174 
For our comparative purposes, it would therefore seem that there was mostly conti-
nuity. However, the ‘crisis’ did differ from the tetrarchy in the sense that in the former peri-
od bandits more commonly appeared with leaders. Mariades, whose activities were dis-
cussed in the first chapter, is said to have been assisted by a large number of ‘friends’. In 
addition, during the reign of Probus an Isaurian bandit leader called Lydius managed to take 
the city of Cremna, located in Asia Minor, and even after his death his followers only surren-
dered after a lengthy siege. The HA gives two other major Isaurian bandit leaders, Trebelli-
anus during the 260’s and Palfuerius during the reign of Probus, although these two may 
well be inventions, or, in the case of Palfuerius, an alternative name for Lydius.175 But fa-
                                                          
172 Zos. 1.71.3; SB XX 14229; P. Ant. II 87 l. 13 (συνῆσαν̣ τοῖς λῃσταῖς). 
173 MacMullen (1966) 195, with 255-268 for a list of evidence; Ando (2012) 195 conveniently provides a cata-
logue of surviving rescripts per emperor. 
174 A division I owe to Hekster (2008) 17. 
175 The supporters of Mariades are mentioned in frag. 1 of the anonymous Continuator of Dio (= Dodgeon and 
Lieu (1991) 53 no. 3.1.5); see also Orac. Sib. XIII.111. The dramatic account of the siege of Cremna provided by 
Zos. 1.69-70 is at least partially corroborated by the archaeological record (on which see Mitchell (1993) 1: 234-
235; Potter (2004) 277). For Trebellianus, see HA, Tyr. Trig. 26; a Trebellianus is also mentioned by Eutr., Brev. 
9.8.1, but as this mention occurs in the context of the rebellion of Ingenuus it is surely an error for Regalianus. 
For Palfuerius, see HA, Vit. Prob. 16.4. 
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mous brigand leaders were not unique to the ‘crisis’: Bulla Felix from the Severan era is just 
one noteworthy example. 
However, if banditism in and of itself was not more of a problem than usual, prob-
lems caused by ravaging bands of soldiers were. That the military was often a plague for the 
civilian populace is well attested throughout the entire history of the empire. It would there-
fore seem reasonable to suggest, as De Blois has done, that the greater frequency of passing 
armies in the third century – for now it was not just brigandage, but also raids and combat-
ing usurpers that necessitated the presence of soldiers – must have led to much damage to 
the towns that they came accross. Indeed, Zosimus criticises Valerian for “only doing dam-
age to the cities he passed through” during his journey through Asia Minor in response to 
the Scythian attacks of the mid-250’s.176  
But De Blois only speaks of the ‘crisis’ and not of the tetrarchy, when, according to 
the fourth paragraph of the Panegyric held before Maximian around 290, he and Diocletian 
were constantly traveling from place to place, something that the documentary evidence of 
the movements of the tetrarchs confirms. As such, this particular problem would appear to 
have been just as prevalent during the tetrarchy, especially as there is at least one attested 
example of soldiers plundering the countryside, namely the army of Galerius after the failed 
attempt to unseat Maxentius.177 
It might be objected that the tetrarchic journeys would not always have had military 
purposes and would consequentially have involved fewer soldiers. But the comment that 
during these journeys “you conquered everywhere” and the reference to “your martial feats 
and victories” that immediately follows it suggest otherwise.178 And even in the best of times 
imperial visits could be rather problematic for the host. Millar has vividly described them as 
a decidedly mixed blessing: for the average inhabitants of the empire they provided an once-
in-a-lifetime opportunity to address their personal grievances to the emperor, but the prep-
arations for the visit also meant enormous costs for the organisers. Furthermore, for imperi-
al capitals such costs were always present.179 
                                                          
176 De Blois (2002) 105; Zos. 1.36.1 (trans. Ridley): μόνον ἐπιτρίψας τὰς πόλεις. 
177 Pan. Lat. XI 4; for imperial journeys during the tetrarchic era, see the exhaustive overview in Barnes (1982) 
49-87. The plundering by Galerius’ men is attested by Lact., DMP 27.5-7; Origo 7; however, see also Leadbetter 
(2009) 195-196 and Potter (2013) 119, who suggest that this helped to make Maxentius unpopular. 
178 Pan. Lat. XI 4.4 (vos ubique vicisse), 5.1 (rebus bellicis victoriisque vestris). 
179 F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London 1977), 32-35; for capitals, see MacMullen (1976) 105. 
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 In addition, an interesting point of nuance can be made with regard to unrest caused 
by soldiers during the ‘crisis’. It is well known that a number of second and third-century 
inscriptions from the eastern provinces are about citizens who petition the emperor to re-
strain his soldiers from looting at will. But these all date from the first half of the third centu-
ry: nothing is heard from 249 onwards, the point at which the ‘crisis’ is generally agreed to 
have gained force. It might optimistically be supposed that the soldiers realised that the sit-
uation was so grave that they had to mend their ways.180 It might more cynically – and prob-
ably more realistically – be suggested that they were simply too busy fighting wars to con-
tinue their extortionist hobbies, or perhaps there remained little to extort anyway. But the 
result is much the same: for many inhabitants of the empire the external and internal con-
flicts that affected the empire during the ‘crisis’ may have been a blessing in disguise. 
 To round off this section, it is worth taking a brief look at the role of the ordinary sol-
diers in the internal unrest. As early as Late Antiquity itself the senators responsible for most 
of the surviving literary sources made soldiers into their main scapegoats; Aurelius Victor in 
particular seized every opportunity to insert a moralizing digression on their depravity. And 
when an emperor was acclaimed or murdered, the agents are usually said to have been ‘the 
soldiers’.181 But it is well worth noting that, with the exception of the account of Probus’ 
murder and a short-lived tetrarchic usurpation that will be treated below, in all the cases in 
which the sources provide some circumstantial detail about usurpations and assassinations 
the common soldiers are conspicuous by their absence. 
 Consider, for instance, the tale of Gallienus’ murder. The identity of the murderers 
differs per account, mostly due to a desire in the Latin tradition to exculpate Claudius II, who 
had been ‘adopted’ by Constantine as his divine ancestor. But all agree that “the conspiracy 
was an officers’ affair”: Gallienus’ favouring of the common soldiers seems to have succeed-
ed in making him popular with the rank and file, who are said to have been upset over his 
assassination, and it may well be that Claudius’ subsequent decision to have Gallienus dei-
                                                          
180 The material is collected in P. Hermann ed., Hilferufe aus römischen Provinzen: ein Aspekt der Krise des römi-
schen Reiches im 3. Jhdt. n. Chr. (Hamburg/Göttingen 1990); for another example, see Mitchell (1993) 1: 229 
n.16. The problem of extortionist soldiers goes back a long time: see J. B. Campbell, The Emperor and the Ro-
man Army (Oxford 1984), 243-263. For the optimistic view of the army’s conduct during the ‘crisis’, see Mac-
Mullen (1976) 213; but cf. De Blois (2002) 105, arguing the fact that we only hear nothing new due to the de-
creasing number of inscriptions. 
181 For anti-military comments in Victor, see De Caes. 3.15, 8.3, 11.9-11, 18.2, 26.6, 31.2; when the soldiers 
show themselves virtuous, Victor calls it a rare exception (De Caes. 34.1, 35.11). 
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fied was made to profit from his popularity.182 Likewise, the assassination of Aurelian is said 
to have been the work of a small group of officers who had been misled by a clerk into be-
lieving that Aurelian wanted their blood. The story may not be quite true, but Aurelian’s 
popularity with the regular soldiers is confirmed by the fact that none of the general staff 
dared to take power for a few weeks.183  
With regard to the military's role in proclaiming emperors, Constantine's elevation to 
caesar is highly instructive. The romantic story told by Lactantius and Eusebius, in which 
Constantine reaches his father on his deathbed, is flatly contradicted by the Origo and a 
Panegyric recited in 310, which has father and son campaigning together for some time prior 
to the death of the former. As a result of this public association between the augustus and 
his son, Constantine became the prime candidate for the succession in the eyes of the army. 
In other words, his acclamation was actually engineered from above: the acclamation by the 
regular soldiers was predetermined. In fact, only the Origo can be taken as saying that the 
regular soldiers provided the main impetus, and this is only an offhand and general remark. 
Lactantius and Eusebius state that the succession was determined by Constantius, Zosimus 
has Constantius’ praetorian guardsmen as the main players, while according to the Epitome 
one of the main acclaimers was the Alamannic king Crocus. The name may be an invention, 
but it is certainly not implausible that Constantius had a major Alamannic associate that 
helped to engineer the accession of his son. As such, it seems proper to play down the in-
volvement of the rank and file in this matter.184 
This gives us a good reason to doubt the various claims about emperors being creat-
ed by the army during the 'crisis' - the supposedly reluctant usurpation of Decius against 
Philip immediately springs to mind.185 Admittedly, it is certainly true that the usurpations 
would not have been possible if soldiers had not been willing to both support illegitimate 
pretenders and fight their colleagues, and there can be little doubt that soldiers were often 
                                                          
182 Drinkwater (2005) 48; for a thorough discussion of Gallienus’ military policy and its many advantages for the 
rank and file, see De Blois (1974) 21-108. As for their resentment at Gallienus murder, according to Zos. 1.41.1 
the soldiers needed to be “calmed” (ἡσυχασάντων) afterwards. HA, Vit. Gall. 15.1-2 also records angry soldiers 
at this point that needed to be bought off. Even if the author is correct to dismiss their fondness for Gallienus 
as a pretence, this still corroborates my case that they had no part in his death. 
183 Watson (1999) 105-106. 
184 The various versions are, in chronological order, Pan. Lat. VI 7.3-8.3; Lact., DMP 24.5-8; Euseb., Vit. 
Cons. 1.18.2-22.2; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. De Caes. 41.2-3 (the (partial) authenticity of the report is defended in 
Drinkwater (2007) 146); Zos. 2.9.1. 
185 See e.g. the story found in Zon. 12.19 in which Decius sends Philip a letter explaining that he usurped against 
his will. On the notion of the ‘reluctant usurper’, see Syme (1971) 198, 205-206. 
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difficult to control during the ‘crisis’. But this had also been the case during the Principate, 
and the story of Galerius having to beg his men on his knees not to desert him before the 
walls of Rome suggests that it continued to be so during the tetrarchy as well.186 So as far as 
internal disorder on the ‘basic’ level is concerned, it can be said that it was generally not all 
that significant, with the possible exception of damage caused by extortionist soldiers to 
cities, and that there is mostly continuity between the ‘crisis’ and the tetrarchy. 
 
Rebels with a cause 
Of course, the general populace was not just a passive recipient of violence: it was quite ca-
pable of revolts. Unfortunately, this is another area where the source material fails us badly. 
It seems reasonable to say that revolts occurred, and they are known to have been a serious 
problem for Maxentius in the weeks leading up to his final battle with Constantine. There 
was also the revolt of the mint-workers of Rome under Aurelian, an obscure episode that 
will be treated in the next chapter. But alas: “The political effectiveness of disorders is more 
easily assumed than proved.”187 Nevertheless, in some cases we know about such rebellions, 
or at least of people taking the law into their own hands, because their leaders have left an 
impact upon the historical record. These men differ from the bandit leaders discussed in the 
previous section in that they actually had coins issued in their name that contained imperial 
titulature, but they also differ from run-of-the-mill pretenders in the sense that they never 
strove to anything but local authority. Indeed, some may not even have been aware of the 
fact that issuing their own coinage amounted to treason.188  
Admittedly, the boundary separating these men from other pretenders is somewhat 
fluid. Mariades, for example, might also be said to belong to this group: while there is no 
reason to believe the claim of the HA that he declared himself emperor,189 he seems to have 
had a considerable number of followers. But to my mind, this group forms a category on its 
own that deserves its own section. First, we have the rebels that were active in the late 240’s 
and the first half of the 250’s. Then, we have the Bagaudae, who can be dated to the first 
half of the 280’s, as well as an Egyptian ‘civil war’ of which it has been suggested that it was 
part of a similar phenomenon. Finally, there were two Egyptian revolts in the 290’s. 
                                                          
186 Lact., DMP 27.4; for problems with the army during the Principate, see Campbell (1984) 186-198. 
187 MacMullen (1966) 172-173. 
188 Potter (2004) 250. 
189 HA, Tyr. Trig. 2.2-3. 
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On three of the four members of the first group little can be said. Jotapianus, who 
was already briefly alluded to in the first chapter, supposedly revolted against Roman au-
thority due to oppressive new tax practices in the eastern provinces, and we have a few 
coins from him. Anything said about Silbannicus and Sponsianus, of each of only one coin of 
uncertain authenticity survives each, from Gaul and Dacia respectively, must be specula-
tion.190 But as we only know of the oppressive eastern tax practices through the east-centric 
account of Zosimus, I would suggest that there was also a reform of the western tax system 
at this time, and that at least the rebellion of Silbannicus should also be seen in this context; 
there seems no reason to ascribe a motive of self-help against foreign enemies in the way 
that we can with Uranius Antoninus. The revolt of Sponsianus can perhaps be seen as a pre-
cursor to the one of Pacatianus that we opened the first chapter with. 
More is known of Uranius Antoninus, as a good number of coins of differing type and 
image have survived from him. From these, Brent has presented the interesting argument 
that Uranius was joining the central emperors from this era in attempting to bring about a 
new golden age through thanksgiving, although his case is unfortunately weakened by the 
dated and erroneous assumption that Uranius was a contemporary of Philip and Decius ra-
ther than Gallus, Aemilian and Valerian.191 In addition, as mentioned above, it seems rea-
sonable to see self-help against attacking enemies as the motive for his actions,192 although 
the fact that we hear nothing of him during the main Persian attack suggests that his con-
cern was for Emesa alone. But much about him will always remain obscure, in particular his 
end: did he willingly submit himself to Valerian or did he have to be put down? 
Next, we have the Bagaudae. According to the literary accounts this was a simple 
peasant’s revolt, but Potter rightly notes that the existence of coins where their leader 
Amandus is called ‘imperator’ and ‘augustus’ points in a different direction.193 He goes on to 
suggest that Amandus’ pretentions were an attempt to establish local autonomy in the face 
of the continued inability of the central government to re-establish its monopoly on vio-
lence, adducing two further events where this may have been the case. The first of these is 
the revolt of Lydius discussed above; the second was an obscure civil war in Egypt from 
                                                          
190 Their coins can be found in RIC V1 p. 66-67. Silbannicus’ revolt may be the civil war that Decius is said to 
have suppressed by Eutr., Brev. 9.4. For the tale of Jotapianus’ rebellion, see Zos. 1.20.2-21.2; Aur. Vict., De 
Caes. 29.2 also reports the rebellion but says nothing of the taxation issues. 
191 Brent (2010) 149-152; the numismatic evidence is collected and discussed in Baldus (1971). 
192 Isaac (1990) 247-248; Potter (2004) 249-250. 
193 Pan. Lat. X 4.3; Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.17; Eutr., Brev. 9.20.2; RIC V2 Amandus 1-3; Potter (2004) 281. 
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about the same time. Apparently, the people from the city of Ptolemais attacked the city of 
Coptus and its surroundings, even calling upon the Blemmyes for help, which led to the in-
cursion discussed in the previous chapter.194  
It is certainly reasonable to see the Bagaudae as a form of self-help made necessary 
by a lack of imperial attention for Gaul, now that there was no longer a separate Gallic Em-
pire that concentrated its efforts on the western provinces.195 In addition, their existence, as 
well as that of Lydius and the conflict in Egypt, is another sign that the idea of a ‘crisis’ that 
lasted into the 280’s is certainly not based upon nothing. But to see this as part of a general 
phenomenon in which the imperial monopoly on violence was challenged throughout the 
empire is, in my view, overdramatic, as none of the given examples really justify such a grand 
interpretation.  
That there could be something like a civil war between the two Egyptian cities is in-
deed rather startling. However, there are two good reasons for questioning its significance. 
First, I think that it is once again important that Probus does not seem to have felt the need 
to visit Egypt in person. Second, our only knowledge of the civil war comes from a character-
istically muddled notion in Zosimus; when the HA covers similar problems during Probus’ 
reign the cities are said to have been captured by the Blemmyes rather than being at war 
with each other. That its author apparently did not know of any conflict between the two 
cities (otherwise he would surely have used it to craft yet another fanciful anecdote) might 
perhaps even suggest that there was never any such thing, but that must remain conjecture; 
it does at least indicate that the episode was insignificant.196 
For Lydius there is no evidence – more specifically coins bearing imperial pretentions 
– that he ever was anything other than what Zosimus describes him as, a brigand leader. 
Such evidence does, as previously seen, exist for the Bagaudae, but to explain this as a sign 
of how grave the underlying difficulties that led to the rise of the war bands were is perhaps 
still connected to the traditional view of large-scale disaster in Gaul during the second half of 
the 270’s, a view that, as previously seen, can be questioned.197 Potter’s alternative sugges-
tion, that Amandus was causing trouble because he was a remaining supporter of Carus’ 
                                                          
194 Potter (2004) 277-279, 281; for the Egyptian civil war, see Zos. 1.71.1. 
195 MacMullen (1966) 211-213; cf. Leadbetter (2009) 52. 
196 HA, Vit. Prob. 17.2-3, 6; however, it is possible (so Potter (2004) 647 n.85. 
197 See n.83 above. 
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dynasty, is preferable;198 it can be reconciled with the element of self-help if we see Aman-
dus as using the Bagaudae as a means to his own end. 
However we might interpret the Bagaudae, in the end Maximian appears to have dis-
posed of them without too much trouble. But before the end of the century there would be 
two differing insurrections in Egypt. First, in the first half of the 290’s, the cities of Busiris and 
Coptus revolted. Then, in either 296 or 297, a man named Domitius Domitianus declared 
himself emperor in Alexandria. This revolt, seemingly continued by Domitianus’ subordinate 
Aurelius Achilleus after the death of the former, did not end until the capture of Alexandria 
by Diocletian in 298. Unfortunately, what exactly happened is obscure due to the extremely 
cursory treatment given by the literary sources to these events. Only two authors – Eusebius 
(as preserved by Jerome) and Zonaras – even knew or cared about the first insurrection, and 
while Domitianus’ revolt is better attested everyone seems to have confused him with 
Achilleus.199 
The documentary evidence is of some help: coins and papyri show that it was Domi-
tianus who was declared emperor and that Achilleus was his adjutant. But, much like it was 
with the question of Egyptian instability in the 250’s, the papyri generally show people carry-
ing on as usual.200 The only exception is a papyrus that seems to indicate something of a di-
vide between supporters and opponents of the rebellion: the author notes that his brother-
in-law has seemingly chosen to stay with the Egyptian prefect rather than report himself to 
Achilleus.201 But while these revolts are obscure, some useful comments on these incidents 
have still been made by modern historians.  
For the revolt of Busiris and Coptus, Leadbetter has noted that, while embarrassment 
prevented the tetrarchs from recording its suppression in their propaganda, the presence of 
Galerius shows that Diocletian took the revolt very seriously.202 Then again, it could once 
again also be the case that the relative tranquillity on the frontiers allowed the augustus to 
                                                          
198 Potter (2004) 281. 
199 For the earlier revolt, see Euseb.-Jer., Chron. s.a. 293, with http://www.tertullian.org (accessed on 30-05-
2014) for the text and a translation; Zon. 12.31. For the later one, see Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.23, 38; {Aur. Vict.}, 
Epit. de Caes. 39.3; Zon. 12.31. 
200 For Domitianus’ coins, see RIC VI Alexandria nos. 5-6, 19-20, 45. P. Cairo. Isid. 62, which describes a conflict 
between a group of siblings and their stepmother, lists Domitianus as emperor but also has Achilleus be re-
ferred to as “his highness” in l. 24 (τò μέγεθος) and 28 (τοῦ μείζονος). For other texts from this archive that 
refer to Domitianus as emperor, see P. Cairo. Isid. 38-39 (grain receipts), 80 (a liturgy replacement), 99-100 
(land leasing contracts), 104-105 (division of inherited land). 
201 SB III 7252. 
202 W. L. Leadbetter, ‘Galerius and the revolt of the Thebaid in 293/4’ Antichton 34 (2000) 82-94, 83-84. 
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send his right-hand man to restore order. For Domitianus’ usurpation there is general 
agreement that the immediate cause was a reform of the census and tax structure, which 
will be dealt with in the fourth chapter;203 as such, it had a similar background to the rebel-
lion of Jotapianus and possibly also Silbannicus. Considering the extremely unclear chronolo-
gy, the suggestion by Williams and Leadbetter that the Alexandrian rebels tried to take ad-
vantage of the war with Persia is possible but unprovable.204 
 
Everything or nothing 
Perhaps the most notorious section of the HA is the book that deals with the so-called ‘thirty 
tyrants’ (tyranni triginta). As part of his overall effort to heap all kinds of abuse upon Gal-
lienus, the author mashed together a large number of people who had set themselves up as 
usurpers against that emperor. In fact, in order to reach the number of thirty to match the 
number of Athenian ‘tyrants’, the author had to scrape the absolute bottom of the barrel: 
some, like Zenobia, never arrogated imperial power for themselves; others, including one of 
the pretenders called Valens, do not belong to Gallienus’ reign; and of yet others, like the 
supposedly famous statesman Censorinus, there is no evidence that they even existed. 
Moreover, as the author notes, “not much concerning them can be either related by scholars 
or demanded of them”.205 As such, he resorted to invention even more than usual, with the 
section on the ephemeral Gallic emperor Marius being a nice example: 
“But we have already said too much about this man, concerning whom it will be sufficient to 
add that there was no one whose hands were stronger, for either striking or thrusting, since he 
seemed to have not veins in his fingers, but sinews. For he is said to have thrust back on-
coming wagons by means of his forefinger and with a single finger to have struck the strongest 
men so hard that they felt as much pain as though hit by a blow from wood or blunted iron; 
and he crushed many objects by the mere pressure of two of his fingers.”206 
That very little reliable information can be gleaned from these biographies is no novel con-
clusion. Nevertheless, historians are fairly unanimous in seeing the third century as a time of 
constant usurpations. In particular, the hyperboles of De Blois and more recently Liebe-
schuetz concerning pretenders are perhaps not too dissimilar from the idea of ‘thirty tyrants’ 
                                                          
203 Barnes (1981) 17; Williams (1985) 79-80; Corcoran (1996) 174; Potter (2004) 333-334; Rees (2004) 39;  the 
relevant edict is preserved on P. Cairo Isid. 1. 
204 Williams (1985) 79-82; Leadbetter (2009) 91. 
205 HA, Tyr. Trig. 1.2 (Loeb translation): non multa de iis vel dici possint a doctioribus vel requiri. 
206 HA, Tyr. Trig. 8.4-5 (Loeb translation). 
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during the 260’s; similarly, Hekster accepts the proliferation of usurpers even while challeng-
ing the concept of the ‘soldier emperor’.207 To be fair, it is true that usurpations were at 
their most common during the ‘crisis’.208 And as far as the comparative purpose of this thesis 
is concerned, the ‘crisis’ easily beats the tetrarchy when it comes to the number of usurpers. 
In fact, other than the pretender Julianus put down by Carinus in 285, who can be seen as 
part of the transition from ‘crisis’ to tetrarchy, as well as Carausius and Allectus, about 
whom more in the next section, we only know of three ‘proper’ pretenders from the tetrar-
chic period. The most significant one was Lucius Domitius Alexander, who was declared em-
peror in Africa against Maxentius. But he was subdued easily, and his overtures to Constan-
tine, attested by a milestone where Alexander lists him as his co-emperor, appear to have 
been ignored.209 
The other two are only directly known from Eusebius.210 Of the first, in Mytilene, 
nothing is known. However, we do have more information about the second one, from Syria. 
This usurpation occurred in 302 or 303 in the city of Seleucia, when a company of soldiers, 
dissatisfied by their workload, forced their unwilling commander Eugenius to assume the 
purple. Then, after a heavy bout of drinking, they marched on Antioch, whose population 
defeated them. In the aftermath, Diocletian would order a purge of the city councils of Se-
leucia and Antioch. The misfortune of these councillors would prove to be a boon to modern 
historians: one of the executed men was the grandfather of the famed Antiochene rhetor 
Libanius, to whom we owe all our information about this incident – an important reminder 
of the fact that there may well have been more incidents like this.211 And yet, most authors 
of works on the tetrarchic era written in the last few decades tend to ignore Eugenius alto-
gether; Barnes, Corcoran and Leadbetter, the third of whom rightly notes that Libanius’ ob-
vious resentment about his grandfather’s execution there may well have been more to the 
story than can now be known, are the only exceptions that I know of. Indeed, Eusebius’ Loeb 
                                                          
207 De Blois (1974) 21: “usurpers arose everywhere” (my translation); Liebeschuetz (2007) 17: “an endless suc-
cession of usurpations”; Hekster (2008) 57-58. 
208 De Blois (1974) 15. 
209 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 40.17-18; Zos. 2.12, 14.2-4; ILS 8936. 
210 Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 8.6.8. 
211 Lib., Or. 11.158-162, Or. 19.45-46, Or. 20.18-20; Or. 1.3, 125 and Ep. 124.3 also mention the execution of his 
grandfather. Cf. Euseb., Hist Eccl. 8.6.8-9, who claims that in the wake of the usurpation there were mass ar-
rests of Christians. 
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translator even admitted that he had no idea what Eusebius’ Syrian uprising was supposed 
to refer to.212 
However, while usurpers were notable for their quantity during the ‘crisis’, this says 
nothing about their quality. In that respect, the following story from Zosimus concerning the 
revolts of Jotapianus and Marinus Pacatianus, of which a very similar version appears in 
Zonaras, is highly significant: 
“Philip was disturbed by these events and asked the senate either to help him against the re-
volts or else, if they were displeased with his rule, to dismiss him. No-one answered until 
Decius, renowned for his birth, reputation and virtue, said that he was worrying himself need-
lessly, because such revolts collapse quickly of their own accord from complete lack of support. 
In fact, everything turned out as the experienced Decius had predicted, and Iotapianus and 
Marinus were put down with little trouble.”213 
The story itself is probably an invention, intended to enhance the reputation of Decius,214 
but this does not change the fact that the observation about the quick collapse of revolts is 
remarkably astute. It certainly seems to have been the case with Pacatianus, as there is no 
indication in any of our sources that he was put down by Decius,215 and it likely went like 
that in many other cases as well.  
If we look at the ‘straightforward’ pretenders, those who made a bid for imperial 
power and either succeeded or failed, it is striking how many usurpations seem to have 
quickly fizzled out again, generally ending in the assassination of the would-be emperor. And 
even when it came to a battle between a usurper and the ‘legitimate’ emperor, that one 
battle would generally be all that happened: the winner would have the empire, the loser 
would be dead (either immediately or shortly afterwards), and that would be the end of it. It 
has been suggested that one usurpation would quickly encourage another, but this is only 
explicitly attested along the Danube, and it would not happen again after Gallienus’ 
strengthening of the region.216  
                                                          
212 Barnes (1982) 12; Corcoran (1996) 217 n.68; Leadbetter (2009) 133; Lake and Oulton (1926-1932) 2: 269 n.2. 
Eugenius is also discussed in D. Kienast, Romische Kaisertabelle: Grundzüge einer römischen Kaiserchronologie 
(Darmstadt 1990), 266-267, but the very slim bibliography listed there is telling. There was also a usurper on 
Cyprus called Calocaerus sometime around 330 (see Aur. Vict., De Caes. 41.11; Euseb.-Jer., Chron. s.a. 334), but 
he falls outside our timeframe. 
213 Zos. 1.21.1-2 (trans. Ridley); cf. Zon. 12.19. 
214 Potter (2004) 244. 
215 Contra ibidem, 240, who calls Decius “the agent of [Pacatianus’] desctruction” but does not elaborate. 
216 E.g. Potter (1990) 41; Goldsworthy (2009) 152; cf. Mócsy (1962) 567-570; De Blois (1974) 26-29. 
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A chronological survey of the various usurpers between 249 and 285 will help to 
make this clear. First, there were Valens and Priscus under Decius. We have no record of 
their suppression, but we also have no coins of them, which means that we can safely as-
sume that their rebellions were highly ephemeral, although Priscus would, as previously 
seen, cause some damage by allowing the ‘Scythians’ into Philippopolis. For the various pre-
tenders that appeared around the time of Valerian’s capture much is unclear, even how 
many of the men mentioned in the sources existed. There are coins of both the sons of 
Macrianus, as well as of Regalianus and his wife;217 it is also known that Ingenuus and Aemi-
lianus (the prefect of Egypt discussed in the previous chapter) existed, although the latter 
was probably a supporter of Macrianus and Callistus rather than a pretender in his own 
right. Nothing can be said about another Valens, who is said to have usurped as an act of 
loyalty to Gallienus in order to block the advance of Macrianus.218  
But while the revolt of Macrianus and Callistus required multiple battles to be put 
down, and would, as we will soon see, also necessitate the granting of special powers to 
Odaenathus of Palmyra, this was due to the unique circumstance of a duumvirate of pre-
tenders who also had an important supporter in the form of Aemilianus. The other pretend-
ers were more easily death with: Ingenuus was defeated by Gallienus, Regalianus was killed 
by an attack of Roxolani (possibly with the connivance of Gallienus) and Valens, if he even 
existed, was killed by his own men.219 
 There are some conspirators belonging to the early 260’s mentioned by Zosimus; 
three of them, Memor, Antoninus and Aureolus, are mentioned by name. The third would, 
as previously seen, only openly usurp in 268. Of Memor it is said in another source that “he 
was immediately slain by the soldiers” before he could even come to a usurpation, and we 
can probably say that the same thing about the otherwise unattested Antoninus, especially 
as neither of them were known to the author of the HA.220 As for Aureolus, the siege of his 
main base Milan was lengthy, and significant because it would mean the end not just for 
Aureolus but also for Gallienus, but it did not involve large-scale battles.  
                                                          
217 RIC V2 Macrianus II, Quietus, Regalianus, Dryantilla. 
218 Aemilianus is said to have usurped in his own right by HA, Tyr. Trig. 22; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 32.4; how-
ever, there is no documentary evidence to confirm it. For Valens, see HA, Tyr. Trig. 19.1-2; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de 
Caes. 32.4; Amm. Marc. 21.16.10 possibly alludes to him.  
219 For the theory concerning Regalianus’ suppression, see Fitz (1966) 15, 58-63; for Valens’ death, see HA, Tyr. 
Trig. 19.3. 
220 Zos. 1.38.1; Anonymous Continuator of Dio frag. 4 (= FHG IV 193-194): σπουδῇ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν 
ἀναιρεῖται. 
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The next group of pretenders appears under Aurelian: Domitianus, Firmus, Septimius 
and Urbanus are all said to have usurped during his reign at varying times. However, the only 
one of whom we have any coins is Domitianus, and then only two, the second of which was 
only discovered recently. In addition, the fact that the two coins originate from France and 
Britain respectively suggests that he is actually in some way related to the Gallic Empire. It is 
surely also significant that only Firmus got his own bogus ‘life’ in the HA; apparently he ate 
ostriches, swam with crocodiles and had so many books that he boasted of his ability to sup-
port an army on papyrus and glue.221 
 There are also a number of pretenders known from the last years of Probus’ reign, 
between 280 and 282. First, there was an abortive attempt at usurpation in Britain by a man 
whose identity is unknown. It has been suggested that this was the result of Aurelian’s coin-
age reform and the new threat of Saxon pirates, the same reasons that later allowed Carau-
sius to claim regional authority. However, the former point is highly problematic on its own, 
and the latter point is bound up with the long-standing debate about the series of fortifica-
tions erected on the British coast from about this time, the ‘Saxon Shore’, so nothing can be 
said conclusively.222  
In addition, there were two usurpers, Proculus and Bonosus, who usurped concur-
rently in Lyon and Cologne, as well as a man called Saturninus who was, supposedly against 
his will, proclaimed emperor by his men in the east. But Kreucher, who spent some pages on 
these men in his monograph on Probus, has rightly noted that there is only scant numismatic 
evidence for Bonosus and Saturninus (and none for Proculus) and no confirmed epigraphical 
evidence for any of them. This, coupled with the fact that Probus does not seem to have felt 
it necessary to march against any of them in person – in fact, Saturninus’ revolt is a clear 
example of the usurpations that collapsed on their own accord – shows that these men, too, 
were of only marginal importance.223 
                                                          
221 Zos. 1.49.2 has Septimius, Urbanus and Domitianus; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de Caes. 35.3 only has Severus (explic-
itly stating that he was immediately killed); Firmus is only known from HA, Tyr. Quadr. 3-6. For Domitianus and 
his coins, see R. A. Abdy, ‘The second-known specimen of a coin of Domitian II recorded in a hoard from Ox-
fordshire’ Revue Numismatique 160 (2004) 6, 219-221. 
222 Zos. 1.66.2; Frere (1987) 172-173; cf. Kreucher (2003) 164-165, who rejects the reform as a factor but ac-
cepts the military threat, also adding a penetration of Hadrian’s Wall, but his main evidence for this are the 
always problematic coin hoards. For the Saxon Shore, see the overview in Casey (1994) 115-126. 
223 Kreucher (2003) 166-177. The sources are Aur. Vict., De Caes. 37.3; Eutr., Brev. 9.17.1; {Aur. Vict.}, Epit. de 
Caes. 37.2; HA, V. Prob. 9.14-15 (most or all of Quadr. Tyr. 7-15 is useless); Zos. 1.66.1; Zon. 12.29. 
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 The only other usurpation that can be argued to have been part of the ‘crisis’ is that 
of Julianus from 283/284 to 285 in Pannonia, which was put down by Carinus after a single 
battle. Of Julianus we can only say that, on the basis of one of his coins that describes him as 
“the augustus of Pannonia”, he might have been striving for regional authority; in addition, 
his suppression by Carinus has plausibly been taken as a sign that the latter was not quite as 
depraved and useless as the sources would have us believe.224 Overall, the track record of 
pretenders during the ‘crisis’ is generally not at all impressive. But admittedly, we have not 
yet discussed the most significant aspect of internal disorder during the ‘crisis’: the tempo-
rary secession of one or more regions from the central Empire. 
 
Better off alone? 
Between 249 and 324 there were three major secessions: the Gallic Empire and the kingdom 
of Palmyra during the ‘crisis’, and the ‘British Empire’ of Carausius and Allectus during the 
tetrarchy. In this section we will tackle them in that order, starting with the empire of Pos-
tumus. We will mainly be thinking about how stable these secessions were, how they came 
to an end, what their consequences were and why people were willing to support their lead-
ers. If we try to answer the first question for the Gallic Empire, we immediately come up 
against major controversy. First, there is the matter of the empire’s stability under Pos-
tumus.  
On the one hand, Postumus’ record of success against the ‘barbarians’ appears to 
have been excellent, and archaeological data suggest generally peaceful conditions and a 
noticeable lack of city fortification in provinces ruled over by the Gallic emperors between 
260 and 275.225 On the other hand, Zonaras tells us that Postumus was twice nearly over-
thrown by Gallienus, there are several coin hoards connected to the Gallic Empire, and we 
have an inscription from the west of Germany detailing the repairs of a public bath seeming-
ly necessitated by “the appearance of the enemies of the State”.226 However, the supposed 
near-collapses of Postumus’ regime may actually have been part of a deliberate strategy to 
avoid a pitched battle with Gallienus on both occasions, and while Gallienus and Postumus 
                                                          
224 The relevant coin is RIC V2 Julianus no. 4 (Pannoniae Aug.); see also Leadbetter (2009) 50. 
225 Drinkwater (1987) 29-30, 229-231. 
226 Zon. 12.24; Drinkwater (1987) 30, 199-200; W. Eck, ‘Krise oder Nichtkrise – das ist hier die Frage. Köln und 
sein Territorium in der 2. Hälfte des 3. Jahrhunderts‘ in: Hekster, de Kleijn and Slootjes (2007) 23-43, 38-40, also 
providing the inscription (l. 4-5: prodit[ionem hostium] publicorum). 
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would continually use their coins to wage ideological warfare against each other, they never 
took military action against each other again.227 Coin hoards are always problematic as indi-
cators of major unrest, and the inscription on its own cannot be used to indicate major prob-
lems. 
The second controversy concerns the stability of the Gallic Empire in its last months, 
which brings us to the manner of its end.  There is agreement among scholars that, after the 
instability following the murder of Postumus that led to the defection of the Spanish prov-
inces, order was mostly restored under Victorinus.228 Most think that under his successor 
Tetricus the instability returned, the short-lived usurpation by a man named Faustinus being 
a particularly notable example, which weakened his position to a point where Aurelian was 
able to win an easy, if bloody, victory.229  
This view has been questioned by Drinkwater, who postulates a much stronger Tetri-
cus based upon the confidence exuded by his coinage and the fact that the battle at Châlons 
that ended the empire is said to have involved considerable slaughter and was thus hard 
fought; he also suggests that Faustinus was actually a supporter of Tetricus who rebelled 
against Aurelian after the battle, as this fits with the comment of Zonaras that Aurelian soon 
had to suppress a second Gallic revolt.230 But this, I feel, places too much trust in the coin 
evidence, which may well reflect a situation precisely opposite to what the messages on the 
coins proclaim. And the references to the battle are too brief to say anything about the bat-
tle being only a close victory for Aurelian, although the same must be said for the view that 
they “leave little doubt that the slaughter was fairly one-sided”.231 The redating of Faustinus 
is plausible, but this need not make him a supporter of Tetricus, and as he is known only 
from a brief notice in Victor232 his revolt must have been quite insubstantial anyway. 
As for Postumus’ support, it is interesting to note that his decision to stay in Gaul (a 
decision he supposedly explained in a letter to Gallienus),233 whether it was a sign of consci-
entiousness or simply pragmatism, seems to have endeared him to the populace, even as 
                                                          
227 Drinkwater (1987) 30-31; for the coin war, see C. Grandvallet, ‘L’ Affrontement Ideologique entre Gallien et 
Postume: l’ exemple des bustes casques et des bustes à attributs Herculeens’ in: Hekster, de Kleijn and Slootjes 
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232 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 35.4. 
233 Anonymous Continuator of Dio frag. 6 (= FHG 4 194-195); see also Drinkwater (1987) 82-84, accepting it. 
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the multiple missed opportunities to march on Rome cost him the affection of his army. The 
best explanation is that the populace evidently desired the presence of an emperor to con-
trol the pressures on the frontier; even if, as seen in the previous chapter, the significance 
and extent of this pressure is questionable, we also saw that there can be little doubt but 
that those living near the frontier perceived a serious threat. 
It has been suggested that the disappearance of the Gallic Empire soon provoked the 
devastating ‘barbarian’ invasions under Probus,234 but we have previously already seen that 
their severity can be questioned. The Gallic Empire’s long-term significance is difficult to as-
certain, but it was probably rather minor: it can be seen as part of a tendency towards ‘self-
help’ in the western provinces, but there is no reason to connect it with separatism.235 As 
such, it seems reasonable to follow Drinkwater in seeing the Gallic Empire as a temporary 
construct that was bound to collapse at one point or another.236 In that sense, the fact that a 
single victory was enough to bring down the empire entirely, just as it was with most usurpa-
tions, was also significant. The Gallic Empire was generally stable under the rule of Pos-
tumus, and later Victorinus, but during the last year of Tetricus it began to fall apart. 
Next, we have the Palmyrene kingdom. This came about as a consequence of the 
large-scale revolt of Macrianus, Callistus and Aemilianus. While two of his generals managed 
to tackle Macrianus and Aemilianus, Gallienus had to ask Odaenathus to take care of Callis-
tus, who was still in Syria. This Odaenathus did, but in return Gallienus had to cede de facto 
control over the east to him. There were, however, precedents: Odaenathus’ new position 
had previously been given to Priscus, the brother of Philip.237 We have already seen in the 
previous two chapters that Odaenathus’ reign was successful; this was also the reason for 
the support that he received, as, much like the Gauls, the Palmyrenes firmly saw themselves 
as Romans and were simply taking matters into their own hands rather than fulfilling sepa-
ratist ambitions.238 We will now mostly consider the stability of his relation with Gallienus. 
How loyal Odaenathus was to Gallienus is not immediately obvious. His arrogation of 
the title of King of Kings after his victory over the Persians suggests an open flaunting of his 
independence, and despite his very favourable reputation in the literary sources there is a 
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disreputable story that he had previously tried to join forces with Shapur.239 But a title like 
King of Kings was not Roman and would thus not have caused offence to Gallienus (in fact, it 
proclaimed his rejection of Shapur), and the story of his earlier attempted betrayal may well 
stem from a refusal of its author to accept that Odaenathus was wholly Roman. In general, 
Odaenathus seems to have been pragmatic enough to accept the at least nominal overlord-
ship of Gallienus.240 Relations between Palmyra and the central Empire were therefore 
peaceful throughout most of the 260’s, a significant difference with the Gallic Empire. 
But both were essentially temporary constructs. In this case, however, it was a con-
flict of views rather than structural weaknesses that ensured conflict: Rome envisioned 
Odaenathus’ position as being unique, while the Palmyrenes saw it as hereditary, leading to 
the investiture of Odaenathus’ son Vaballathus after the death of the former.241 Whether 
hostilities were initiated already by Gallienus, said by two late sources to have been complic-
it in Odaenathus’ death, cannot now be known, but an expeditionary force was sent to the 
east under Claudius II at the latest.242 The result was, as described in the previous chapter, a 
short period of conflict, but by 272 the east had been brought back under Roman control by 
Aurelian. And while the only detailed account of that campaign, by Zosimus, makes it clear 
that there were multiple battles and that Palmyra revolted a second time afterwards, it also 
shows that most eastern cities needed little incentive – Aurelian’s pragmatic mildness to-
wards captured cities sufficed – to re-join central authority.243 However, there was one long-
term consequence: the destruction of Palmyra after its second revolt deprived Rome of a 
major buffer city between them and the Persians.244 
Finally, we must deal with Carausius and Allectus. As we saw in the first chapter, the 
literary evidence allows us to construct the basic history of their ‘British Empire’. But it is 
utterly insufficient to come to a deeper understanding of their secession. The epigraphical 
evidence is even worse: there is only one relevant inscription, and that only confirms that 
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the story, see frag. 10 of Petrus Patricius (= Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) no. 4.1.3). 
240 Watson (1999) 30-32; Hartmann (2001) 135-138, 182-183. 
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Carausius’ control stretched all the way to Hadrian’s Wall.245 There is plenty of numismatic 
and archaeological evidence, but using this to reconstruct the history of Carausius’ empire is 
problematic, although various scholars, most notably John Casey, have made good attempts. 
Nevertheless, with the source material being as poor as it is – it is not even certain what Al-
lectus’ position was prior to his accession246 – only brief and speculative comments can be 
made regarding the questions posed at the beginning of this section.  
With regard to stability, there are some negative signs: there may have been a brief 
economic crisis, and, of course, Carausius was assassinated in 293. But the fact that the em-
pire held out for nearly a decade despite an unenviable military position, even beating of 
Maximian’s initial attack, shows great tenacity. The length of the final phase of conflict be-
tween Britain and the tetrarchs is also noteworthy: even after the capture of Boulogne it still 
took two years to assemble a fleet strong enough to bring down Allectus, and the presence 
of Allectan coins in France that do not include his final issues indicates that he managed to 
retain continental possessions for most of his reign.247 Especially speculative must be an an-
swer to the question of ramifications of the empire’s dissolution: perhaps there were raids 
by Picts, but there seems to have been no major damage.248 The most likely reason for 
Carausius’ popularity found is a fear, whether this was justified or not, of ‘barbarian’ raid-
ers.249 In that sense the British Empire was similar to the Gallic one. Another interesting simi-
larity between the empires of Carausius and Postumus is that Carausius may also have been 
murdered because the soldiers were dissatisfied with his policy of staying in one place.250  
Overall, however, Carausius was more similar to Zenobia, in that he tried (and failed) 
to be acknowledged as a legitimate partner in government. But whereas Zenobia was satis-
fied with simply minting coins that had the portraits of both Vaballathus and Aurelian on 
them, Carausius took the additional step to have himself, Diocletian and Maximian depicted 
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246 For Allectus as a finance minister, see Casey (1994) 127-129; according to A. R. Birley, The Roman Govern-
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on coins with the text “Carausius and his brothers”.251 Whether this was a desperate at-
tempt at gaining acceptance or him taking pleasure in the inability of the diarchy to unseat 
him is impossible to say. Another important similarity with Palmyra was that it took more 
than one battle to bring Britain to heel. But in the end the most important difference with 
the ‘crisis’ secessions is that Carausius and Allectus only ever controlled a small part of the 
empire as opposed to nearly a full third. This is probably most significant, even if they de-
serve more attention than they usually get for their tenacity. 
 
An empire divided 
Throughout this chapter we have seen that on its various levels, the internal disorders 
should not be overstated for the ‘crisis’, and their presence must not be overlooked for the 
tetrarchy. But in all cases the periods either suffered from the problem to the same degree, 
or it was less present in the tetrarchic era. It might therefore appear that this chapter must 
end on the same note as the previous one, but this is not so. For there is one category of 
internal disorder that did not appear during the ‘crisis’, and it is, in my view, the most signifi-
cant one: wars between the various members of the imperial college.  
The course of these wars between 306 and 324 has already been sketched in the first 
chapter, so there is no need to repeat it here. It is, however, worth emphasising that these 
wars were protracted and led to great loss of life on both sides. Eusebius’ claim that Con-
stantine always tried to limit the number of casualties in battles is belied by the large num-
ber of dead from his battles listed in other sources.252 This is certainly not ignored by other 
scholars. Once again, Gibbon already recognized that the tetrarchy only functioned for as 
long as Diocletian held power, and later scholars, most notably Kolb, have not shied away 
from attacking “the selfishness of Constantine” in breaking with Diocletian’s plan.253 Yet this 
can still be seen as a positive development: the new system of Diocletian kept internal strife 
within the confines of the imperial college or the male relatives of its members, thus greatly 
reducing the number of potential threats and finally ending the vicious cycle of usurpations 
that characterised the third century. And those who did break into the college from outside 
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were content with only part of the empire rather than all of it, thus ‘only’ weakening the 
bond between the various provinces rather than the office of emperor itself.254 
Indeed, so great is the appreciation of the idea of multiple emperors that it has also 
had an impact upon the historiography of the ‘crisis’, by making scholars see the actions of 
certain emperors as a precedent leading up to the tetrarchy. This has been done by Millar 
with regard to the situation of the 250’s, when Valerian, his fellow augustus Gallienus and 
his caesar Saloninus were all active in different parts of the empire. Horster has done like-
wise with Antiochene coins from the reign of Carus, which speak of three augusti through 
the legend AUGGG., thus making the emperor and his sons into an imperial triad.255 It is also 
present in Drinkwater’s critical stance towards Aurelian for his failure to end the ‘crisis’, 
blaming his unwillingness to take a colleague: “as Diocletian did immediately after he be-
came sole emperor, Aurelian should have shared the burdens of his office”.256 
 That the measures of Valerian and Carus are part of a long-term development leading 
up to the establishment of the tetrarchy is possible, if unprovable. But to blame emperors 
like Aurelian and Probus for failing to do the same misses the fairly essential point that these 
men lacked an obvious heir. It could be argued that a colleague could easily be found among 
the Balkan-dominated cabal of generals that had appeared under the reign of Gallienus, but 
while the existence of the group is well attested the various links between them are mostly 
forgeries by the HA.257 Moreover, there are indications of conflict within this group: Potter 
has noted that Claudius II may well have desired that his brother Quintillus rather than Aure-
lian should have succeeded him (and what happened with Tacitus, Florian and Probus could 
perhaps be a parallel), and Drinkwater himself has acknowledged that Carus was probably 
behind the coup that brought down Probus.258  
In those circumstances only a capable adult son could be trusted as a colleague. The 
only suitable candidates during the ‘crisis’ appear to have been Volusianus, Gallienus and 
Carinus, all of whom received the hatred of later authors for their troubles. That Diocletian 
                                                          
254 Williams (1985) 49, 198, 209; W. Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, 284-1081 (Stanford 1995), 199-200; E. 
Flaig, ‘Für eine Konzeptualisierung der Usurpation im spätrömischen Reich’ in: F. Paschoud and J. Szidat eds., 
Usurpationen in der Spätantike (Stuttgart 1997), 15-34, 27-28. 
255 Millar (1993) 164; M. Horster, ‘The emperor’s family on coins (third century): ideology of stability in times of 
unrest’ in: Hekster, de Kleijn and Slootjes eds. (2007) 291-309, 303; the specific coins are RIC V Carus nos. 125, 
205, 208, 327, 375, 378. 
256 Drinkwater (2005) 61-62; cf. Ando (2012) 219, who does not explicitly criticize Aurelian for this but also 
points to a continued lack of charisma associated with the office. 
257 As demonstrated by Syme (1971) 208-220. 
258 Potter (2004) 268; Drinkwater (2005) 56-57. 
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selected someone who was unrelated to him was not a bold and necessary change of strate-
gy, he was simply lucky enough to have an associate as loyal as Maximian, whose loyalty is 
acknowledged even by the hostile Lactantius: “two people could not combine in so loyal a 
friendship if there were not in them both a single mind, the same line of thought, an equal 
will, and identical opinions”.259 Loyalty seems to have been the prime consideration for ad-
mission to Diocletian’s college in general, and while all the tetrarchs seem to have been de-
cent enough administrators, their military record is rather mixed. 
Licinius made the best out of a bad job in his first conflict with Constantine, and Ga-
lerius scored an impressive victory over the Persians. But that victory only came after an ini-
tial defeat, and the previously discussed incident before the walls of Rome does not suggest 
that his men had much confidence in him; similarly, that Severus’ army deserted him so 
quickly means that his generalship can hardly have been inspiring. Maximian seems to have 
done better in this regard, as his declaration of support for his usurping son seems to have 
been a major factor in the unwillingness of Severus’ men to fight.260  
But while he was a good enough commander to defeat the Bagaudae and the various 
‘barbarian’ tribes that he had to contend with, he had little success against Carausius. Simi-
larly, while it is likely that Constantius oversaw the recapture of Carausius’ continental pos-
sessions, the only non-Panegyrical account of the final attack on Britain, that of the ‘Kai-
sergeschichte’, suggests that the role of the praetorian prefect Asclepiodotus was far greater 
than that of Constantius.261 And we have previously already seen how Constantius nearly 
allowed himself to be overwhelmed by a force of Alamanni on one occasion. Maxentius was 
effective enough to defeat Alexander, but his generalship at the battle of the Milvian Bridge 
appears to have been anything but inspired. Daja seems to have been defeated by Licinius 
with little difficulty. As for Diocletian, we know of only one major battle where he was in 
personal command, namely the battle of the Margus against Carinus, which he very nearly 
                                                          
259 For the quotation, see Lact., DMP 8.1 (trans. Creed): nec enim possent in amiticam tam fidelem cohaerere, 
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lost.262 Considering this poor record, it is highly significant that the most capable commander 
of all, Constantine, was ignored during the succession. 
That Constantine played a significant role in the collapse of the tetrarchic order can 
hardly be doubted. For contrary to what most sources for both his wars with Licinius would 
have us believe, he was almost certainly the aggressor in both cases.263 But the focus on 
Constantine should not obscure the fact that most of the other tetrarchs also did their fair 
share of plotting and scheming. While he did eagerly support Maxentius’ usurpation when it 
came, Maximian should probably be excluded from plotting against Diocletian, since the 
suggestion of König that the acclamation of Constantius was an action taken without Diocle-
tian’s consent (forcing him, in turn, to appoint Galerius) has been convincingly refuted by 
Kolb: if Maximian really wanted to stir up trouble, he would surely have selected Maxen-
tius.264 Constantius would do just that when he consciously decided that Constantine should 
be emperor in his place, as we saw above.  
The attempt of Leadbetter to downplay the involvement of Constantius – according 
to him Constantine came to his father of his own accord to secure his own interests, and the 
latter was not necessarily glad to see him – does not quite convince. He is right to note the 
suspiciousness of the fact that Constantius has little function in the historiographical tradi-
tion beyond being ill, dying and passing the torch to Constantine. But his argument that Con-
stantius’ campaigns in the last years of his live, most notably the one in Britain, show that he 
cannot have been very ill at that time and would thus not have been planning forward for 
the succession, is too weak to overturn the standard view of Constantius.265 For it ignores 
the fact that there was another emperor that went on campaign (in Britian, in fact), even as 
he was dying, namely Septimius Severus.  
And if that point can still be questioned, it seems reasonably certain that Constantius 
tried to distance himself from Diocletian’s persecution of the Christians as much as he could. 
Conversely, Daja tried to avoid implementing Galerius’ toleration edict even as he avoided 
openly setting himself against his imperial colleagues for now: first he ordered only a limited 
                                                          
262 Potter (2004) 358 notes Maxentius’ mistake in choosing to fight with the bridge behind him. For the defeat 
of Daja, see Lact., DMP 45.2-47.6, 49.1-2; Zos. 2.17.3. For the battle at the Margus, see Aur. Vict., De Caes. 
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263 Potter (2013) 210-211, 230. 
264 I. König, ‘Die Berufung des Constantius Chlorus und des Galerius zu Caesaren. Gedanken zur Entstehung der 
Ersten Tetrarchie’ Chiron 4 (1974) 567-576, 573-576; Kolb (1987) 77-80. 
265 Leadbetter (2009) 156-165. 
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restoration, then he undertook new repressive measures, and finally he went back to partial 
tolerance.266 However, we already saw in the first chapter that he too eventually declared 
war on his colleagues when he allied himself to Maxentius. 
Of the items listed above we can be reasonably sure that they happened. In addition 
to those, Lactantius has conveyed a general impression of both Diocletian and Galerius being 
continually undermined by their direct subordinates. Thus, upon hearing of the appointment 
of Licinius as augustus, a discontented Daja, who remained caesar, demanded equal treat-
ment, and actually managed to have himself acclaimed as augustus by his troops against the 
wishes of Galerius.267 But in general, the main theme of the De Mortibus is that of a nervous 
Diocletian, who is constantly hounded and pressured by the crude bully Galerius. How much 
of this can be believed is difficult to tell, and relates to the controversial question of Lactan-
tius’ veracity, and that matter therefore demands some consideration. 
On the one hand, it is beyond doubt that Lactantius was heavily biased against most 
of the tetrarchs and against Galerius in particular. And some items, such as his claim that the 
tetrarchs quadrupled the size of the army, are patently exaggerations. It is therefore easy to 
see why not all historians have been convinced of the veracity of his narrative. On the other 
hand, it has also been observed that documentary sources confirm many of Lactantius’ de-
tails, and as he was living in Diocletian’s capital Nicomedia in the northwest of Turkey until at 
least 305, he would have been close to the action.268 It is therefore easy to see why he has 
received such a differing reception.  
Here, the most important point is the role ascribed by Lactantius to Galerius in de-
termining the succession. The critical passage is a conversation between Diocletian, still 
weak from his recent illness, and an aggressive and determined Galerius. The latter first suc-
ceeds in forcing the former and Maximian to abdicate, and then manages to have his associ-
ates Severus and Daja selected as caesares rather than the intended heirs Constantine and 
                                                          
266 For Constantius as a reluctant persecutor, see Lact., DMP 15.7; Euseb., Hist. Eccl. 8.13.13, Vit. Cons. 1.13.1-3. 
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Maxentius, despite the fact that Constantine was expected to become an excellent ruler and 
both Severus and Daja were unfit for command.269 
Lactantius’ claim to give a verbatim account of a private conversation between two 
emperors has naturally been a cause of some concern to those disinclined to believe him. 
Nevertheless, while it would be a bad idea to take the conversation as we have it literally –
those involved, particularly Galerius, are clearly caricatures – it is quite plausible that the 
general gist of it became publicly known, and that Lactantius’ view of the political situation 
as contained in the dialogue has validity.270 Moreover, the main argument advanced against 
the arrangement presented by Lactantius is that a ruler as strong as Diocletian would never 
have allowed this to happen. For if he was really that weak, why was he so effective as a ref-
eree at the Carnuntum conference mentioned in the first chapter?271  
However, this will not do. Diocletian was still weakened from his brush with death, so 
while the relentless pressure from Galerius is likely to be exaggerated, and the claim that he 
was responsible for Diocletian’s abdication highly questionable, it is by no means implausible 
that he seized a unique opportunity to rearrange matters to his own liking. And Diocletian’s 
weaker health need not have damaged his charismatic authority at Carnuntum, especially as 
he was one of the main innovators on that front.272 
The argument that there was a change in the plans for the succession is far better 
supported: two of the Panegyrics contain references to hereditary succession, which was, 
after all, the preferred mode of succession, and both Severus and Daja had little to com-
mend them other than being associates of Galerius. It is therefore reasonable to see Galerius 
as the architect of some sort of change intended for his own benefit; indeed, Leadbetter, the 
most recent defender of Galerius’ loyalty towards Diocletian, notes that even if the new ar-
rangement was created through friendly rather than hostile persuasion, Galerius still wilfully 
set himself against both Maximian and Constantius.273 We have seen that the results were 
catastrophic: by passing over two claimants to imperial power Galerius created two obvious 
threats to the stability of his new order, and both threats would soon manifest themselves.  
                                                          
269 Lact., DMP 18. 
270 Barnes (1981) 297 n.95; Potter (2004) 338, 662 n.22. 
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However, like it was with Constantine, it would not be fair to pile all the blame upon 
Galerius:274 it has been shown throughout this section that all the tetrarchs were in one way 
or another responsible for creating internal instability. Moreover, the conflicts between the 
tetrarchs also set a dangerous precedent for the future. While Constantine’s final victory led 
to a brief period of peace, after his death in 337 internal stability soon returned: first most of 
his relatives were massacred with the connivance of his sons, and then those sons proceed-
ed to quarrel with each other. This only ended after the bloody victory of Constantius II, 
Constantine’s last remaining son, over the usurper Magnentius in 353. This was followed by 
further discord between Constantius and his cousins and caesares Gallus and Julian. But this 
pales compared to what happened in 378, when two-sided rivalry between the eastern em-
peror Valens and his nephew, the western emperor Gratian, prevented the forces from both 
halves of the empire from linking up in time to take on the Goths, which resulted in the bat-
tle of Adrianople, one of the worst defeats that the Roman Empire would ever suffer.275 Hav-
ing multiple emperors, then, was really not a good thing at all. 
If this seems a rather obvious conclusion, then it is worth emphasising that only two 
scholars, Jochen Martin and Boris Bleckmann, appear to have argued the same at length. 
And even they neglect to do something that strengthens the argument further: provide a 
comparison between the problems caused by having multiple emperors and the problems 
caused by the third-century usurpers.276 Fortunately, this chapter puts us in a position to do 
just that. For we have seen that most usurpations were generally put down after one battle, 
if it even came that far. Conflicts between emperors of the fourth century, on the other 
hand, were protracted affairs, even in cases where this is not immediately obvious,277 as 
both contestants had already had time and resources to establish themselves. In short, while 
the tetrarchic era witnessed fewer usurpations, it introduced the more significant practice of 
wars between pre-established emperors, and as such that period was worse than the ‘crisis’ 
when it comes to internal strife.  
                                                          
274 In that regard, I agree with Leadbetter (2009) 2. 
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4. The economy 
 
“Now he officially issued new money after arranging for the state to buy in the debased coin-
age to avoid confusion in financial dealings.”278 
This throwaway line found in Zosimus’ account of Aurelian’s reign is the only reference 
found in the literary sources to the coinage reform of that emperor, a symptom of the gen-
eral lack of interest in economic affairs displayed by most ancient writers, which is further 
compounded by the fact that these authors would have had little economic data available to 
them.279 Nevertheless, economic difficulties were just as important in the history of this pe-
riod as the external and internal conflicts, and we will accordingly deal with them in this 
chapter. 
 While in the previous two chapters two large phenomena that are made up of sepa-
rate events were investigated as two long-term trends, economic history is characterized by 
long-term developments by definition. As such, a comparison between the economic situa-
tion of the ‘crisis’ and that of the tetrarchy is likely to show a large degree of continuity. 
Thus, for instance, the diminishing of seaborne trade that began during the ‘crisis’, revealed 
by the decline of port cities like Ostia and a decrease in the number of Mediterranean ship-
wrecks, continued throughout the fourth century, while other developments, such as the 
economic problems in Spain, date back to the second century, in which the Antonine plague 
(165-180) was a significant factor.280  
It is also difficult to say something about the economy in general: it seems as if the 
empire at large suffered economic decline, but data is scarce and contradictory. Thus, we 
have an admission from Egypt that cities are now far less prosperous than they were under 
the Severans, but also a large number of documents telling us that there was a large-scale 
free distribution of grain in Oxyrhynchus and other cities from the late 260’s onwards.281 
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Nevertheless, there are some individual matters that are worth investigating and that can 
benefit from a comparative perspective. 
The main issue here is coinage debasement. This refers to the practice of succeeding 
emperors to steadily decrease the percentage of gold and silver in their coins, a process that 
went back to the reign of Nero (54-68) but would reach especially great heights from 250 
onwards. The precious metal content of the coins would be at their lowest around 270, but it 
would remain an issue until the late fifth century.282 This matter, and the inflation that may 
or may not be related to it, will be the most important matter considered in this chapter, but 
there will also be brief looks at the questions of the interrelation of the empire’s various 
provinces, the costs of the army and taxation reforms. 
 
An irrelevant disaster? 
The opinions of previous scholars on the consequences of the coinage debasement have 
undergone such a radical shift throughout the years that this subject deserves its own histo-
riographical section. Until fairly recently, there was common consent that the rapid debase-
ment of the coinage was an absolute disaster, resulting in the closing of the local mints that 
produced bronze coins, the collapse of the old system of denominations, a partial return to 
an economy with barter and even taxation in kind, and rampant inflation, especially in the 
last quarter or so of the century. Some comments on the monetary policies of these emper-
ors even took on a moralizing tenor. Aurelian’s reform, on the other hand, which appears to 
have consisted of the creation of new coins with a higher percentage of precious metal and a  
better appearance that were intended to replace the old coins, was a valiant attempt to set 
things right. Thus, in his 1969 article on the heaviest debasement under Claudius II the nu-
mismatist Lawrence Cope spoke derogatorily of “Claudius’ conduct”, and the later reform 
was described as “the necessary restoration of the coinage”.283  
Historians made similar comments on the debasement issue. The strong degree of 
debasement enacted by Gallienus is one of the main reasons why the verdict that he has 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“while the cities were still prosperous” (ἔτ̣ι̣ τ̣ῶν πολέων εὐπóρων οὐσῶν). For the free grain, see P. Oxy. XL 
2892-2940. 
282 For an overview of the process of debasement, see the mass of data in J.-P. Callu, La Politique Monétaire des 
Empereurs Romains, de 238 à 311 (Paris 1969), 237-248; more accessible are the graphs in K. W. Harl, Coinage 
in the Roman Economy (Baltimore 1996), 130, 137, 142, 145. 
283 L. H. Cope, ‘The nadir of the imperial antoninianus in the reign of Claudius II’ Numismatic Chronicle S7 9 
(1969) 145-161, esp. 147, 161. 
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received from his foremost modern political biographer, De Blois, is rather mixed.  MacMul-
len, while more appreciative of the factors that forced these emperors to debase, nonethe-
less concluded that by Aurelian’s reign reform had become a dire necessity, and he saw that 
reform as a great success. Williams wrote in a similar vein. In his article on the connection 
between Roman taxes and trade Keith Hopkins argued that the increased taxation in kind, 
previously mentioned as one of the proposed consequences of the mass debasement, was 
one of the main factors responsible for the decline of Roman trade.284 Finally, Drinkwater 
has also referred to the actions of third-century emperors as “the irresponsible production 
of uncontrolled quantities of debased antoniniani in whatever metal they could get their 
hands on”, and commended Tetricus for trying to find a way out in the Gallic Empire like 
Aurelian was doing in the central Empire; he did, however, note that things were perhaps 
not quite as dramatic as other scholars made them out to have been.285 In fact, it may be 
that the dramatic story of debasement told by the coins is an important reason for the third 
century’s poor reputation.286 
This orthodoxy was ably summarized in the 1996 handbook on Roman coinage by 
Kenneth Harl. He described how the debasement resulted in a loss of confidence of the pop-
ulace in the coinage, led to the withdrawal from circulation of many older coins, an increas-
ing scarcity of bronze coins, the collapse of local coin systems and rampant inflation. Howev-
er, he did recognize that the debasement measures did help the empire through the mone-
tary shortages of the ‘crisis’. Moreover, he saw Aurelian’s reform as only a limited success: in 
some areas it instilled renewed confidence in the money and lowered prices, but in other 
areas the coins made little headway, and in Egypt the result was that prices increased eight-
fold, perhaps even tenfold. In his 1999 monograph on Aurelian Alaric Watson would go so 
far as to call the reform a long-term failure even if it was a short-term success. Nevertheless, 
both maintained the traditional bleak view of the depreciation problem, with Watson argu-
ing that nobody could have solved the problem at that stage.287 
But by the late 1990’s, another view had appeared. This perhaps goes back to Jean-
Pierre Callu’s massive treatment of the debasement problem from 1969, in which he recog-
nized that there were also some good consequences aside from the bad ones (for instance, 
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the commercial unity of the empire became stronger), and argued against a large-scale de-
monetization as a consequence of the debasement. A further notable step was the conten-
tion by Peter Brunt and Richard Duncan-Jones that the Roman economy had never been 
truly monetized: payments in kind had also been important prior to the large-scale debase-
ment.288  
More importantly, in 1995, shortly before Harl published his work, Christopher 
Howgego had presented a radically different perspective on the matter in his own hand-
book. While previous numismatists and historians were aware of the fact that the inflation 
did not really gather force until after the worst of the debasement had passed, they saw it as 
a delayed reaction. Howgego, on the other hand, suggested that the fineness of coins was of 
little concern to their ancient users (at least not up until a certain point), who were generally 
perfectly willing to accept debased coins as a valid means of payment. It was the restorative 
reforms, like those of Aurelian, that led to the skyrocketing inflation. In addition, he argued 
that the disappearance of local coinage, previously ascribed to the mass debasement, was 
also caused by other long-term developments like the widening gap between rich and 
poor.289 
 A concurrent development was the publication of an article by Dominic Rathbone in 
which he advanced two important arguments. First, the third-century inflation in Egypt, and 
thus presumably also in the rest of the empire, was not all that high, at least not until he 
later third century. Second, despite all the debasement problems the government always 
remained willing to accept the silver coins as tax payments at the same value that the coins 
had when they were first issued, and as a result the coins retained their value despite the 
ever-decreasing percentage of precious metal that they contained; as such, they had suc-
cessfully been converted into a token coinage. When Witschel published his previously dis-
cussed survey of the third-century west a few years later he therefore concluded that the 
debasement did have some unfortunate consequences, but that its effects should not be 
overestimated.290  
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Potter would take the aforementioned to its logical conclusion: it was the actions of 
Aurelian, rather than the debasement, that threw the coin system into chaos by removing 
the link between gold and silver money. Furthermore, the fact that he waited until near the 
end of his reign to implement the reform does not suggest that it was a necessity (the old 
system had, after all, worked for him in preceding years), but that it was a political act: he 
wanted to remove the coinage of all previous emperors and usurpers. “By so doing, he may 
have done more harm to his subjects than he did good through all the rest of his actions.”291 
 A more optimistic appraisal of the debasement issue has, in fact, become dominant: 
Olivier Hekster, who still wrote about it in negative terms in his reference work on the ‘crisis’ 
from 2008, appears to be something of an exception in that regard. In Clifford Ando’s 2012 
study debasement is also acknowledged as a sign of trouble; rightfully so, as the radical 
drops in purity do show that something must have been wrong. However, the consequences 
of the debasement are nuanced, and his comments on Aurelian’s reform echo those of Pot-
ter.292 In her two articles on the economy during the third and fourth centuries written for 
the Cambridge Ancient History Mireille Corbier went even further than Potter had gone: the 
greater number of coins brought into circulation by the debasement actually had a beneficial 
effect in the sense that they contributed to the monetization of the Roman economy, and 
the effects of the inflation of prices were limited by the fact that wages tended to rise at the 
same time.293 
 Similarly, in the two articles in the recent Oxford Handbook on Greek and Roman 
Coinage that cover the third century, those of Roger Bland and Sylviane Estiot, it is noted 
that there now seems good reason to reject the apocalyptic views of earlier scholars. How-
ever, a more critical perspective has recently been offered by Constantina Katsari, who ar-
gues that the monetary tinkering of third-century emperors resulted in the virtual disap-
pearance of gold coins from circulation, many of which were used for trading with Rome’s 
neighbours for whom these coins were more valuable.294 And in general we should also not 
forget the cautionary remark of De Blois: our only way of checking inflation are Egyptian 
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prices, but these may not have risen before the mid-270’s because Egypt had its own coin 
(the tetradrachm), and this says nothing about the consequences of debasement in the rest 
of the Empire.295 Then again, this still does not change the fact that we have no direct indica-
tions of problems caused by debasement in areas that did use the ‘common’ coinage. 
 Much like it was with tetrarchic historiography in general, the historiography of the 
money situation after the ‘crisis’ is far less complex; there is also none of the moralizing 
found in some accounts of the ‘crisis’. There is agreement on the overall picture: there 
would continue to be trouble with the silver and bronze coinage (eventually the former dis-
appeared completely) as well as inflation, but the new gold coin instituted by Constantine, 
the solidus, would keep its value until the eleventh century, and there was never any de-
basement on the scale seen during the ‘crisis’.296 Nevertheless, there is uncertainty about 
the precise causes, aims and effects of the three major economic reforms of the period: the 
replacement of the coinage, Diocletian’s currency edict and his Edict on Maximum Prices 
(both from 301). In circumstances such as these, adding something can be difficult, but that 
is nonetheless what we will try to do in the next section. 
 
Raging greed burns without end 
Perhaps the main problem that plagues research on coinage debasement in the third centu-
ry is that the evidence is so difficult to interpret. Consider, for instance, a proclamation of 
the strategos of Oxyrhynchus from the early 260’s, which is our only direct piece of evidence 
of an unwillingness on the part of the empire’s inhabitants to accept certain coins, although 
there are also some indirect indications.297 
From Aurelius Ptolemaeus also called Nemesianus, strategus of the Oxyrhynchite nome. Since 
the officials have assembled and accused the bankers of the banks of exchange of having 
closed them on account of their unwillingness to accept the divine coin of the Emperors, it has 
become necessary that an injunction should be issued to all the owners of the banks to open 
them, and to accept and exchange all coin except the absolutely spurious and counterfeit, and 
not to them only, but to all who engage in business transactions of any kind whatever, know-
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ing that if they disobey this injunction they will experience the penalties already ordained for 
them in the past by his highness the praefect. Signed by me. The 1st year, Hathur 28.298 
At first sight, this would seem to confirm the view that people did not accept coins that were 
debased too heavily. But the alternative explanation, that some coins were not accepted 
because they had the portrait of defeated pretenders on them (in this case presumably 
Macrianus and Quietus), is probably preferable.299 After all, the evidence from Egypt strong-
ly suggests that the real inflation did not start until around 275, as wheat then suddenly 
costs 200 drachmae per artabas (a Roman term of measurement), about ten times higher 
than its cost throughout the 260’s, and there also appears a request of weavers from Ox-
yrhynchus for more money necessitated by a sudden rise in costs of materials.300 Of course, 
De Blois’ comment on the situation of Egypt should still be kept in mind, but the indications 
provided above are nonetheless highly significant. 
Indeed, in general the authors following the revisionist trend have succeeded in chal-
lenging not just the idea of the rampant inflation starting before Aurelian’s reform, but also 
several other main assumptions lying behind the traditional view, like the disappearance of 
local mints being caused solely by the debasement and the failure of the old system of de-
nominations: this was actually done by Aurelian to increase central control.301 As such, they 
are probably right to argue that previous scholars were wrong to portray the debasement 
problem in such dramatic terms. That being said, I think that there are a few reasons for 
thinking that the debasement was becoming a problem from about 270 onwards. 
 One of the most interesting features of the Gallic Empire is that its coins were usually 
of better fineness than their central Empire counterparts. The difference was especially clear 
under Postumus; under Tetricus the coins were actually slightly worse than the central Em-
pire ones, but they always retained a superior appearance. Similarly, the coins issued by 
Carausius were of better quality than those minted by Diocletian and Maximian at the same 
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time, especially after the failure of Maximian’s initial expedition.302 Even more interesting is 
that in the case of the Gallic Empire the central Empire may have recycled the superior coins 
minted by the former for its own ends when it could get them. That at least was the explana-
tion of Cope for the fact that some Italian coins from the reign of Claudius II found in Italy 
are metallurgically much closer to Gallic Empire coins than those from the mint at Milan.303 
While we have previously seen that Cope attached far too much weight to the importance of 
debasement, this does not invalidate his argumentation here, and it indicates that at least 
Claudius felt the need to have better coins in circulation. Furthermore, the fact that Claudius 
decided that the fineness of coins should be increased at least slightly304 also shows that 
describing the reform of Aurelian as being primarily politically motivated is not entirely fair, 
although political considerations probably did play a part in his decision. 
The revolt of the mint-workers in Rome also demands consideration, even if it is an-
other of those cases where the sources are poor and confused. Chronologically the revolt, 
which only appears in the Latin tradition, could have been in either 271 or 274 (in the latter 
case it would have been shortly before the monetary reform), and there is disagreement 
between Aurelius Victor and Eutropius about what the mint-workers had been doing: Victor 
states that “they had been filing off the coin marks”, while according to Eutropius “they had 
debased the coinage”.305 Eutropius’ vitiatis could also be read as tampering in a general way, 
which might indicate that it refers to the filing mentioned by Victor. But the extraordinarily 
low precious metal content in the coins honouring the consecration of Claudius II suggest 
that it is Eutropius who is closer to the truth, and as such Aurelian’s ruthless repression of 
the rebels is another sign of an interest in the state of the coins that goes beyond mere polit-
ical motivations.306 
In particular, one point that previous authors do not seem to have fully appreciated is 
that responses could differ between regions. We have already seen that scholars are aware 
of the mixed results of Aurelian’s reform across the empire and that De Blois has challenged 
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the validity of the Egyptian evidence for determining empire-wide inflation.307 But they do 
not take the point as far as they perhaps should have done: if the response to Aurelian’s re-
form could vary between total rejection in Gaul and a massive increase in prices in Egypt, 
there is no reason why the response to the debasement could not have varied from region 
to region as well. As such, I think that the two items discussed above do indicate that at least 
in Italy the debasement was reaching a point where it was getting out of control and needed 
sorting out. In that respect, the comment of Katsari that the exchange rate between gold 
and silver remained constant only for so long as emperors were not necessitated to tinker 
with the fineness of the gold coins, which did happen from the reign of Gallienus onwards, is 
also significant.308 Aurelian’s reform can therefore justifiably be called necessary for Italy, 
even if he brought economic disarray to other provinces by issuing an empire-wide reform, 
which he did for the aforementioned political reasons. 
While charting the consequences of Aurelian’s reform is hopelessly difficult, it at least 
seems reasonably clear that his system remained in use for the next twenty years (even if it 
also seems probable that inflation kept rising at least during Probus’ reign),309 and this brings 
us to the economic reforms from the tetrarchic era. The first of these came between 293 
and 296 when Diocletian radically overhauled the coinage system by introducing two new 
silver coins: the argenteus and the nummus. This reform had rather mixed results. It suc-
ceeded in replacing the old coinage by the new and bringing money to provinces where this 
had become scarce, but despite their strong fineness and robust appearance the new coins 
seemingly failed to win public confidence (possibly simply due to their newness), leading to 
even more inflation.310 From 293 we have a price of 300 drachmae per artabas of grain, a 
noticeable increase compared to the price from 276, but still far lower than the price of 1200 
that appears on a papyrus from either 304 or 305.311 
Diocletian’s response was two further measures enacted in 301, possibly intended to 
act in conjunction with each other. The first was an edict on currency that doubled the face 
value of all the coins.312 The second was the Edict on Maximum Prices, an extraordinarily 
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ambitious attempt to control the prices of goods at an empire-wide level. In its infamous 
preamble the strong moralising tone makes the exasperation of the tetrarchs with the eco-
nomic situation quite clear. 
“If any restraint might curb those inclinations with which raging greed burns without end – av-
arice which without care for humankind hurries towards its own growth and gain, not by year 
or month or day, but almost by hour and minute – or if society’s experience could with equa-
nimity tolerate the licence to rage freely by which in its misfortune it is harmed most seriously 
day after day, perhaps there would be left an opportunity for dissimulation and reticence, 
since the communal patience in spirit would alleviate the hateful cruelty and wretched situa-
tion. But because it is the single desire of untamed fury to give no account to the common 
need, and amongst wicked and extravagant people it is almost held a religion of greed, swell-
ing and rising with violent emotions, to hold off harming the fortune of all through necessity 
rather than its own will, and since those whom extremes of poverty brought to an appreciation 
of their most wretched circumstances can no longer close their eyes to it, as we looked on, we 
who are the parents of the human race decided that justice should intervene as arbiter, so that 
a solution which has for a long time been desired but humankind has been unable to provide 
could, by the remedy of our foresight, be brought, for the general moderation of all.”313 
In fact, the tetrarchs may, as Corcoran has argued, well have been among the main culprits 
themselves. For on their many journeys they would invariably have brought a large number 
of courtiers with them, and on some occasions also soldiers. And while the coin problems 
were probably the most important factor in causing the inflation, in individual cities the ef-
fect on prices of having so many extra people in and around a city should not be underesti-
mated. It is therefore interesting to see Lactantius claim that the price edict was promulgat-
ed because “by [Diocletian’s] various misdeeds he was causing an immense rise in prices”, 
although he could be referring to the consequences of the emperor’s earlier coin reforms.314 
 Lactantius derided the price edict as an embarrassing failure that was quickly re-
pealed because it only resulted in even greater inflation and much unrest. Modern scholars 
have scarcely been more complimentary (Potter in particular describes the edict as “an act 
of economic lunacy”), though it has been noted that Diocletian’s aims were perhaps more 
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modest than the grandiose language of the preamble suggests.315 Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that the edict was abandoned prior to Diocletian’s abdication in 305, and despite the 
large number of copies of the edict that have been found (it is, in fact, the best-preserved 
Latin inscription from the Greek east) there is no evidence of its enforcement in the west. 
Admittedly, this does not in and of itself prove that a measure with a clear universal intent 
was never implemented there, but considering how Constantius barely ever enforced the 
persecution edicts it is certainly possible that this measure suffered the same fate.316 
 It has already been noted that there would continue to be trouble with the coinage 
and inflation during our period (in 314 an artabas of wheat cost 8000, which means that 
prices had increased more than sixfold since 305, though the precise reason is not known)317 
and long after the end of the tetrarchic era, although Constantine’s solidus at least resulted 
in some measure of improvement. However, for Egypt it has been noted that, no matter 
how high the inflation got, the economy never ceased functioning, as its institutions were 
not as vulnerable to inflation as those of the modern economy.318 This was probably true for 
the rest of the empire as well. That being said, the rise in prices must have been a real prob-
lem in people’s day-to-day business. 
What does all this mean for our comparison? Overall, the coin problem was a long-
term issue: the large-scale debasement was limited to the crisis (although the internal strife 
from 307 to would result in some renewed debasement),319 but the inflation that was in 
some way or other related to it was especially prominent during the tetrarchy. That there is 
mostly continuity in this regard is not surprising, as economic history is as a rule a more long-
term matter than the military conflicts discussed in the previous chapter. It must also once 
again be admitted that the scarcity of data keeps any conclusion from being definitive.  
Nevertheless, two important points have emerged from all this. First, the tinkering 
with coins, which had managed to give the emperors enough economic breathing room to 
make it past the worst of the ‘crisis’, apparently had no serious consequences until about 
270, the point at which the military situation had, as previously seen, begun to improve con-
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siderably. Second, the fact that the impact of both Aurelian’s coinage reform and Diocle-
tian’s prices edict seems have differed sharply between regions suggests that this was the 
same with coin issues in general during both periods. This latter point is particularly im-
portant, and it leads us to a consideration of the economic relationship between the various 
Roman provinces. 
  
Outer and inner provinces 
Our starting point is the model of Hopkins, who proposed a divide between two kinds of 
provinces: on the one hand the rich internal provinces that produced taxes, and on the other 
hand the militarized provinces on the fringes of the empire and the central government in 
Italy that consumed taxes. Under Roman rule the former had to export their taxes to the 
latter, forcing the cultivators from the tax-producing areas to produce a surplus for purposes 
of export in order to maintain revenues, thus promoting trade. The demonetization of the 
late antique economy wrecked this model, leading to a permanent decline in trade.320 
 The trade aspect of Hopkins’ thesis has come under considerable criticism. Duncan-
Jones in particular has argued that the idea of increased trade through taxation is untenable, 
considering the relative lack of exchanged regional coins, the likelihood that the economy of 
the Principate was not all that monetized and the fact that Mediterranean trade had also 
been vigorous during Hellenistic times. In addition, after investigating the distribution pat-
tern of Roman lamps he concluded that the empire was not, in fact, a single integrated 
economy when it comes to trade.321 Nevertheless, Witschel has rightly noted that criticisms 
such as these need not invalidate the model altogether.322 For now, Hopkins’ division be-
tween provinces that created and provinces that consumed revenue demands consideration, 
as it shows that some provinces were far more important to the survival of the empire than 
others. 
 Back in the second chapter we saw that the effects of ‘barbarian’ invasions on the 
Latin part of the empire and Asia Minor differed strongly from province to province. But the 
provinces that were hit hardest – Germany, Noricum, the Balkan provinces – were border 
regions. Of the internal, revenue-producing provinces, only Greece and parts of Spain suf-
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fered some damage, while precisely the economically most important part of Gaul, the 
south, was not touched by the troubles afflicting the rest of that area.323 It is another matter 
with Syria, one of the critical tax provinces, as that had to bear the main brunt of the Sassa-
nid attacks in the 250’s and 260. However, we have also seen that recovery appears to have 
been reasonably fast.324 
 Whether the damage caused during the ‘crisis’ was still present during the tetrarchy 
cannot really be said. There is one piece of evidence that this was so: the Panegyric held be-
fore Constantine by an orator from Autun in 311 or 312, which seems to imply that his city 
has still not recovered from the third century ravages, particularly its sack by the forces of 
Victorinus in 270, with the speaker also hinting at a generally poor agricultural situation in 
Gaul. However, Witschel has rejected the idea of great poverty, as there is a tradition of cit-
ies overdramatizing their economic situations. The agricultural problems were real, but they 
were part of a long-term development that had its origin in the second century.325 But even 
if the situation was as dire as the orator claims, as most of the moneymaking provinces were 
not that disturbed by the ‘crisis’, there seems no reason why their revenues should not have 
been able to bring a measure of restoration to the provinces that were more badly afflicted. 
 However, we should also not forget that the central government did not have direct 
control over all its provinces during much of the period from 249 to 324. In the case of the 
Palmyrene Empire this meant the loss of some of the richest provinces. But, as we have pre-
viously seen, because Palmyra remained at least nominally loyal to Rome, other than the 
limited period of conflict that led to the reintegration of the east, this did not have any real 
impact on revenues.326 Britain and the northwest of Gaul both belonged to the areas that 
consumed revenue, so Carausius and Allectus are not relevant in this regard. 
 The Gallic Empire is another manner. While its core was formed by northern Gaul and 
the Germanic provinces, all of which were frontier areas, it also contained economically im-
portant regions like Gallia Narbonensis and the northern Spanish provinces. The loss of these 
provinces was economically probably a considerable blow to the economy of the central 
Empire. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that it was precisely these areas that returned 
to central rule during the period after the death of Postumus. Indeed, the economic im-
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portance of southern Gaul is perhaps the best explanation for the fact that the forces of 
Claudius II went no further than that area, and calling Claudius’ lack of support for the be-
sieged Autun “an act of appalling moral and political failure”327 ignores the possibility that 
Claudius was simply being pragmatic, as any other Roman emperor might have been. But 
perhaps most important is that Rome never lost control of Africa, ensuring the city and its 
empire of a steady supply of grain. Indeed, the loss of Africa in 439 was perhaps the event 
that sealed the fate of the Western empire more than any other.328 
 From the death of Constantius in 306 to the final defeat of Licinius in 324, it is diffi-
cult to say what ‘central authority’ actually was. Galerius was nominally the senior augustus, 
but it is evident that he always lacked the unchallenged seniority of Diocletian. After his 
death in 311 there was no superior authority at all, and while Constantine had clearly estab-
lished himself as senior augustus over Licinius after the end of their first war in 317, the em-
pire remained divided until 324. How did this affect the economic situation of the empire? 
We cannot know for certain; our only evidence for the degree of interaction between both 
halves comes from the spheres of law and government, from which we have indications that 
the empire’s civil servants could cooperate effectively even if their masters could not.329  
It is, however, questionable whether this was also the case while the empire really 
was split into rival blocks. We hear nothing of famines in areas controlled by a tetrarch that 
lacked an Africa or an Egypt, suggesting that there must at least have been some economic 
exchange, but we know very little about famines anyway.330 Overall, if the division between 
the Gallic and central Empires was economically disadvantageous, then there seems no rea-
son why the rivalry between the members of the post-Diocletianic college of emperors 
should not have been at least equally problematic, especially once that rivalry turned into 
outright war. 
 
The army: costs and complement 
That the army was an enormous drain on the Roman treasury seems beyond doubt. In the 
early third century the total number of soldiers – also including the praetorians and sailors - 
appears to have been about 400000; while this was actually a relatively small army to con-
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trol a stretch of territory as large as the Roman Empire, it was probably as large as it could 
be, as it already cost the state hundreds of millions of coins per year.331 Far from obvious, 
however, is how much of a cost it became during our two timeframes. 
 It is known that, after military pay had remained constant throughout the second 
century, it was doubled in 197 by Septimius Severus and further increased by half in 211/212 
by his son and successor Caracalla. It is also known that these pay increases resulted in a 
considerable strain upon the treasury. However, while Maximinus Thrax is said to have dou-
bled pay once again in 235, there is no way of knowing whether this was ever intended as a 
permanent measure.332 For the time of Diocletian our main source of information is an ex-
change of letters between Aurelius Isidorus, the procurator of the Thebaid (the southern half 
of Egypt) and several of his subordinates (whom he often berates for their incompetence 
and even outright obstructiveness) that occasionally includes orders to arrange for the pay 
of local forces. This data, however, is difficult to interpret: Jones, the first scholar to investi-
gate that part of the papyrus, concluded that pay was just about the same as it had been 
after the reform of Caracalla, but Duncan-Jones argued that, when factoring in the payments 
in kind reported in the papyrus and another collection of letters written by an official from 
the Thebaid, the figures confirm an additional doubling of pay, whether under Maximinus or 
a later emperor.333 
 Compounding the problem is the fact that the size of the army in the later third and 
early fourth century is utterly obscure. It seems logical that the various defeats suffered by 
the third-century army would have decreased its numbers. And indeed, this view is 
strengthened by the fact that at several points during the ‘crisis’ it was seemingly necessary 
for a local militia to take action where the regular army had failed. We have already talked 
about Uranius Antoninus and the Palmyrene forces, but the rallying speech to the Athenians 
preserved by Dexippus also appears to be addressed to a militia, Zosimus reports a panicky 
senate gathering civilian volunteers into a militia in response to the ‘barbarian’ incursion into 
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Italy of 259/260, and the Ausburg inscription mentions a militia that helped the regular forc-
es repulse this attack.334  
Obviously, the existence of these militias shows yet again that there was a certain 
degree of instability, and certainly a lack of trained manpower. But from a purely economic 
viewpoint, this may arguably have been an advantage: a soldier that died in battle needed 
no retirement donative,335 and the militias, which seem to have been reasonably effective 
when they were used, were not under the employ of the state and thus received no salary 
whatsoever. In a time when the economic situation made the government debase the coin-
age to its absolute limit, this would have been most welcome. 
 For the fourth century there are at least a few indications of the size of the army, but 
these are from late sources and not really reliable. Thus, Zosimus gives figures for the forces 
of Constantine and Licinius during their wars, but these figures suggest that the size of the 
army had swollen to 500000 or even 600000. 336 Nevertheless, historians have traditionally 
tended to assume that there was at least a major increase even if the numbers themselves 
are not precisely accurate. However, when MacMullen surveyed the available evidence in his 
1980 article on the subject he concluded that the evidence is so doubtful that it is impossible 
to postulate anything beyond a minor increase in size, and Potter, focussing on the discrep-
ancy between paper strength and actual strength, has gone so far as to argue that the 
fourth-century army was either of about the same size as its earlier counterpart or even 
somewhat smaller.337 
 A final complicating matter is the role of inflation. We have already seen that the one 
thing that we can be certain about in this regard is that prices had greatly risen by 301, when 
Diocletian issued the Edict of Maximum Prices. In fact, in the preamble it is claimed that 
prices are now so high that soldiers sometimes lose all their pay in a single transaction. This 
has led scholars to argue that, despite their comparatively high wages, soldiers were quite 
poorly off; indeed, while the views of Jones and Duncan-Jones on the pay rate under Diocle-
tian differ strongly, they do agree that prices were so high that soldiers had little chance to 
                                                          
334 Dexippus F24; Zos. 1.37.2; AE (1993) 1231 l.6 (militibus); see also Potter (2004) 250-251. 
335 P. Herz, ‘Finances and Costs of the Roman Army’ in: P. Erdkamp ed., A Companion to the Roman Army (Mal-
den 2007), 306-322, 317. 
336 See n.245, also for the far more conservative numbers of the Origo. 
337 R. MacMullen, ‘How big was the Roman army?’ Klio 62 (1980) 451-460; Potter (2004) 454-457. For the tradi-
tional view, see Jones (1964) 2: 679-686; and, more recently, Treadgold (1995) 43-59. 
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profit from their high salaries.338 But this presents another conundrum: if the well-paid sol-
diers could not pay for basic goods, how did civilians manage? It is therefore likely that the 
inflation was not quite as dramatic as the preamble indicates. 
 The inflation may also account for the fact that military pay had risen so much from 
the reform of Severus onwards: because goods had become more expensive, salaries had to 
be adjusted accordingly to prevent the soldiers from starving. That is, after all, what the 
Edict on Maximum Prices proclaims. However, with regard to the raise by Severus it is actu-
ally quite possible that the state had already compensated the soldiers by providing them 
with equipment that they previously had to buy at their own expense, which means that his 
pay raise was done for political reasons only. In the case of Caracalla and Maximinus this is 
not even in doubt.339 But was the inflation also mitigated by government support in the te-
trarchic era? We cannot say. However, it seems unlikely that pay raises could keep up with 
the increasing prices indefinitely, especially not when the prices rose as fast as they did from 
276 onwards. 
 What are we to make of all this? Little, as there is simply not enough known about 
the fourth-century economy. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that army pay rates had risen 
to truly astronomical rates at this point, and this might perhaps be the best explanation for 
the fact that one of the foremost contemporary ancient historians can argue that there was 
actually a minor decrease in army size: the state could simply not afford more soldiers. The 
issue of army pay is therefore similar to the debasement problem in the sense that it was 
during the tetrarchy that its consequences were really being felt, while the losses of man-
power during the ‘crisis’ may actually have had positive effects on the army budget. 
 
Taking on the taxman 
Up until now we have seen that as far as the economy goes both periods were troubled, and 
in the case of the coinage debasement and army pay there is good reason to suppose that 
the full effect of measures taken during or before the ‘crisis’ was only felt during the tetrar-
chic period. Previous historians have certainly not been blind to the monetary crises faced by 
the tetrarchs. However, they have generally directed most of their attention at individual 
                                                          
338 Edictum De Pretiis Rerum Venalium (= Rees (2004) no. 19) pr. 14; Jones (1964) 2: 623; Duncan-Jones (1990) 
106. 
339 Potter (2004) 130-136. 
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measures, especially the Edict on Maximum Prices, without looking at the economic situa-
tion as a whole. The lack of information on economic matters makes this understandable, 
but this only makes it all the more strange that the debasement of the coinage has been so 
eagerly been taken for a sign of ‘crisis’, while Diocletian, for all his faults in his economic pol-
icies, has been praised for never debasing his reformed coins. That the other emperors 
would regularly debase their coinage in the period of turmoil that followed Diocletian’s abdi-
cation has only been noted and not really been elaborated upon.340 We will end this chapter 
by looking at taxation reforms, as these provide another illustration of that tendency. 
 The tax system of the Principate was problematic. The state expected its cities to pay 
as much as they could reasonably be expected to, but this only stimulated cities to claim that 
their income was lower than it actually was. Moreover, taxes fell the heaviest on those who 
could least afford it, the urban poor and common peasants. The small group of senators and 
equestrians that controlled the overwhelming majority of wealth had to pay only relatively 
minor amounts of taxes, and there was little that the government could do about it other 
than outright confiscations, as was supposedly done by Aurelian, who “fell upon the rich like 
a torrent”.341 This inherently inefficient tax structure may well have been one of the deeper 
causes of at least part of the third-century ‘crisis’, as it left emperors with not enough money 
to maintain an army large enough to keep Rome’s enemies at bay.342 
 By contrast, the tax reforms of the tetrarchs have been seen as one of their greatest 
administrative achievements, even by historians who deplore their monetary policies. 
Through the initiation of censuses Diocletian ensured that every taxpayer was now assessed 
separately, which went a long way towards dealing with the inequality issue. In addition, the 
right of tax-exemption for Italy, the ius Italicum, was also abolished. Moreover, the precise 
delineation that Diocletian drew between the iugum (a land-tax generally paid in money) 
and the caput (a head-tax now mostly paid in kind), and the institution of the capitatio (a 
measure that regularized the previously random seizures of property) would prove effective 
in dealing with the two main economic problems. The payments in kind negated the poor 
quality of the coins and the institutionalisation of taxes levied on the wealthy went a long 
                                                          
340 See e.g. Harl (1996) 158-159. 
341 Amm. Marc. 30.8.8 (Loeb translation): torrentis ritu ferebatur in divites. However, cf. Watson (1999) 162 and 
Potter (2004) 270, who argue that Aurelian was far less aggressive than Ammianus makes him out to have 
been. 
342 MacMullen (1976) 129-137; Potter (1990) 7-11. 
96 
 
way towards dealing with the inefficiency of the taxation system. While the new system was 
by no means perfect, Diocletian’s measures can nonetheless be seen as a success: “together 
they constituted a workable plan for survival”.343 
 However, it should be noted that ancient comments on the new system were less 
generous. That Lactantius should write that “with farmers’ resources exhausted by the 
enormous size of the requisitions, fields became deserted and cultivated land was turned 
into forest” is perhaps unsurprising.344 But we should also not forget the testimony of Aure-
lius Victor, who claims that the system initially functioned judiciously, but that it had become 
subject to abuse by the 350’s, when Constantius II reigned. Ammianus, while not saying any-
thing about the tetrarchic era, lodges a similar complaint, although his hostility towards Con-
stantius makes his comment problematic.345 
 And if Victor and Ammianus only show the long-term effects, there is also evidence 
for immediate negative consequences. As part of their effort to determine who should taxed 
for what, the tetrarchs had initiated a census for Egypt (we cannot know whether there was 
a concurrent census for the rest of the empire).346 There survives a letter from the prefect of 
Egypt in which he explains the necessity of the census to the populace. It states that the em-
perors, “having learned that the levies of the public taxes were being made capriciously so 
that some persons were let of lightly while others were overburdened, decided in the inter-
est of their provincials to root out this most evil and ruinous practice and to issue a salutary 
rule to which the taxes would have to conform”.347 
Both Jones and MacMullen have cited this document with approval, praising its egali-
tarian intent.348 But we have previously seen that this precise document was probably the 
immediate cause for the revolt of Domitius Domitianus, as the Egyptian populace resorted to 
a rather radical form of tax evasion. And the fact that most of our documents where Domi-
tianus is listed as emperor deal with everyday issues shows that the common people, who 
                                                          
343 MacMullen (1976) 137-152, especially 152 for the quote; see also Jones (1964) 1: 61-67; Williams (1985) 
123-125; Rees (2004) 38-40 is more neutral. 
344 Lact., DMP 7.3 (trans. Creed): ut enormitate indictionum consumptis viribus colonorum desererentur agri et 
culturae verterentur in silvam. 
345 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.31-32; Amm. Marc. 21.16.17. 
346 Barnes (1982) 230-231. 
347 P. Cairo. Isid. 1 l.3-6 (ὡς ἔτυχεν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῶν δημοσίων εἰσφορῶν γίγνεσθαι ὥς τινας μὲν κου[φ]ίζεσθ[α]ι 
ἄλλους δὲ βαρῖσθαι, τὴν κακίστην ταύτην καὶ ὀλέθριον συνήθειαν ἐκκόψαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ [συμ]φέροντος τῶν ἑαυτῶν 
ἐπαρχειωτῶν τύπον τε σωτήριον δοῦναι καθʼ ὃν δέοι τὰς εἰ[σφο]ρὰς γίγνεσθαι κατηξίωσαν). 
348 Jones (1964) 1: 61-62; MacMullen (1976) 151. 
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could be expected to have been the main beneficiaries of the new tax policy, supported the 
rebellion as well.349 Nor was this the only measure that encountered stiff resistance.  
Lactantius devotes an entire paragraph to Galerius’ decision to tax all the provinces 
and cities, even of Italy and Rome, sketching a gloomy picture of poverty and desolation as a 
consequence of the census undertaken in preparation for the taxation. There is undoubtedly 
a lot of overdramatizing in this paragraph; particularly the claim that Galerius was avenging 
the taxes levied upon his native Dacia when the Romans conquered it in 106 is highly ques-
tionable. Nevertheless, that Lactantius went as far as he did, does show how much of a 
shock the levying of taxes from Rome and Italy was, and lends credit to Lactantius’ claim a 
little further into his text that dissatisfaction with Galerius’ tax measures was the main rea-
son for the civilian populace of Italy to support Maxentius when he usurped, even if, as 
Leadbetter has argued, the measures were not as foolhardy as Lactantius makes them out to 
have been.350 In addition, Licinius may also have provoked hostilities by his rash economic 
measures in the early 320’s in preparation for his second war with Constantine.351 Eventually 
the reforms were pushed through: Victor confirms this for Italy, and Eutropius states that 
Egypt was greatly reorganised after the revolt had been crushed, although the previously 
discussed letters from Panopolis show that the new tax system was still being resisted.352 
Nevertheless, the above shows that in many cases economic reforms were not easily ac-
cepted. 
 
Despite the repeatedly mentioned lack of data, then, this chapter has a clear theme: there 
were several economic difficulties that arose during or shortly before the ‘crisis’, but these 
were either of no great consequence or very difficult to fix once they got out of hand. Over-
all, and as far as our scarce sources allow us to be sure, from an economic point of view 
there is much continuity between ‘crisis’ and tetrarchy. If this seems an unoriginal conclu-
sion, then it must be emphasised again that most other scholars seem insufficiently aware of 
this, and instead choose to emphasise both the economic troubles of the ‘crisis’ and the 
supposed recovery in that sphere under tetrarchy. 
  
                                                          
349 See n.194, 197 above. 
350 Lact., DMP 23, 26.2; Leadbetter (2009) 170-176. 
351 Barnes (1981) 69-70. 
352 Aur. Vict., De Caes. 39.31-32; Eutr., Brev. 9.23; P. Panop. Beatty 2 l.145-152. 
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Conclusion 
 
Over the previous 95 pages we have been comparing the third century ‘crisis’ (249-284) and 
the tetrarchic era (284-324). We started out by looking at the available sources (which are 
poor especially for the first period) and at what previous historians have written about these 
two periods. This showed that, despite the recent attacks on the idea of the third century as 
a time of ‘crisis’, there remains agreement that the tetrarchic era was generally an im-
provement over the troubled period that preceded it. This theme has also recurred through-
out the thematic chapters: the general lack of interest in foreign warfare during the tetrar-
chy, the insistence that the college of emperors was, despite its many problems, still an im-
provement over the many usurpations of the ‘crisis’, and the more detached way in which 
the tetrarchic economy is described as opposed to the apocalyptic and occasionally even 
moralizing treatments of its third-century counterpart (individual tetrarchic measures like 
the price edict notwithstanding). By looking back at the previous chapters we can now see 
that, by and large, this is to distort the history of both these periods. 
 
1. In the case of foreign warfare, it is mostly a question of nuance. As far as the ‘crisis’ is 
concerned, we have seen that some surviving fragments of Dexippus give us a good reason 
to think that ‘barbarians’ had little success taking cities even if they could inflict serious de-
feats on Roman armies in the field. The Sassanid Persians launched devastating incursions 
deep into Roman territory on two occasions, but the Romans recovered rapidly both times. 
And the Sassanids seem to have exhausted their resources during these two attacks, as they 
remained remarkably quiet between 261 and 292. Areas like northwestern Africa, Egypt and 
the Arabian provinces appear to have been reasonably tranquil during both periods. 
With regard to the tetrarchy, the fact that we hear so little about attacks by external 
enemies is at least partially due to the lack of interest in these matters of our prime inform-
ant Lactantius and the good fortune (for the Romans) that both the ‘barbarians’ and the Per-
sians entered a period of internal strife. In fact, however, there are some scattered indica-
tions of military conflict with external enemies during this timeframe.  
This nuancing should not be taken too far: the tetrarchic era never witnessed the 
kind of military disasters against foreign foes that did occur occasionally during the ‘crisis’. 
But things were not as black and white as most studies have made them out to have been. 
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2. Internal wars are another matter entirely. Perhaps the most notorious aspect of the ‘crisis’ is 
its multitude of pretenders, and the fact that between about 260 and 272 two-thirds of the 
empire were not under the direct control of the central government. While there were still a 
few usurpations under the tetrarchy, and the era experienced its own secession with the 
empire of Carausius and Allectus, this does not really compare to what happened during the 
‘crisis’. The tetrarchic era also lacked the charismatic bandit chiefs known from the ‘crisis’, 
like Mariades and Lydius, although the Bagaudae and their leaders Aelius and Amandus were 
active during the time of transition from ‘crisis’ to tetrarchy. 
But in matters like the role of the army in causing problems, there was continuity be-
tween both periods. Also, pretenders were less numerous during the ‘crisis’ than sources like 
the Historia Augusta would have us believe, their impact was generally limited to a single 
battle, after which they would either be emperor or dead. Indeed, in various cases they were 
killed by their own men before it could even come to a battle. We have also seen that the 
long-term effects of the secessionist empires were not that major. By contrast, the existence 
of a college of rivalling emperors would prove to be disastrous in the long run. The protract-
ed wars between 307 and 324 were already bad enough, but the rivalry between the various 
emperors would continue to haunt the empire, with the crushing Roman defeat at Adriano-
ple in 378 being the most notable consequence. 
In short, despite the consensus among historians that the most significant way in 
which the tetrarchy improved on the ‘crisis’ was in the sphere of internal disorder, we have 
seen that it was actually the other way around: the many usurpations that have made the 
‘crisis’ infamous actually amounted to little in most cases, while the wars between emperors 
that became common from the tetrarchic era onwards were both protracted ad destructive. 
 
3. A third problem faced by the empire during the ‘crisis’ was the rapid debasement of the 
coinage. The very negative view of most older writers has mostly been replaced by an alter-
native perspective that argues that its consequences should not be exaggerated and that 
there were actually some beneficial effects as well. We have, however, seen that there is 
good reason for thinking that the debasement was getting out of hand at least in Italy. But 
reforms undertaken to save the situation did not work and led to skyrocketing inflation; te-
trarchic measures like the Edict on Maximum Prices only seem to have made things worse. 
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The general picture that emerges is mostly one of continuity, although the real ef-
fects of the monetary policies of succeeding emperors were seemingly not really felt until 
the worst of the ‘crisis’ was over, and attempts at repairing the damage backfired. In fact, 
this also seems to have been the case with another important aspect of the Roman econo-
my: the costs of the army. Investigating the difference between outer and inner provinces 
suggests continuity alone. Finally, our look at attempts to reform the tax system indicated 
that economic change was difficult to push through, further supporting the idea that the 
tetrarchic era meant no end to the economic ‘crisis’. 
So once again, the conventional dichotomy between ‘crisis’ and recovery does not fit. 
Instead, we see a large degree of continuity, with economic problems being virtually impos-
sible to solve once they arose. In many cases the problems only got worse as time went on. 
 
The results are clear: on only one of the three subjects was the tetrarchic era a clear im-
provement on the ‘crisis’, and on another point it only got worse from there on, while on the 
third item results were neutral at best. That does not mean that we should reject the idea of 
a ‘crisis’ altogether: we have seen time and again that much of the period between 249 and 
284 was indeed a difficult time for the empire. However, it was not all bad all the time. 
While the proliferation of military problems during the ‘crisis’ is generally still taken for 
granted, these were mainly, though not exclusively, limited to short periods within the 
timespan from 249 to about 270, while the economic problems only seem to have become 
serious from then on. But though we need not and cannot reject all idea of ‘crisis’, it has, I 
think, become clear that the still conventional view of the tetrarchic area as a time of recov-
ery needs serious adjusting. 
In the final analysis, then, I heartily agree with those scholars listed in the introduc-
tion who either divide the period from 249 to 324 into smaller units or turn it into one big 
timeframe altogether, rather than maintaining the boundary of 284.353 And other than the 
thorough re-evaluation of the tetrarchic era argued for above, it may also be suggested to 
perform a similar analysis on other periods of supposed ‘crisis’ and ‘recovery’, as that could 
reveal similar tendencies towards a dichotomous way of thinking that does not account for 
processes of change and continuity that reveal a rather different picture. 
                                                          
353 For the former option, see Potter (2004); for the latter option, see Christol (1997). 
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Appendix: Roman emperors, 249-324354 
 
Emperors during the ‘crisis’355 
Emperor   Reign   Emperor   Reign  
Philip Arabs   244-249  Aurelian   270-275 
Decius    249-251  Tacitus    275-276 
Trebonianus Gallus  251-253  Florian    276  
Aemilian   253   Probus    276-282 
Valerian   253-260  Carus    282-283 
Gallienus   260-268  Numerian   283-284 
Claudius II   268-270  Carinus   283-285 
Quintillus   270 
 
Tetrarchic emperors356 
Diocletian   284-305  Maximinus Daja  305-312 
Maximian   285-305  Constantine   306-337 
Constantius   293-306  Maxentius   306-312 
Galerius   293-311  Licinius   308-324 
Severus   305-307 
 
 
  
                                                          
354 For the full titulature of these emperors and a brief overview of their careers, see Kienast (1990). 
355 This list includes all the men who were acknowledged as augustus in Rome at one point or other during this 
timeframe. ‘Reign’ does not include periods in which men who would later become augusti were caesares. 
356 This includes all the men who were at one point or other part of the ‘college of emperors’. Maxentius is also 
included, as he is simply too important to ignore; moreover, he controlled Rome and was initially allied with his 
father Maximian, who was a former tetrarch himself. The reigns given do include tenures as caesares in this 
case for the same reason as their exclusion from the ‘crisis’ list: to keep it intelligible. 
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